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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between the private enforcement of EU competition 
law and forum shopping with a particular focus on cross-border collective end-consumer 
redress. There is no coherent framework across the EU for these types of cases. This lack 
of uniformity has the potential to create recourse to different national courts. Lawyers may 
engage in forum shopping when filing lawsuits on behalf of the victims of mass torts. Such 
practices can provide Member States with incentives to amend their laws to attract 
collective proceedings and create competition between national judicial systems.  
 
However, forum shopping is not the only concern. There appears to be a paucity of cross-
border collective claims. This is coupled with an apparent lack of motivation for end-
consumers to seek a remedy, particularly if the only choice is to litigate outside their own 
legal regime. Addressing this situation is vital given that end-consumers regularly suffer 
harm in the form of higher prices, lower output, reduced quality and limited innovation as 
a result of antitrust infringements but they are rarely compensated due to legal and 
practical obstacles. To each end-consumer the harm may indeed be de minimis. However, 
the aggregate harm can amount to a considerable sum. In the absence of effective redress 
procedures, infringing undertakings retain the spoils of their unlawful conduct.  
 
Against this background, this thesis examines the extent to which the conflicts-of-laws 
rules encourage forum shopping and considers the appropriate forum and the appropriate 
procedural measures that need to be adopted in order to facilitate effective and equal access 
to justice for end-consumer victims of EU competition law violations.   
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INTRODUCTION  
 
0.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between the private enforcement of EU competition 
law and forum shopping with a particular focus on cross-border collective end-consumer 
redress. Forum shopping refers to the practice of litigants bringing their action to the court 
that is considered to be the most convenient for their action, i.e. where they will be most 
likely to obtain a favourable judgment. 1 
 
This is a topic of importance because there is no coherent framework for cross-border 
collective redress cases in Europe.  This has also been a major policy concern for the 
European Commission for some time.  Currently, the EU comprises a mosaic of national 
legal systems. There are significant differences in the approaches of Member States 
towards collective redress. Such mechanisms exist in most, but not all, Member States. 
There has been much debate following the Commission’s Recommendation on collective 
redress,2 which invites Member States to legislate for collective redress. There is no 
obligation for the Member States to implement such a procedural tool. The soft nature of 
this instrument, and the fact that the issue of collective redress is not addressed by the new 
                                                                
1 Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A, Economic an Scientific Policy, Collective 
redress in antitrust, 7, available at:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2012/475120/IPOL-
ECON_ET(2012)475120_EN.pdf (accessed 31.05.2016); See also Shearman & Sterling, case comment: 
jurisdiction – forum shopping, (2016) 31(5) J.I.B.L.R. N72; anon., Shopping for justice, (1999) 13(9) Lawyer 
22; A. Waters, Forum shopping in fraud actions following Owusu v Jackson, (2010) 25(6) B.J.I.B. & F.L. 
359; R. King and S. Colbran, Forum shopping, (2005) 149(18) S.J. 531; F. Ferrari, Forum shopping despite 
international uniform contract law conventions, (2002) 51(3) I.C.L.Q. 689; D. Sandy, The importance of 
early forum shopping, (2005) 125(Mar) Supp (Disputes 2005) I.H.L 46; J.F. Campsie, Why shopping around 
for forum is a sensible move, (2008) L.L.I.D. 8, 7; B. Barton, England and Wales: effective tactics, (1998) 
Jul/Aug Supp. I.C. Lit. 153. 
2 Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress 
mechanism in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law OJ L 201 
26.7.2013, 60. 
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Directive on Actions for Damages,3 must be regarded as a strong indication that the EU 
legislator believes that Member States are better placed to devise their own cross-collective 
redress mechanisms.4 Despite the attempt at establishing common principles, the European 
legislature thus seems to accept a heterogeneous landscape of collective redress in Europe. 
Some argue that the Commission has missed the opportunity to provide rules on 
international jurisdiction, recognition and the applicable law particularly designed for 
cross-border mass litigation and that, as a consequence, forum shopping has the potential 
to become even more important for claimants in mass damages claims.5  
 
This diversity has the potential to engage multiple judicial forums in cases arising out of 
common facts and legal questions. The lack of uniformity of a legal solution causes 
uncertainty in the choice-of-law and jurisdictional rules, and has the potential to create a 
rush to different national courts. 6 The opportunity to file lawsuits in different fora makes 
the choice of venue a matter of business tactics.7 Lawyers may engage in forum shopping 
when filing lawsuits or entering into settlements on behalf of the victims of mass torts. 8 
This, in turn can provide Member States with incentives to amend their laws to attract 
collective proceedings and create competition between national judicial systems. For 
example, it is stated that the Amsterdam Court of Appeal has been performing the role of 
the most favourable forum for the enforcement of foreign collective action judgments in 
                                                                
3 Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements 
of competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union OJ 349 5.12.2014 1. 
4 M. Danov, Cross-border competition cases: level playing for undertakings and redress for consumers, 
(2014) 35(10) E.C.L.R. 487, 494. 
5 A. Stadler, The Commission’s Recommendation on common principles of collective redress and private 
international law issues, NiPR 2013 Afl. 4. 483. 
6 D-G for Internal Policies (supra n.1), 43. 
7 L. Gorywoda, The emerging EU legal regime for collective redress, in A. Nuyts, N.E. Hatzimihail, W. de 
Gruyter, Cross-border class actions: The European Way (2013), 188. 
8 A. Stadler, Mass damages in Europe – allocation of jurisdiction – cross-border multidistrict litigation, in 
W.H. van Boom, G. Wagner, W. de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG, Mass torts in Europe: Cases and reflections 
(2014), 200. 
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the EU. 9 Contrast the situation with Germany which has faced political resistance to the 
implementation of new instruments.10 
 
There are also other factors which make this an important topic. There are growing 
concerns that the diversity of collective redress procedures across the EU contributes to a 
paucity of claims. Moreover, there appears to be a lack of motivation for end-consumers to 
seek a remedy, particularly if they have to seek redress outside of their own legal regime. 
Addressing this situation is vital given that end-consumers regularly suffer harm in the 
form of higher prices, lower output, reduced quality and limited innovation as a result of 
antitrust infringements but they are rarely compensated due to legal and practical 
obstacles.11 Collective redress is a mechanism that may accomplish the termination or 
prevention of unlawful business practices which affect a multitude of claimants or the 
compensation for the harm caused by such illegal practices.12 Efficient and effective 
schemes for collective actions are considered as a vital component of a well-functioning 
judicial system. In the area of antitrust where illegal conduct may cause scattered and low-
value damage to a multitude of individuals, and where the individual cost for redress might 
not be proportionate to the damage suffered, this holds true all the more.13 
 
  
                                                                
9 See J. Kortmann and M. Bredenoord-Spoek, The Netherlands: a ‘hotspot for class actions?’ (2011) 4(1) 
G.C.L.R. 13; See also Court of Appeal Amsterdam 1.6.2006, LJN: AX 6440 (DES); 25.01.2007, LJN: AZ 
7033, NIPR 2007, 208 (Dexia); 29.4.2009, LJN: BI 2717 (Vie d’Or); 29.5.2009, LJN: BI 5744, NIPR 2010, 
71 (Shell); 15.7.2009, LJN: BJ 2691, NIPR 2010, 458 (Vedior); 12.11.2010, LJN: BO3908, NIPR 2011, 85 
and 17.1.2012, LJN: BV1026 (Converium). 
10 Although see A. Stadler, Developments in collective redress: What’s new in the ‘new German KapMuG,’ 
(2013) 24(6) E.B.L.R. 731. 
11 D-G for Internal Policies (supra n.1), 1. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 11. 
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0.2 Research Questions  
 
Two main research questions have been identified. First, to what extent do the conflicts-of-
laws encourage forum shopping; second, what is the appropriate forum and what are the 
procedural measures that need to be adopted in order to facilitate effective and equal access 
to justice for victims of EU competition law violations?  
 
0.3 Methodology 
 
This thesis provides a critical analysis of the EU rules on jurisdiction and the applicable 
law. In undertaking this research, a mixture of primary and secondary sources has been 
considered. This thesis includes reference to statutory materials, case law, standard 
textbook and reference books, legal periodicals, parliamentary debates and government 
reports. Moreover, this thesis compares the EU with the jurisprudence and legal doctrines 
of the EU Member States and US. The US in particular has a well-recognised private 
enforcement regime and collective redress mechanism. This type of approach is beneficial 
where modification and amendment to EU cross-border end-consumer redress is required. 
 
0.4 Structure 
 
This thesis answers the research questions over six chapters (excluding the introduction 
and conclusion). The first chapter provides an overview of the current system of end-
consumer cross-border redress in EU competition law. It provides definitions of the 
relevant terminology. It describes the potential for forum shopping given the diversity of 
EU Member States’ collective procedures. This chapter also considers the US as the 
pioneer of collective redress and its culture of private antitrust enforcement, emphasising 
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the EU’s rejection of the US’ invasive and far-reaching punitive measures. The second 
chapter addresses the first research question. It assesses the current private international 
law rules on jurisdiction and the applicable law relevant to cross-border collective redress 
(with particular reference to EU competition law). Their relationship with forum shopping 
shall be analysed. The following chapters address the second research question. This 
begins by considering the role of alternative dispute resolution, namely class arbitration, to 
resolve cross-border collective claims flowing from a breach of competition law. The 
experience in the US shall be drawn upon to assess whether such an approach is suitable 
for a European setting. The analysis then embarks upon an evaluation of the attitudes of 
end-consumers towards competition law violations. This is followed by a discussion of 
what can be learned from this information in order to make cross-border collective redress 
more effective from an end-consumer perspective. The penultimate chapter evaluates the 
interface between public and private enforcement.  This chapter discusses whether methods 
of public enforcement (such as fines, settlements and commitment decisions) should play a 
role in facilitating the redress of victims who have suffered from wide-spread 
anticompetitive harm. The final chapter considers the ultimate remedy to the problems 
faced by the current heterogeneous system of collective redress by concentrating 
proceedings in a centralised EU competition court.
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CHAPTER 1 BACKGROUND 
 
1.0 The definition of forum shopping 
 
The concept of forum shopping comes from the notion that the ‘[t]he plaintiff usually 
shops in the forum where he is most familiar or in which he gains the greatest procedural 
advantage or puts the defendant to the greatest procedural disadvantage.’1  
 
It has developed from the lack of uniformity throughout the world’s legal systems, in terms 
of internal laws, choice-of-law and procedural rules developed by different countries to 
facilitate the enforcement of those laws.2Lack of uniformity in any one of these three areas 
may vary the legal result in any given situation according to the forum in which litigation 
takes place. Difference in forum and legal approach may convert an unpromising case into 
an eminently winnable one3 or at least one wherein the certainty of an opponent’s victory 
is considerably diminished, paving the way for settlement where one was either not 
feasible prior to the jurisdictional battle or on far better terms for the jurisdictional victor. 
Once a state or a nation produces a law, people and firms connected with the polity must 
obey the law or suffer the consequences. But individuals and undertakings are increasingly 
given another choice, i.e. to move beyond the law’s reach. This has become more common 
with the dawn of transnational litigation.4Litigation over where to litigate has increased 
dramatically in recent decades.5 One commentator has observed that ‘in a world where 
daily transactions routinely involve multiple countries, litigants are increasingly likely to 
                                                                
1 L. Collins, Contractual obligations: The EEC Preliminary Draft Convention on Private International Law, 
(1976) 25 I.C.L.Q. 35, 36. 
2 A.S. Bell, Forum shopping and venue in transnational litigation, (2003, (OUP)), 25. 
3 Ibid., 47. 
4 L.E Ribstein and E. O’Hara., The law market, (Oxford Scholarship Online, (2009)), 3. 
5 A.S. Bell (supra n.2), vii. 
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find themselves embroiled in simultaneous contests in several theatres.’6 Lord Goff has 
rather pertinently remarked in Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel7 that the world ‘is a jungle of 
separate, broadly-based jurisdictions’.8 
 
Forum shopping is a controversial issue.9 Some embrace the concept. Others strongly 
condemn it. ‘Like cholesterol and trolls, forum shopping can be good, and forum shopping 
can be bad.’10 Debra Lyn Bassett11 states that: 
 
‘One of the more interesting contradictions in law is the common description of litigation 
as a ‘game’ while simultaneously decrying ‘game playing’ in the litigation process. 
Litigation involves strategic choice, as game theory illustrates. One of those strategic 
choices includes the plaintiff’s initial selection of the forum, which the defendant may 
attempt to counter through transfer strategies of its own. Criticising and trivialising forum 
selection through the label of forum shopping misapprehends the forum game by treating 
forum selection as a parlor trick – as unfair and abusive – rather than as a lawful, 
authorised strategy. Forum shopping is not a form of ‘cheating’ by those who refuse to 
play by the rules. Playing by the rules includes the ability of plaintiff’s counsel to select – 
and the ability of defendant’s counsel to attempt to counter – the set of rules by which the 
litigation ‘game’ will be played.’12 
 
                                                                
6 L.E. Teitz, Taking multiple bites of the apple: A proposal to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction and multiple 
proceedings, (1992) 26 Int’l Law 21, 22.  
7 Airbus Industrie G.I.E. v Patel and Others [1999] 1 A.C. 119. 
8 Ibid., at 132. 
9 A.G. Slater, Forum non conveniens: A view from the shop floor, (1988) 104 L.Q.R. 554, 561. 
10 R. Maloy, Forum shopping? What’s wrong with that? (2005) 24(1) Quinnipiac L. Rev 25. 
11 Professor of Law at Southwestern Law School. 
12 D.L. Bassett, The forum game, (2006) 84 N.C.L. Rev. 333, 344; In 1973, Lord Denning MR refused to 
disapprove of forum shopping in England since ‘it is a good place to shop in, both for quality of goods and 
the speed of service.’ See The Atlantic Star [1973] Q.B. 364, 382; R. Schuz, Controlling forum-shopping: 
The impact of MacShannon v Rockware Glass Ltd, (1986) 35 I.C.L.Q. 374, 375. 
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Bassett continues by arguing that: ‘The ethical rules require lawyers to represent clients to 
the best of their ability, and selecting the forum most favourable to the client’s claim is an 
integral part of vigorous and effective representation. Indeed, the failure to forum shop 
would, in most cases, constitute malpractice.’13 
 
Others are of the opinion that forum shopping is fundamentally malevolent and that it is 
solely concerned with the unfair exploitation of different legal systems. It describes the 
scenario of ‘a plaintiff by-passing his natural forum and bringing his action in some alien 
forum which would give him relief or benefits which would not be available to him in his 
natural forum.’14‘As a rule, counsel, judges and academics employ the term ‘forum 
shopping’ to reproach a litigant who, in their opinion, unfairly exploits jurisdictional or 
venue rules to affect the outcome of a lawsuit.’15 The UK House of Lords has on several 
occasions expressed the need to combat forum shopping.16 
 
1.1 The relationship between forum shopping and the private enforcement of EU 
competition law 
 
An area where forum shopping has the potential to arise is within the private enforcement 
of EU competition law. Central to the objective of EU competition policy is that anyone 
within the EU who has suffered loss as a result of anticompetitive conduct has the right to 
                                                                
13 D.L. Bassett (supra n.12), 344. 
14 Boys v Chaplin [1971] A.C. 356 at 401 per Lord Pearson; See also J. Fawcett, Forum shopping? Some 
questions answered, (1984) 35 Northern Ireland Law Quarterly 141. 
15 F. K. Juenger, Forum shopping, domestic and international, (1989) 63 Tul. L. Rev. 553, 553. 
16 Boys v. Chaplin (supra n.14); The Atlantic Star [1974] A.C 436, 454; Hesperides Hotels Ltd. v Muftizade 
[1979] A.C. 508. 
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take action in the national courts.17This shall be in accordance with national rules.18 This 
evokes questions of forum shopping before the national courts given the existence of 
different national laws governing causes of actions, different procedural rules (e.g. relating 
to disclosure of documents, admission of evidence/pre-trial discovery, statute of limitation, 
allocation of costs, sources of funding for legal expenses etc.) and different remedies 
(interim relief, restorative-compensatory and/or punitive damages).19 If the victims of an 
antitrust infringement cannot gain an effective remedy in their home Member State, they 
will have an incentive to shop around for the best forum in which they are perceived to be 
the most favourably treated and take their case to a different, ‘better equipped’ 
jurisdiction.20 Note that the new Damages Directive21 has started to pave the way for 
antitrust damages actions by removing barriers which formerly prevented victims from 
seeking redress, and harmonizing procedures across the EU for claimants seeking to bring 
damages actions for harm caused by businesses which have been found to have infringed 
competition law. This uniformity should contribute to the reduction (or even elimination) 
of ‘forum shopping’ in which claimants bring actions in jurisdictions with the most 
favourable laws.22However, there are still areas of private enforcement of competition law 
which remain open to the possibility of forum shopping. One is collective redress. 
                                                                
17 EU courts do not have jurisdiction to hear private antitrust claims for the infringement of EU or national 
competition law although the courts of the Member States can bring the issue before the CJEU through a 
referral for a preliminary ruling. Those references lead to the landmark rulings in Case 453/99 Courage Ltd v 
Bernard Crehan [2001] E.C.R. I-6297 and Case 295/04 to 298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico 
Assicurazioni Joined Case [2006] E.C.R. I-6619; see S. Peyer, Myths and untold stories: Private antitrust 
enforcement in Germany (2010) U.E.A. C.C.P. Working Paper available at 
https://lra.le.ac.uk/bitstream/2381/28243/6/Peyer-
Private%20Antitrust%20Enforcement%20in%20Germany2011-11-29final.pdf (accessed 09.08.2016). 
18 Commission staff working document accompanying the White Paper on damages actions for breach of the 
EC antitrust rules, SEC (2008) 404.  
19 P.L. Krauskopf and A. Tkacikova, Competition law violations and private enforcement: forum shopping 
strategies, (2011) 4(1) G.C.L.R. 26, 26. 
20 Ibid., 38. 
21 Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union OJ L 349 
5.12.2014, 1. 
22 M. de Sousa e Alvim, Legislative comment: The new EU Directive on antitrust damages – a giant step 
forward? (2015) 36(6) E.C.L.R. 245, 248; However, note the concerns of the European Justice Forum about 
Article 5(8) of the Damages Directive: ‘Article 5 will already revolutionise disclosure in most Member 
States, creating a process that is almost entirely unknown, and which is likely to create significant cost. There 
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1.2 The relationship between forum shopping and collective redress flowing from a 
breach of the EU competition rules 
 
There is no overarching EU regime for collective redress and the new Damages Directive 
gives little attention to this area. In spite of the EU legislator’s objective to ‘improve the 
conditions for consumers to exercise their rights,’23the Damages Directive states that ‘[it] 
should not require Member States to introduce collective redress mechanisms for the 
enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty.’24 
 
Without any overarching rules, there exists a patchwork of different Member State 
regimes. A small number of Member States do not have such procedures.25 This has the 
potential to engage forum shoppers. With a mosaic of legal systems and no coherent legal 
framework, this means that potentially multiple judicial forums can be engaged in cases 
arising out of common facts and common legal questions. The possibility to file lawsuits in 
different fora with different applicable laws makes the choice of venue a matter of business 
tactics. This in turn can provide the Member States with incentives to amend their laws to 
attract collective proceedings. For example, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal is considered 
                                                                
is a real risk that disclosure may be abused by claimants as a means of forcing defendants to settle even 
unmeritorious claims. Article 5, as it currently reads, offers only minimal protection against such potential 
abuses. Article 5(8) would render such minimal protection wholly ineffective since it would allow Member 
States to maintain and develop unfettered disclosure procedures. Further, it would cause a misalignment 
among Member States, which would trigger forum shopping and would create barriers to effective redress.’ 
European Justice Forum, 5 key changes to the Commission’s proposed Directive on antitrust damages 
actions, available at 
http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/333255/24425576/1393335180850/EJF+5+Key+Changes+to+the+Com
mission's+proposed+Directive+on+antitrust+damages+actions.pdf?token=zZLap4R2fiMbVMIHzw4NXRYd
PgA%3D (accessed 09.05.16). 
23 Directive 2014/104/EU (supra n.21), Recital 9.   
24 Ibid., Recital 12.   
25 For example, in Luxembourg, see L.V. Steinmetz, Focus on collective redress, British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, http://www.collectiveredress.org/collective-
redress/reports/luxembourg/overview (accessed 24.5.2016). 
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one of the most favourable forums for the enforcement of foreign collective redress 
judgments in the EU.26  
 
Before further considering the relationship between forum shopping and collective redress, 
a word should be said on terminology. Collective redress is a mechanism that allows, for 
reasons of procedural economy, and/or efficiency of enforcement, many similar legal 
claims to be bundled into a single court action. It facilitates access to justice in particular in 
cases where the individual damage is so low that potential claimants would not think it 
worth pursuing an individual claim. It also strengthens the negotiating power of potential 
claimants and contributes to the efficient administration of justice, by avoiding numerous 
proceedings concerning claims resulting from the same infringement of law.27As a result, 
actions for damages under competition law are facilitated due to the reduction of the 
necessary economic resources and technical expertise.28  
 
One category of claimant who benefits from collective redress is the end-consumer. An 
end-consumer is an end-purchaser acting out-with their trade or profession.29 End-
consumers regularly suffer harm in the form of higher prices, lower output, reduced quality 
and limited innovation as a result of antitrust infringement.30 In all probability each 
individual end-consumer claim is likely to be very small - too small to make it worth the 
                                                                
26 L. Gorywoda, The emerging EU legal regime for collective redress, in A. Nuyts, N.E. Hatzimihail, W. de 
Gruyter, Cross-border class actions: The European Way (2013), 188. 
27 Commission Communication, Towards a European horizontal framework for collective redress, COM 
(2013) 401, para 1.2. 
28 P. Eckel, A common approach to collective redress in antitrust and unfair competition: A comparison of 
the EU, Germany and the United Kingdom¸ (2015) 46(8) I.I.C. 920, 920. 
29 See for example, the notion of ‘consumer’ in EU law, Library Briefing, Library of the European 
Parliament, 06.05.2013, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130477/LDM_BRI(2013)130477_REV1
_EN.pdf, (accessed 09.05.16).  
30 Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A Economic an Scientific Policy, Collective 
redress in antitrust, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201206/20120613ATT46782/20120613ATT46782E
N.pdf (accessed 09.09.2016), 1.  
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time, effort and expense of bringing an individual damages claim. Using the US Bank of 
Boston31 case as an example, no one claimant would initiate a lawsuit with the hope of 
receiving an $8.76 award. As Judge Posner stated, 'the realistic alternative to a class action 
[this is the US name for a collective redress mechanism and shall be discussed in greater 
depth below] is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only one 
lunatic or fanatic sues for £30.'32 What is small fry to the end-consumer may of course be 
big fish indeed so far as the infringer is concerned: if thousands or millions of consumers 
have been affected, the infringer may well escape paying a very considerable sum in 
damages if no effective mechanism exists for providing collective redress. In these 
circumstances, there is a concern not only that victims suffer an injustice, but also the fear 
of fines alone may prove insufficient to deter would-be infringers who stand to make large 
profits.33 
 
This kind of mass harm situation often includes a cross-border element. Products, goods 
and services of all kinds are distributed all over Europe. Damages arising from a breach of 
competition law may thus entitle victims domiciled in different Member States to claim 
compensation from the infringing undertaking(s). Cross-border collective redress 
proceedings offer the chance of pooling all or at least a large number of claims arising 
from the same violation.34 This raises the issue of forum shopping. Member States which 
offer the facility to pool together similar claims from victims domiciled in different parts of 
the EU will be perceived as more attractive to claimants. This generates some complex 
issues for private international law.  
                                                                
31 Carnegie v Household International, 376 F.3d 656, 991 (2004). 
32 Ibid. 
33G. Barling, Collective redress for breach of competition law: A case for reform? (2011) Comp. Law. 5, 10 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/sir_gerald_barling_en.pdf 
(accessed 02.08.2016); The fine is limited to 10% of the overall annual turnover of the company. The profits 
of a cartel could outweigh this, especially if there is no effective private enforcement mechanism.  
34 British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Focus on collective redress, available at 
http://www.collectiveredress.org/collective-redress/eu-cross-border (accessed 02.08.2016).  
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1.3 Failure to establish a coherent framework of EU collective redress and forum 
shopping 
 
The European Commission has worked for many years to develop an EU cross-border 
collective redress mechanism in the field of competition and consumer law. Last decade, 
the Commission issued a series of publications in which the issues relating to private 
enforcement of European competition law were analysed with the aim of integrating 
collective actions for damages. Those initiatives have resulted in the following 
publications: 
 
 Green Paper on antitrust damages actions;35 
 White Paper on damages actions for breach of EU antitrust rules;36and 
 Green Paper on consumer collective redress.37 
 
Having failed in these attempts to propose legislation on collective redress, the 
Commission deepened its analysis by carrying out a public consultation entitled, ‘Towards 
a Coherent Approach to Collective Redress.’38The Commission tried to set out core 
principles which could pave the way for future initiatives in the area of collective redress.39 
Such principles must cover, inter alia, the following points: 
 
 The creation of strong safeguards to avoid the risk of abusive litigation (including 
the availability of the ‘loser pays’ rule, a ban on contingency fees and punitive damages); 
                                                                
35 Green Paper, Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM (2005) 672. 
36 White Paper, Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM (2008) 165. 
37 Green Paper, Consumer collective redress, COM (2008) 794. 
38 Commission Communication (supra n.27).  
39 Z. Juska, The future of collective antitrust redress: is something new under the sun? (2015) 8(1) G.C.L.R. 
14, 15. 
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 The importance of ensuring availability of appropriate financing mechanisms; and 
 The importance of the role of representative bodies. 
 
Parallel to the work being carried out by the Commission, the European Parliament 
decided to provide its input to the European debate on collective redress by adopting a 
Resolution entitled, ‘Towards a Coherent Approach to Collective Redress.’40This 
Resolution welcomed the main views expressed in the public consultation of the European 
Commission, stressing that: 
 
‘victims of unlawful practices – citizens and companies alike – must be able to claim 
compensation for their individual loss or damage suffered, in particular in the case of 
scattered and dispersed damages, where the cost risk might not be proportionate to the 
damages suffered.’41 
 
It suggested that any proposal in the field of collective redress take the form of a horizontal 
framework so as to avoid the fragmentation of national laws applying to different areas of 
law.42The European Parliament also stressed the need for procedural measures to avoid 
frivolous claims if a horizontal measure is adopted, including: 
 
 The ‘opt-in’ principle should be the only appropriate European approach to 
collective redress; 
 Damages should be compensatory and punitive damages should be clearly 
prohibited; and, 
                                                                
40 European Parliament Resolution of 2 February 2012 on Towards a coherent European approach to 
collective redress (2011/2089 (INI)).  
41 Ibid., para. 1. 
42 Ibid., paras. 15-20. 
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 The ‘loser pays’ principle should be used as a means of avoiding unmeritorious 
claims. 
 
Subsequently, the European Commission revealed its latest and long-awaited contribution 
to collective redress. The EU legislator decided to adopt a Commission Recommendation 
on common principles for injunctive and collective redress in the Member States 
concerning violation of rights granted under Union law.43 The Recommendation invites, 
rather than instructs, Member States to adopt collective redress mechanisms for injunctive 
and compensatory relief. These principles are supposed to represent ‘minimum standards’ 
that Member States are encouraged to apply in their regulation of collective redress. They 
are not bound to do so. The non-binding nature by no means guarantees that all Member 
States will participate to form a coherent body of collective redress across the EU. This has 
the potential to create an uneven playing field and thus produces the potential for forum 
shopping.  
 
Moreover, a major issue is that some Member States have already gone beyond these 
minimum standards. For example, reforms in recent years have sent a signal that individual 
Member States may comply broadly with the Commission but, on key issues, such as the 
opt-in procedure and funding mechanism, each will feel free to chart its own course.44 For 
instance, the UK, the Netherlands and Portugal have implemented opt-out mechanisms. In 
Denmark, if the number of individual claims is high enough to make it burdensome to 
pursue them individually, the competent court may decide that the collective mechanism 
will encompass all group members which will have not opted-out within a deadline set by 
                                                                
43 Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective relief 
mechanisms in the Member State concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law OJ L 201 
26.7.2013 60. 
44R. Gamble, Not a class (yet): Europe moves softly towards collective redress, (2016) 37(1) E.C.L.R 14, 21. 
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the court.45 In Bulgaria the decision of the court is binding for those who have submitted a 
claim as well as for the potential victims who did not opt-in, but did not bring separate 
actions on their own either.46 Belgium was the first country to pass a broader collective 
redress procedure after the Recommendation’s release.47  
 
The soft nature of the EU legislative instrument, and the fact that the issue of collective 
redress is not addressed by the Directive, must be regarded as a strong indication that the 
EU legislator believes that Member States are better placed to devise their cross-collective 
redress mechanisms.48Moreover, despite the attempt at establishing common principles, the 
European legislature thus seems to accept a heterogeneous landscape of collective redress 
in Europe and has missed the opportunity to provide rules on international jurisdiction, 
recognition and the applicable law particularly designed for cross-border mass litigation. 
As a consequence, forum shopping becomes even more important for claimants in mass 
damages cases.49  
 
  
                                                                
45 D-G for Internal Policy (supra n.30), 20. 
46 Ibid.  
47 In 2014, the Belgium enacted a law adding a new section on ‘collective compensation action’ to the Code 
of Economic Law (Title 2 ‘On Collective Compensation Action’ in Book XVII ‘Special Jurisdictional 
Procedures’ of the Code of Economic Law, 28.3.2014, Official Gazette of Belgium). Contrary to the 
Recommendation, there is no default opt-in rule. In its certification decision, the Belgian court can choose 
between an opt-in or an opt-out system, based on the underlying facts and claims of the case. For instance, in 
small-claim consumer damages, an opt-out system will be most feasible. (CEL Article XVII.43.1).  
48 M. Danov, Cross-border competition cases: level playing for undertakings and redress for consumers, 
(2014) 35(10) E.C.L.R. 487, 494. 
49 A. Stadler, The Commission’s Recommendation on common principles of collective redress and private 
international law issues, NiPR 2013 Afl. 4. 483; See also C. Hodges, Collective redress: A breakthrough or 
a damp squib? (2014) J.C.P. 37, 67. 
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1.4 The current lack of cross-border provisions in the Recommendation and the 
potential for forum shopping  
 
The Recommendation only has one cross-border provision. This concerns legal standing.50 
It is recommended that group claimants and representative entities with legal standing in 
one Member State should not be prevented from bringing claims in other Member States. 
Foreign groups and representative entities may have legal standing in the Member States 
where the claim is issued, based simply on their status in their home jurisdiction, whereas 
identical or similar domestic groups and entities may not because of more restrictive group 
standing and representative entity designation criteria in the jurisdiction where proceedings 
are issued. This has the potential for discrimination and inconsistency. There is the 
prospect that this cross-border provision could subvert established conflicts-of-laws 
principles. Legal standing is a procedural issue. Ordinarily, procedure is a matter for the 
lex fori. However, designation and regulation of representative entities could, depending on 
the manner of implementation in Member States, be subject to substantive public and 
administrative law, opening the prospect of some foreign claimants on public policy 
grounds. Even if this is not the case, there are no European treaties or regulations on 
conflicts-of-laws that would require the domestic courts to apply, on the basis of this non-
binding Recommendation, foreign procedural laws on legal standing. This then opens up 
the question of which law the court seised of jurisdiction should apply. The 
Recommendation essentially anticipates that national courts will voluntarily recognise 
procedural standing defined according to foreign laws in cross-border claims, whereas 
national courts, which enjoy procedural autonomy, will most likely be under a legal duty to 
apply the domestic procedural law. Disregarding the Recommendation’s principles on 
cross-border standing will stultify the Recommendation’s impact on cross-border mass 
                                                                
50 Recommendation (supra n.43), para. 17. 
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harm cases. On the other hand, following the non-binding Recommendation might 
contradict established conflicts-of-laws principles on civil procedure, undermine European 
principles of non-discrimination, subsidiarity, mutual respect and sovereignty, and be 
contradictory to the legal tradition in that national system, contrary to Article 67 TFEU. 
Thus the legal standing provisions could have the adverse unintended consequence of 
exacerbating cross-border ‘forum shopping,’ a risk that is already present due to the 
absence of substantive harmonising standards applicable to collective actions.51  
 
1.5 The main reason for the lack of an EU-wide collective redress procedure: the US 
experience 
 
Fragmentation and the lack of consensus in Europe over a harmonized collective procedure 
is largely due to a hostility towards the type of experience in the US. Collective redress 
was pioneered in the US. Many in the EU believe that the US collective regime has led to 
excessive litigation by entrepreneurial lawyers that, in the end, produce limited benefits to 
victims while creating significant costs to society.52 Before proceeding, the terminology 
should be clarified. In the view of Fairgrieve and Howells53it is preferable to reserve the 
term ‘class action’ for the US procedure. Whilst class action procedures can take a variety 
of forms, the kernel of the concept is an opt-out procedure whereby consumers can be 
represented by default if given adequate notice of the action. The US version also has a 
formal certification stage, and the judge has the power to award a flexible range of 
remedies, including but not restricted to the award of damages to identified individuals. 
                                                                
51 R. Money-Kyrle, Legal standing in collective redress actions for breach of EU rights: Facilitating or 
frustrating common standards and access to justice? in B. Hes, M. Bergström, E. Storskrubb, EU civil 
justice: Current issues and future outlook (Bloomsbury Publishing, (2016)), 66. 
52D. Geradin, Collective redress for antitrust damages in the European Union: Is this a reality now? (2014) 
22. Geo. Mason L. Rev 1079, 1080. 
53 D. Fairgrieve and G. Howells, Collective redress procedures: European debates, (2009) 59 I.C.L.Q 379, 
382. 
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There is also the possibility for the award of treble (punitive) damages. At present, there is 
no European equivalent to the US class action model.   
 
The class action plays a special role in the US legal regime, particularly in the field of 
antitrust law.54In the US, the antitrust laws are considered as important to protecting 
individual rights as the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights.55 As the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly stressed, every antitrust violation strikes at the very heart of the US economy – 
the free enterprise system.56For these reasons, the antitrust laws are treated with special 
solicitude in the US and their enforcement is highly encouraged. Congress recognised early 
on that the government would not have the resources to handle adequately this task alone.57 
Therefore, it enlisted the support of the public to serve as ‘private attorneys general’ to 
assist in the enforcement.58 The policy is that every individual is able, and is incentivised, 
to seek out and pursue infringements by others. The number of private antitrust actions for 
any given year dwarfs the number of government actions, in some years by as much as a 
factor of 20.59 Information on 34 collective redress cases collected by US scholars Lande 
and Davis reveal that collective redress returned almost $30 billion to victims.60 
 
Many fear that Europe might eventually adopt the litigation culture prevalent in the US.61 
US-style collective redress mechanisms are rejected on the ground that, as a punitive 
                                                                
54 Collective redress for infringements of competition law in the US is jointly ruled by: The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure which govern the conduct of all civil actions brought in Federal District Courts and the 
Clayton Antitrust Act which is a civil statute that prohibits mergers or acquisitions that are likely to lessen 
competition and also prohibits other business practices that may harm competition. 
55 US v Topco Assoc., 405 US 596, 610 (1972). 
56 Hawaii v Standard Oil, 405 US 251, 262 (1972). 
57 G. Schnell, Class action madness in Europe: a call for a more balanced debate, (2007) 28(11), E.C.L.R. 
617, 617. 
58 Cargill v Monfort of Colorado, 479 US 104, 129 (1986). 
59 G. Schnell (supra n.57), 617. 
60 See D-G for Internal Policies (supra n.30), 35: Some of them resulted in very high monetary awards, such 
as In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation 192 F.R.D. 68 No. 96-CV-5238 (2000) and Wal-Mart, 
Inc v. Visa USA Inc. & MasterCard Int’l Inc. 396 F.3d 96 (2005) that returned awards of $3,383 million.   
61 ‘The rise of the compensation culture in the US was fostered by a civil justice system that adopted several 
‘access to justice’ features such as class actions (primarily on an opt-out basis), contingency-fee financing of 
litigation, extensive reliance on juries as fact finders, costly pre-trial discovery, and the availability of 
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tool,62 they create an unacceptable risk of ‘over-deterrence’ encouraging ‘groundless’ 
claims, and a ‘blackmail effect’ on defendants.63 The US mechanism, at least in the 
Commission’s belief, contains the ‘toxic cocktail’ that could open the door to abusive 
litigation.64 As such, the goal of the Recommendation is to ensure effective access to 
justice and economic growth, while avoiding the excesses perceived to derive from US 
class actions.65 
 
In its Communication, the Commission made a veiled reference to the US, affirming that 
any collective redress policy should be seen as complementing public enforcement but 
would be seen: 
 
‘primarily as an instrument to provide those affected by infringements with access to 
justice and (sic) possibility to claim compensation for harm suffered…there is no need for 
EU initiatives on collective redress to go beyond the goal of compensation.’66 
 
To this end, the Recommendation includes procedural safeguards: it adopts the ‘loser pays’ 
costs rule and the opt-in mechanism, places severe restrictions on the use of contingency 
                                                                
punitive damages in the area of civil litigation such as torts. The implication drawn is that the foregoing 
features generate a considerable and undesirable drag in the US economy. In the US, litigation costs total 2.1 
per cent of GDP, four times that of other OECD countries. Four reports [2009 at time of writing] last year on 
the competitiveness of US capital markets found that the ability to bring broad securities class actions in the 
US was a factor in a foreign company’s decision whether to list or trade in the US. In fact, a 2007 Financial 
Services Forum study found nine out of every ten companies who delisted from a US exchange in the last 
four years said the litigation environment played a rule in that decision.’ G.L. Fowler, M. Shelley and S. 
Kim, Emerging trends in international litigation: Class actions, litigation funding and punitive damages, 
(2009) 3 Disp. Resol. Int’l 101, 105. 
62 Commission Communication (supra n.27), paras. 7-9. 
63 P. Eckel, A common approach to collective redress in antitrust and unfair competition: a comparison of 
the EU, Germany and the United Kingdom, I.L.C. 2015, 46(8) 920, 923; See also D. Hass and N. Fagan, US 
class action: will the EU follow suit? (2005) Euro. Law. 53, 31. 
64 The definition of class actions as ‘toxic cocktails’ refers to a deadly combination of dangerous measures, 
such as punitive damages, contingency fees, opt-out schemes and pre-trial discovery procedures comes from 
a press release accompanying the Green Paper on consumer collective redress. See European Commission, 
Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress – Questions and Answers, MEMO/08/741, para 9, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-741_en.htm, (accessed 23.05.2016).  
65 Z. Juska, (supra n.39), 16. 
66 Commission Communication (supra 27), para 3.1. 
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fees, bans punitive damages and imposes stricter disclosure rules.67Further, and again in 
contrast to the US, where private enforcement is regarded as a substitute for the work of 
the public regulator, private enforcement in Europe plays second fiddle.68A private 
enforcement tool, such as collective redress, is primarily an instrument to provide victims 
with access to justice: punishment and deterrence is the responsibility of the public 
regulators.69This supplementary role is assured because collective redress actions are 
primarily follow-on actions that generally only commence after any proceedings brought 
by the public regulator have been concluded.70 
 
1.6 Forum shopping only one part of the picture  
 
The fragmentation of EU collective redress procedures and forum shopping is not the only 
concern. Another major issue is that by trying to avoid the type of perceived litigation 
abuse in the US, the Commission’s efforts are inadvertently stifling the development of 
effective EU collective redress measures. Some argue that the Commission’s regime is 
inconclusive, unconvincing and nothing more than a political compromise which is 
influenced by the European Parliament and by (industrial) lobbying pressure.71  
 
There also appears to be a lack of motivation for end-consumers to seek a remedy, 
particularly if they have to seek redress in another Member State. For example, it may be 
argued that the recommended opt-in mechanism is a major hindrance. Under this 
mechanism the claimant party includes only those who actively choose to be a part of the 
                                                                
67 C. Hodges, Collective redress in Europe: The new model, (2010) 29 C.J.Q. 370, 373. 
68 Recommendation (supra n.43), para. 6. 
69 Ibid., para. 3.1. 
70 R. Gamble (supra n.44), 16. 
71 Z. Juska, (supra n.39), 24. 
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represented group. The judgment is binding on those who opted-in while all others who 
have been harmed remain free to pursue compensation individually. 
 
The Commission advocates the use of the opt-in regime for a number of reasons.72First, the 
procedure is compatible with the normative principle that a party should not be bound by 
acts of agents who have not been authorised to act on their behalf.73Secondly, consistent 
with the Commission’s aversion to US-style entrepreneurial litigation, the opt-out option is 
seen as prone to abuse. Finally, it is more compatible with the legal traditions that exist in 
many Member States that currently have some form of collective redress.74 
 
However, the opt-in mechanism can be criticised for a number of reasons. First, it 
discourages participation and access to justice, particularly where claimants are not able to 
make informed decisions on whether they wish to sue for compensation.75They may not 
know the existence of the claim. The UK’s Response to the Consultation76(specifically on 
private actions in competition law) stated: 
 
‘It is very clear that the current system of collective redress does not work. Consumers are 
not currently getting redress for breaches of competition law. It appears unlikely that 
simply tinkering with the opt-in system would deliver the desired access to justice…and 
bodies such as the Law Society of England and Wales have said that an opt-out regime is 
essential if consumer cases are to be brought successfully.’77 
                                                                
72 Commission Communication (supra n.27), para 3.4. 
73 Recommendation (supra n.43), para. 23. 
74 R. Gamble, (supra n.44), 19. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Department for Business Innovation & Skills, Private actions in competition law: A consultation for 
reform – government response, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/70185/13-501-private-actions-
in-competition-law-a-consultation-on-options-for-reform-government-response1.pdf (accessed 02.08.2016). 
77 Ibid., 30. 
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Secondly, in an opt-in system, the ‘loser pays’ rule discourages anyone from volunteering 
as a representative plaintiff, because passive claimants may share in the gains but are not 
required to share in the losses.78 
 
Thirdly, it erodes the elements of finality and diminishes the attractiveness of a settlement 
because those who have not been part of the proceedings are free to initiate actions or join 
another collective action later. In this sense a defendant has much less to gain from 
settlement. 
 
Fourthly, it is said that the opt-in provision lacks logic: 
 
‘As to logic, how can it be thought that many thousands of consumers, each suffering the 
same loss or damage, can obtain access to justice and proper redress through an action in 
which each case has to opt-in?’79 
 
The logic is particularly difficult to sustain where those who opt-in may suffer badly in the 
event the action is unsuccessful as a result of the loser pays rule. Professor Issacharoff has 
embellished Judge Posner’s remark that ‘only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30,’80by 
stating that: ‘it would take a particularly fanatical lunatic to do so and assume the risk of 
millions of dollars in adverse costs judgment to boot.’81 
 
In very simple terms, under the US system, a claimant will bring an action where the: 
                                                                
78 R. Gamble (supra n.44), 17. 
79 G. Jones, Collective redress in the European Union: Reflections from a national judge, (2014) 41(3) Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration 289, 301. 
80 Supra n.31. 
81 S. Issacharoff, Litigation funding and the problems of agency cost in representative actions, (2014) 63 De 
Paul Law Review 561, 568. 
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[Probability of winning] x [number of claimants] x [damages from each claim] x [treble 
damages] x [25% (average fee)] 
 
exceeds the total costs incurred in bringing the claim (costs of providing notice to 
claimants, costs of time spent on the case, costs of hiring experts, etc.). 
 
This is based on research performed by Damien Geradin.82  In order to illustrate this 
numerically, he makes assumptions: 
 
1. The probability of winning the action is 80%; 
2. There are 100,000 claimants; 
3. The damage from each claim is $50; 
4. The law firm would collect 25% of the amount recovered; and 
5. The costs incurred in bringing the claims are expected to be $2,000,000.  
 
Because 80% x 100,000 x $50 x 3 x 25% = $3,000,000 > $2,000,000, the claimant will 
likely bring this action. 
 
The collective redress approach promoted in the Recommendation, however, dramatically 
impacts on the above equation, and thus incentives to bring actions, because the ‘opt-in’ 
mechanism will drastically reduce the amount of the possible award. In addition, because 
the ‘loser pays’ principle applies in the EU, the entity funding the action will have to factor 
into its calculations the risk of paying the costs of the defendants if the action goes to trial 
                                                                
82 D. Geradin, (supra n.52). 
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and is unsuccessful. Finally, given the strict conditions that apply to third party funding, 
the level of compensation that private funders will be able to obtain is not entirely clear. 
Thus, under the EU system, an entity will bring an action if the: 
 
[Probability of winning] x [Number of claimants] x [Damages from each claim] x [25% 
(average fee)] 
 
Exceeds the 
 
[Costs incurred in bringing the claim + Costs of defendants] x [1- Probability of winning] 
 
With the following assumptions made: 
 
1. The number of claimants is lower due to the opt-in system, decreasing to 10,000; 
2. The costs of bringing the action are estimated at $2,000,000; and 
3. The costs of defending the claims are estimated at $3,000,000. 
 
Due to 80% x 10,000 x $50 x 25% = $10,000 < $1,000,000 = [1-80%] x [$2,000,000 + 
$3,000,000], there will be a great disincentive to bring an action.83 
 
The Recommendation also fails to take into account any analysis of behavioural 
economics. Assuming that the maximum participation by the alleged victims is a desirable 
social aim, opt-out provides the easiest access to court, ‘as parties need not do anything to 
join the proceedings and benefit from the group membership.’84 The question is, however, 
                                                                
83 Ibid., 1097. 
84 A. Higgins and A.A.S Zuckerman, Class action in England? Efficacy, autonomy and proportionality 
in Collective redress, (2013), Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 93/2013, 20. 
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why this is so: why are people reluctant to opt-in to an opt-in class action, and reluctant to 
opt-out of an opt-out collective action. The answer derives, Alma M. Mozetic85 suggests, 
from behavioural economics, viz. the importance in the collective redress context of 
introducing default options into the choice set.86The empirical experience in the US 
confirms the analysis from behavioural economics. Opt-in will fail to attract widespread 
participation whereas in opt-out actions, Americans usually do nothing. Thus, in the US, 
less than 0.2 per cent in thousands of consumer cases from 1993 to 2003 opt-out.87  
 
The relationship between the opt-in method and behavioural economics is further 
complicated in pan-European cases. This is based on the current geographical restriction. 
Whilst there is only one EU economic market, the legal traditions of different states vary 
widely. In other words, there is no pan-European legal market. This is problematic for the 
following reason. The effectiveness and utility of an opt-in mechanism rest on a fair notice 
being given, usually through advertisement by counsel in the national media: newspapers, 
TV and so on. Yet, civil legal systems adopt a conservative attitude towards advertising 
legal service, which is an inevitable by-product of opting-in to a class action it represents.88  
 
1.7 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has underlined the current status of EU-wide collective redress. It started with 
the premise that the fragmentation and diversity of national legal systems opens up the 
                                                                
85 A.M. Mozetic, Collective Redress: a case for opt-out class actions in England and Wales, (2016) 35(1) 
C.J.Q. 29. 
86 Ibid. 
87 T. Eisenberg and G.P. Miller, The role of opt-outs and objectors in class action litigation: Theoretical and 
empirical issues, (2004) Cornell Law School Research Paper No.04-019, 1532.  
88 In Slovenia, for instance, two legal instruments: The Attorney Act 1993, s.21 and Code of Professional 
Conduct of the Bar Association of Slovenia, ss. 22 and 23 restrict, albeit, not prohibit, an attorney from self-
advertisement.  
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potential for forum shopping. The latest legislative move by the Recommendation does not 
do much to address this.   
 
The other issue that has been identified is that the Commission's conservative approach to 
EU collective redress has the potential to raise significant obstacles to the effective 
vindication of consumer rights. This is even more possible when a cross-border element is 
added.   
 
The background provides the foundations upon which to consider the research questions. 
First, to what extent do the conflicts-of-laws encourage forum shopping; second, what is 
the appropriate forum and what are the procedural measures that need to be adopted in 
order to facilitate effective and equal access to justice for victims of EU competition law 
violations?   
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CHAPTER 2 THE CONFLICTS-OF-LAWS, FORUM SHOPPING AND END-
CONSUMER CROSS-BORDER COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN COMPETITION 
LAW  
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the relationship between forum shopping and cross-border end-
consumer collective redress in EU competition law cases from a conflicts-of-laws 
perspective. This chapter is primary focussed on the first research question: namely the 
extent to which the conflicts-of-laws encourage forum shopping in this area of law. 
However, it also touches on the second research question by considering where, under the 
current regime, the appropriate forum should be for this type of action.  
 
2.1 Background to Jurisdiction 
 
Collective redress mechanisms are fairly novel in Europe when compared with legal 
systems such as the US. Nevertheless, the EU and its Member States have been 
considering this issue for some time.1 Most EU Member States have collective 
mechanisms2 in some shape or form but there are many differences between them and they 
have proved to be 'limited in scope and effectiveness'3(for instance, most of the national 
mechanisms are generally restricted to national claims). The specific cross-border 
                                                                
1 For example: Green Paper on antitrust actions, COM (2005) 672; White Paper on damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM (2008) 165; Green Paper on consumer collective redress, COM (2008) 
794.  
2 See F. Cafaggi and H.W. Micklitz, Collective enforcement of consumer law: A framework for comparative 
assessment (2008) 16 E.R.P.L. 391. 
3 S. Tang, Consumer collective redress in European private international law, (2011) 7 J. Priv. Int’l L. 101, 
102. 
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dimension of collective redress (and the avoidance of forum shopping) has long concerned 
the EU Commission4 In the Commission Communication it was stated that: 
 
'The general principles of European international private law require that a collective 
dispute with cross-border implications should be heard by a competent court on the basis 
of European rules on jurisdiction, including those providing for a choice of court, in order 
to avoid forum shopping. The rules on European civil procedural law and the applicable 
law should work efficiently in practice to ensure proper coordination of national collective 
redress procedures.'5 
 
It went on to state that:  
 
‘with regards to jurisdictional rules, many stakeholders asked for collective proceedings to 
be specifically addressed at European level. Views differ, however, as to the desirable 
connecting factors between the court and the cases. A first group of stakeholders advocate 
a new rule giving jurisdiction in mass claim situations to the court where the majority of 
parties who claim to have been injured are domiciled and/or an extension of the 
jurisdiction for consumer contracts to representative entities bringing a claim. A second 
category argues that jurisdiction at the place of the defendant’s domicile is best suited since 
it is easily identifiable and ensures legal certainty. A third category suggests creating a 
special judicial panel for cross-border collective actions with the Court of Justice of the 
European Union.’6 
 
Further, it stated that:  
                                                                
4 Commission Communication, Towards a coherent European approach to collective redress, COM (2013) 
401, 9. 
5 Ibid., 13.  
6 Ibid. 
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‘in this respect the Commission considers that the existing rules of [Regulation 
1215/2012]7 on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (the Brussels I [Recast] Regulation), should be fully exploited.’8 
 
The subsequent Commission Recommendation9 is silent on jurisdictional rules. What can 
be gathered from the Communication and the Recommendation is that the Commission 
believes that the Brussels I Recast Regulation remains best placed to allocate jurisdiction, 
contrary to the views expressed and proposals made by some writers.10  However, in doing 
so the Commission relies on a Regulation which was created for and guided by the 
leitmotiv of two party proceedings. Litigation is generally regarded as taking place 
between one specific claimant and one specific defendant. Some are concerned that the 
jurisdictional aspects of both 'traditional' two-party cross-border proceedings and collective 
cross-border litigation cannot be treated with a 'one-size-fits-all' approach.11 Cross-border 
collective redress may in many cases have very specific needs which are different from 
traditional two-party litigation.  
 
There are not many provisions in the Brussels I Recast Regulation which would appear to 
be relevant to cross-border end-consumer redress in competition cases. Only two heads of 
                                                                
7 Regulation 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters OJ L 351, 20.12.2012, 1 (Brussels I Recast Regulation). 
8 Commission Communication (supra n.4). 
9 Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress 
mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law OJ L 201 
26.7.2013 60.  
10 C. Gonzalez Beilfuss and B. Añoveros Terradas, Compensatory consumer collective redress and the recast 
Brussels I Regulation, in A. Nuyts, N.E. Hatzimihail, W. de Gruyter, Cross-border class actions: The 
European way (2013), 241; B. Aňoveros Terradas, Consumer collective redress under the Brussels I 
Regulation Recast in the light of the Commission's Common Principles, (2015) 11(1) J. Priv. Int’l L. 143, 
147. 
11 See H. Muir Watt, Brussels 1 and aggregate litigation or the case for redesigning the common judicial 
area in order to respond to changing dynamics, functions and structures in contemporary adjudication and 
litigation, (2010) 2 I.P.R.A.X. 111. 
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jurisdiction would immediately stand out to serve this purpose: Articles 4 and 7(2). The 
former underpins the general rule (the court of the domicile of the defendant) and the latter 
refers to matters relating to tort/delict at the courts for the place where the harmful event 
occurred or may occur.  A major difficulty faced by cross-border collective redress and the 
Brussels I Recast Regulation in terms of Article 7(2) will arise when there is a plurality of 
end-consumer claimants who have each suffered from similar harm but in different 
Member States.   
 
On closer inspection of the Regulation, it is noted that Article 8(1) may be of relevance. 
This allows for the potential consolidation of claims against members of a cartel provided 
that one of the members is domiciled in the jurisdiction in question (and so is subject to the 
jurisdiction of that court under Article 4(1)). The English courts refer to this member as the 
‘anchor defendant.’12 
 
Article 7(5) of the Regulation may also be relevant. A person domiciled in a Member State 
may be sued in another Member State: ‘as regards a dispute arising out of the operation of 
a branch, agency or other establishment, in the courts for the place where the branch, 
agency or other establishment is situated.’   
                                                                
12 C. Stothers, M. Gardner, S. Hinchliffe, Forum shopping and ‘Italian torpedoes’ in competition law in the 
English courts, (2011) 4(2) G.C.L.R 67, 68; See also C. Balmain and V. Coughlan, More haste less speed: 
the evolving practice in competition damages actions in the UK, (2011) 4(4) G.C.L.R. 147. 
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2.2 Domicile of the Defendant 
 
The general rule in the Regulation is found in Article 4. The Article provides that a 
defendant domiciled in an EU Member State should be sued in the courts of that Member 
State. If the national provisions of that State include a collective action mechanism, the 
action can, in principle, proceed. In a collective redress case, this head of jurisdiction 
allows for relatively easy bundling of claims of several parties from various States, as it 
focuses on the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled.  
 
With regards to forum shopping, Article 4 is a provision which clearly favours a 
defendant.13 This was intentional in the structuring of the Brussels Regime, having taken 
the actor sequitur forum rei as its foundation. The Regulation operates on the basis that the 
defendant should have a reasonable expectation of where they are likely to be sued.14 
Special jurisdictions (i.e. derogations from the general rule) are provided for only as an 
exception. If this is the sole ground for clothing a court with jurisdiction in a collective 
action, then the claimants would appear to be left with a tactical disadvantage. The 
defendant will generally be left in an economically strong position and would benefit from 
the practicability of their home jurisdiction. Meanwhile foreign collective members 
potentially suffer from high costs and the many risks associated with litigation abroad. This 
would seem particularly inappropriate where a vast majority of victims are domiciled 
elsewhere.15 Given that many representative authorities working on behalf of the claimants 
have finite financial resources; this could result in a huge disincentive to litigate. Referring 
back to Chapter 1, it was mentioned that the opt-in and ‘loser-pays’ rules already 
                                                                
13 E. Lein, Cross-border collective redress and jurisdiction under Brussels I: A mismatch, in D. Fairgrieve 
and E. Lein, Extraterritoriality and collective redress (OUP, (2012)), 8.11. 
14 Brussels I Recast Regulation (supra n.7), Recital 15.  
15 E. Lein, (supra n.13). 
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discourage collective actions on the basis of the reduction of the possible award and the 
risks of having to pay the defendant’s costs if the action is unsuccessful.16 
 
Moreover, jurisdiction at the domicile of the defendant may give the wrong incentives. 
Even though it might seem practically unlikely, undertakings may deliberately choose to 
incorporate and take their seat in countries which do not provide for any collective redress 
mechanisms.17 Companies domiciled, for instance, in France, where there is currently 
some hostility towards the most effective forms of collective redress (e.g. opt-out 
mechanisms), would never be subject to such procedures. By contrast, companies 
domiciled in Member States such as Sweden and Portugal, which have adopted quite wide 
ranging mechanisms of collective redress, would be subject to such mechanisms on a local 
basis; this is hardly in agreement with the idea of a common judicial area, or with the goal 
to avoid distortions of competition in the internal market.18  
 
There are, however, some benefits for the claimant under Article 4. In fact, the definition 
of the 'domicile' of companies or other legal persons provided for in Article 63(1) of the 
Regulation may prove in a collective redress setting to favour a claimant. Article 63(1) 
provides that the domicile of legal persons is linked to the statutory seat, central 
administration, or principal place of business. These criteria do not follow any hierarchical 
order and leave the claimant free to choose upon which to found jurisdiction.19 These 
places are all considered by law to be of a sufficient link to the dispute. However, from a 
forum shopping perspective, it may allow claimants to launch a collective suit in a certain 
Member State for the simple reason that the company has a registered office there. This 
                                                                
16 Supra Ch.1, 23; A. Layton, Collective redress: Policy objectives and practical problems, in D. Fairgrieve 
and E. Lein, Extraterritoriality and collective redress (OUP, (2012)), 5.39. 
17 E. Lein (supra n.13), 8.12. 
18 A. Nuyts, The consolidation of collective claims under Brussels I, in in A. Nuyts, N.E. Hatzimihail, W. de 
Gruyter, Cross-border class actions: The European way (2013), 72. 
19 E. Lein (supra n.13), 8.13. 
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raises questions of appropriateness when the selected forum is only tenuously linked to the 
dispute whilst the major focus of the case rests elsewhere. This Article thus provides both 
tactical advantages and disadvantages for both sets of parties depending on the particular 
set of circumstances. 
 
Some suggest that the domicile of the defendant (or one of the defendants) should actually 
be the only rule of jurisdiction for collective redress.20 By definition, these types of cases 
deal with a cross-border activity that causes damages in the territories or in the markets of 
more than one State. The harmful activity is spread across several States, and the victims 
or consumers who are harmed by this activity are based in different States. The domicile of 
the defendants would seem to provide in that case the only central point where all claims 
and interests can be consolidated and taken into account by a single court.21 
 
Allocating jurisdiction to any court other than the court of the defendant would require that 
a choice be made amongst, potentially a large number of fora. This would create a number 
of problems. It would discriminate between end-consumers. The action would be brought 
in the Member State where some of the end-consumers are domiciled, but not others. 
Forum shopping would be generated where the procedures and laws perceived to be the 
most advantageous are located. Moreover, allocating jurisdiction to more than one court 
could mean that collective redress proceedings could potentially be initiated concurrently 
in different Member States raising the issue of parallel collective proceedings. 
 
In sum, jurisdiction at the place of the defendant's domicile would appear to be the most 
appropriate since it is easily identifiable and ensures legal certainty.22 It has nevertheless, a 
                                                                
20 A. Nuyts (supra n.18). 
21 Ibid., 71. 
22 Commission Communication (supra n.4), 13.  
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great disadvantage for the potential collective claimants insofar as they may have to face 
the cost and difficulties of litigating abroad. Here, it is hard to reconcile both principles: 
legal certainty and the necessary consumer protections which are both stated objectives in 
the Commission's Recommendation.23 
 
2.3 Place where the harmful event occurred or may occur 
 
Given the tortious nature of antitrust claims, Article 7(2) will be relevant.24 This confers 
jurisdiction to the courts at the place 'where the harmful event occurred or may occur'. In 
general terms, the CJEU has understood this place as twofold: it will be either the place 
where the harmful event giving rise to the damage occurred (place of acting) or the place 
where the actual damage occurred (place where the harm was felt).25  
 
The choice between the two places is left to the claimant.26 To place reliance exclusively 
on the place of acting could make Article 7(2) lose most of its effectiveness since 
ordinarily a person would act where they have their domicile and thus Article 4 would 
come in to play to the detriment of Article 7(2).27 This so-called ‘principle of ubiquity’ 
avoids choosing between the putative defendant's activity and its results by attributing the 
same weight to both, and thereby favours the claimant, the alleged victim.28  
 
                                                                
23 B. Aňoveros Terradas (supra n.10), 156. 
24 Claims based on antitrust law infringements brought by end-consumers most probably have an extra-
contractual nature (tort). Depending on the facts of the case, the contractual nature of the infringement is also 
conceivable as a basis for an antitrust claim. Yet it is unlikely, especially for violations that occur at the level 
of the production/distribution chain that are so far from the end consumer and where no direct contractual 
relationship exists between the consumer and the competition law infringer. According to Article 7(1) of the 
Regulation, in matters relating to contract, the action can be brought in the courts of the place of performance 
of the contract.  
25 Case 21/76 Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier B.V. v Mines de Potasse d'Alsace S.A. [1976] E.C.R. 1735. 
26 ibid., 1747, para. 24.  
27 ibid., para. 20. 
28 U. Magnus, P. Mankowski and A. Calvo Caravaca, Brussels I Regulation, (European Law Publishing, 
(2007)), para 204. 
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The principle of ubiquity has been restricted by case law. In the case of Shevill29 the CJEU 
developed the so-called 'mosaic principle'. At the place where the damage was sustained, a 
claim can only be brought for the damage arising in the forum state, not for the world-wide 
damage.30 The advantage of having a forum actoris is combined with (and simultaneously 
poisoned by) a restriction. The mosaic principle should be regarded as a structural element 
in Article 7(2).31 It should be a much-welcome obstacle to forum shopping.32 To favour the 
claimant overly would constitute a windfall profit for the claimant and would deny, or at 
least neglect, the defendant's legitimate interests. The equality between the two options has 
to give way to procedural justice. The option to sue wherever damage was sustained still 
plays enough the claimant's hands and is favourable enough. Almost unlimited or universal 
jurisdiction by virtue of the places where damage was sustained, spread out would not 
serve the purpose of Article 7(2).33  
 
In an EU competition law case the English High Court opined that ‘[t]he jurisdiction based 
upon the place of the harmful event will be international, while the jurisdiction based upon 
the relevant harm will be restricted to England and Wales.’34 Consumers may often prefer 
to sue at the place where damage occurred for the local harm only. Since there is a low 
mobility of consumers insofar as they prefer to sue in their home state, it is a relatively safe 
prediction that parallel proceedings would be bound to arise insofar as a number of 
consumers may wish to sue for the local harm in their home states.35 This leads to an 
argument that Article 7(2) is not suited to allocate jurisdiction before a single forum in 
cross-border cases. That said, it is important to consider the elective nature of the special 
                                                                
29 Case 68/93 Fiona Shevill v Presse Alliance SA [1995] E.C.R. I-415. 
30 Ibid., paras. 28-33. 
31 U. Magnus, P. Mankowski, A. Calvo Caravaca (supra n.28), para 208. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid.  
34 SanDisk Corp. v Koninklijke Philips Electronics [2007] E.W.H.C. 332 (Ch); [2007] Bus. L.R. 705 at 25.  
35 M. Danov, Cross-border competition cases: level playing for undertakings and redress for consumers, 
(2014) 35(10) E.C.L.R. 487, 490. 
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heads of jurisdiction under Article 7. The claimant always has the opportunity to resort to 
the general rule of Article 4 under which the proceedings may be centralised before the 
courts of the defendant’s domicile.  
 
It should be noted that, by relying on Article 4 of the Regulation, the injured party could 
avoid unnecessary and lengthy jurisdictional challenges which could be an important factor 
in cross-border EU competition cases.36 However, as already touched upon, a major 
disadvantage for a claimant who wishes to sue under Article 4, stems from the fact that 
they will have to follow the defendant to the Member State of their domicile. It is well 
established that a ‘cross-border litigant may, as a practical matter, require two lawyers, one 
in their home state to give preliminary advice, and one in the host state to conduct the 
litigation.’37 This would fuel the costs of competition litigation which could be a 
disincentive for claims brought by consumers.38  
 
The interpretation of Article 7(2) 
 
In recent years, case law has been shown to broaden the scope of Article 7(2), in particular 
as the basis for English jurisdiction.39In refusing to adopt a narrow interpretation of Article 
7(2), the Court of Appeal in the case of Deutsche Bahn gives claimants more options to try 
to establish jurisdiction in the UK, in turn allowing them to take advantage of the perceived 
'claimant-friendly' nature of the English judicial system. The most interesting implications 
                                                                
36 Ibid., 496. 
37 Green Paper, Legal aid in civil matters: The problems confronting the cross-border litigant, COM (2000) 
51, 9. 
38 M. Danov (supra n.35), 496. 
39 The case of Deutsche Bahn AG & 30 Ors v Morgan Advanced Materials plc. (formerly Morgan Crucible 
Company plc.) & 5 Ors [2012] E.W.C.A. Civ 1055 has the potential to create greater exposure for non-UK 
undertakings. The Court of Appeal held that it could: '...see no justification for imposing on Article [7(2)] a 
gloss to the effect that...a harmful event must be one of which the putative claimant is the immediate victim. 
That would involve a search for a connecting factor and the putative jurisdiction rather than a connecting factor 
between the defendant and the putative jurisdiction, which is what the Regulation is concerned with'. [at para. 
20]. The key factor is whether the damage claimed (direct or indirect) occurred in the UK.  
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of Deutsche Bahn are in relation to the UK Government’s introduction of opt-in and opt-
out collective actions in the Competition Appeal Tribunal (hereinafter ‘CAT’). Deutsche 
Bahn could lead to more exposure to opt-out collective actions for non-UK domiciled 
defendants. The decision implies that an opt-out collective action could be brought in 
relation to all UK sales of the allegedly cartelised product even if none of the alleged 
cartelists have any UK domiciled entities in their corporate groups and even if the UK 
purchases were made indirectly through third parties (the defendant never having made any 
direct sales to the UK).40  
 
The CJEU has also considered the application of Article 7(2) in cartel damages claims.41 
The CJEU confirmed that the place of a causal event of loss would be the place of the 
conclusion of the cartel, or as the case may be, the place in which one agreement in 
particular was concluded which can be linked to the sole causal event giving rise to the 
damage.42  
 
It is worth noting that AG Jääskinen took the view that in complex cartel cases the 
jurisdiction of the court should only be based on Articles 4 and 8 and not on Article 7(2) 
for the reason that it opens defendants up to claims in multiple jurisdictions.43 The CJEU 
clearly disagreed. It has also been argued that had the Court excluded Article 7(2) as a 
basis for jurisdiction in cartel damages actions and forced claimants potentially to have to 
bring proceedings outside their country of domicile, it would have significantly impaired 
                                                                
40 S. Garvey, Indirect harm sufficient to found jurisdiction for antitrust claim, available at 
http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Indirect-harm-sufficient-to-found-jurisdiction-for-
antitrust-claim-.aspx (accessed 02.08.2016); See also R. Pike, New Court of Appeal judgments likely to 
increase scope for competition damages claims, available at 
http://bakerxchange.com/rv/ff00138a65026fc97ca1c8113946880552271cfe#page=1 (accessed 02.08.2016). 
41 Case 352/13 Cartel Damage Claims (CDC) Hydrogen Peroxide SA v Akzo Nobel NV EU:C:2015:335 
(CJEU). 
42 Ibid., para. 50. 
43 Opinion of AG Jääskinen 11.12.2014, Cartel Damages Claims (CDC) Hydrogen Peroxide SA v Evonik 
Degussa GmbH and Ors, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2443, para 50. 
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the claimant’s right to obtain appropriate redress for the loss they have suffered, which is 
one of the key objectives of the Directive on Damages.44 
 
The comments made by AG Jääskinen may have relevance with regards to securing the 
most appropriate forum when considered alongside cases such as Cooper Tire.45Mr Justice 
Teare appeared to suggest that in many EU competition law cases, it may be very difficult 
to identify the appropriate court. On the one hand, the place where the event giving rise to 
the damage may be difficult to determine. On the other hand, the place where the damage 
occurred may be numerous. In particular, the judge held: 
 
‘In the present case the act complained of is a ‘complex and continuous infringement’ of 
Article [101] of the Treaty by agreeing price targets, sharing customers by non-aggression 
agreements and exchanging sensitive information relating to prices, competitors and 
customers. The meetings which gave rise to it took place in a number of locations 
including Milan, Vienna, Amsterdam, Brussels, Richmond-on-Thames, Frankfurt, Grosse 
Leder, and Prague. The cartel was ended at a meeting in London. I consider that this is a 
case where it is, at the very least, difficult to say where the event which gave rise to the 
damage occurred. […] In truth the harmful events occurred in several countries.46 
 
In other words, given the pan-European nature of the business activities (and the antitrust 
infringements), an injured party would often have a number of potential fora where they 
can sue for damages. Since cross-border EU competition law infringements would by their 
nature cause damage to businesses and consumers in a number of Member States, injured 
parties may often choose where to bring their EU competition claims (subject to being 
                                                                
44 N. Boyle, G. Chhokar, S. Gartagani, Jurisdiction in follow-on damages claims, (2015) 8(3) G.C.L.R. R-58, 
R-60. 
45 Cooper Tire (2010) E.W.C.A. Civ 864. 
46 Ibid., at 65. 
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prepared to pay the higher litigation costs which they may have incurred if they sue in a 
country other than their home state).47 Therefore, in theory, Article 7(2) has the potential to 
encourage forum shopping on the basis that it opens the defendant up to being sued in 
multiple jurisdictions.  
 
The place of acting in a collective antitrust case  
 
To be clear, the ‘place of acting’ alone can induce several different possibilities. These 
could include the place of agreement and the seat of the cartelist.48  
 
The place of agreement may be more difficult to justify as an appropriate forum in certain 
cases. It can be entirely fortuitous (a meeting room at a conveniently located airport or a 
holiday resort) and may from a procedural point of view be relatively uninteresting. The 
only evidence located at the place of agreement would be witnesses to the fact that the 
cartelists met and actually had a meeting. In terms of the location of evidence relevant to 
proving anticompetitive behaviour and damage the respective seats of the cartelists could 
well be much more relevant. Furthermore, it may also be noted that the place of acting can 
often coincide with the defendant's domicile or principal place of business. In some cases, 
this place may not present an alternative forum to the one provided in Article 4.49  
 
  
                                                                
47 M. Danov (supra n.35), 490.  
48 J. Basedow, International cartels and the place of acting under Article 5(3) of the Brussels 1 Regulation, in 
J. Basedow, S. Francq and L. Idot, International antitrust litigation: Conflicts-of-laws and coordination, 
(Hart Publishing, (2012)), 33.   
49 Eva Lein, (supra n.13), 8.14. 
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Place where the harm was felt 
 
With regards to the ‘place of damage,’ this can be quite useful if all the victims are located 
in one country. In a collective action led by a representative body this can often be the case 
since the representative body is quite likely to be territorial in nature and represent victims 
in its own jurisdiction. As soon as the damage occurs in several countries this ground of 
jurisdiction ceases to be useful to the collective members that want to consolidate their 
claims in a forum other than that of the defendant's domicile. This will be the case as long 
as a court chooses not to depart from the mosaic principle. Given that the Court on several 
occasions has indicated its great reluctance against anything that could be interpreted as 
general jurisdiction at the domicile of the claimant,50 this is although not impossible, 
perhaps not likely. 
 
However, the CJEU has made some interesting findings with regard to the concept of the 
'centre of gravity' in cases where there is a plurality of consumer claimants having their 
domicile in different Member States. This was in a field unrelated to collective redress but 
is worthy of a mention. In the joined e-Date and Martinez case51 the CJEU was asked to 
consider the jurisdiction to entertain claims about the infringement of personality rights by 
means of the internet. 
  
The CJEU in e-Date went beyond the findings made in Shevill and held that they could 
encompass ‘a wide range of infringements to personality rights recognised in various legal 
systems.’52 The harm in Shevill was caused by the printed publication and distribution of 
an article by the media. In contrast, the medium used to publish and distribute the 
                                                                
50 See, for example, Case 168/02 Kronhofer [2004] E.C.R. I – 6009.  
51 Joined Cases 509/09 and 161/10 e-Date Advertising GmbH v X and Martinez v MGN Ltd. [2011] E.C.R. I-
10269. 
52 Ibid., at 44. 
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information which caused the harm to the claimants in e-Date was the internet. The CJEU 
ruled that the findings made in Shevill could also be ‘applied to other media and means of 
communication.’53 However, it noted that ‘the placing online of content on a website is to 
be distinguished from the regional distribution of media such as printed 
matter.’54According to the Court, once information is placed online its distribution is ‘in 
principle universal,’55as it may be instantly consulted throughout the world by an unlimited 
number of internet users.56In addition, it was said that the distribution of content online 
was outside of the control and intentions of the person who placed it on the internet.57 
Further, it was noted that it is not always possible to quantify the distribution of content 
which is placed online, and it is therefore difficult to assess the damage caused within a 
particular Member State.58 
 
Claims for infringements of personality rights by means of content placed on the internet 
thus presented difficulties to the rules of jurisdiction previously recognised by the CJEU in 
Shevill. Accordingly, the CJEU decided that it was necessary to recognise an additional 
connecting factor between the claim and the forum upon which the jurisdiction of a court 
under Article 7(2) of the Regulation may be based. It held that in cases involving alleged 
infringements of personality rights committed by means of content placed on an internet 
website, an individual may bring proceedings before the court of a Member State where 
they have their ‘centre of interests.’59It was further held that such actions were in respect of 
all of the alleged damage caused to the individual.60In providing guidance on the meaning 
of this additional connecting factor, the CJEU stated that: 
                                                                
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid., at 45.  
55 Ibid., at 46.  
56 Ibid., at 45. 
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid., at 46. 
59 Ibid., at 48 and 52. 
60 Ibid. 
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‘The place where a person has the centre of his interests corresponds to his general habitual 
residence. However, a person may also have the centre of interests in a Member State in 
which he does not habitually reside, in so far as other factors, such as the pursuit of a 
professional activity, may establish the existence of a particularly close link with that 
State.’61 
 
Individuals may continue to bring proceedings before the courts of each Member State in 
which the content placed online has been accessed and causes damages. However, in 
accordance with Shevill, such courts will only have jurisdiction in respect of the damage 
caused in the territory of the Member State of the court seised.62 
 
This ruling may be relevant in the context of collective redress. It demonstrates that Article 
7(2) of Regulation can be construed as including connecting factors that are absent from 
the text, when specific circumstances require to create such connecting factors.63 
 
The CJEU appeared to accept for the first time that jurisdiction at the place where part of 
the damage is suffered has jurisdiction to entertain claims that relate to damages suffered in 
other States.   
 
To justify giving jurisdiction to the place of the centre of interests of the victim, the Court 
has considered that this is in accordance with (i) the 'objective of the sound administration 
of justice'; (ii) the need to attribute jurisdiction to the place which has a 'close connecting 
factor' to the dispute; and, (iii) the aim of predictability of jurisdiction. In respect of the last 
                                                                
61 Ibid., at 49. 
62 Ibid., at 51-52.  
63A. Nuyts (supra n.18), 77. 
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point, the Court has ruled that jurisdiction is fair for the defendant as, at the time at which 
they placed the content online, they are 'in a position to know the centre of interests of the 
persons who are the subject of that content.'64 
 
Applying this reasoning to the case of collective redress, it may not be such a big step to 
accept that jurisdiction is attributed at the place of the ‘centre of interests’ of the collective 
injured parties. It could be argued that jurisdiction is predictable at that place for the 
defendant, and that the consolidation of claims in one forum will foster the sound 
administration of justice. In the case of Wintersteiger,65 the Court refused to extend the 
application of the forum of the victim's centre of interests to online infringements of 
trademarks. However, the Court justified this solution by reference to the territoriality of 
national trademarks. As for the infringement of personality rights, the situation involves a 
person whose personality rights are protected in all Member States, and thus is what 
requires, according to the Court, that a single forum be available at the place of the centre 
of interests of the victim. Similarly, the right to damages arising from a breach of EU 
competition law is a right which is available in all Member States. This reasoning could, 
again, support that Article 7(2) be construed as providing, in the context of collective 
redress, for a jurisdiction at the place of centre of interests of the collective injured 
parties.66 Such a rule may have a spill-over effect, in the sense that the court of one 
Member State would rule on activities that have taken place entirely abroad, and have 
injured persons established abroad. However, the appliance of this spill over effect is 
precisely what the CJEU seems to have accepted in e-Date/Martinez (though in relation to 
one victim and one tortfeasor).67 
 
                                                                
64 e-Date Advertising (supra n.51), at 50.   
65 Case 523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4 Sondermaschinenbau GmbH [2013] Bus. L.R. 150. 
66 A. Nuyts (supra n.18), 78. 
67 Ibid., 79. 
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This still leaves one essential question that needs to be addressed with regard to 
establishing a ‘centre of interests’ for end-consumers domiciled in different Member 
States. Perhaps that ‘centre of interests’ connecting factor should be at the court of the 
Member State which is the most affected by the illegal practice. This is a very delicate 
issue. On the one hand, it might be thought that the jurisdiction should be restricted to the 
place which is mainly affected: this is in accordance with e-Date, under which jurisdiction 
is provided at the place of the centre of interests of the persons involved. This avoids 
excessive forum shopping. On the other hand, it may be difficult to identify the Member 
States or market which is the most affected by the mass harm. Moreover, such a 
concentrating rule could have the result of attributing jurisdiction only in Member States 
which have large markets, where harmful activities are felt on a wider basis. Injured parties 
from smaller markets would never enjoy the benefit of bringing collective proceedings in 
their home State. It may then have to be that the test should be that jurisdiction is provided 
at any place where loss is suffered that is sufficiently material to comply with the 
requirements of predictability and sound administration of justice.68  
 
It will be remembered that some stakeholders in the Communication requested the creation 
of an exclusive jurisdiction.69 This would be where the majority of parties who claim to 
have been injured are domiciled. However, the above discussion reveals the problems 
surrounding such a concentrating rule. Although an exclusive forum is attractive in the 
context of cross-border collective litigation, the complexities associated with creating an 
exclusive jurisdiction rule make this option less attractive than others. Moreover, an 
                                                                
68 Ibid.  
69 Commission Communication (supra n.4), para. 3.7. 
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exclusive jurisdiction rule will not necessarily solve the problem of parallel litigation if, for 
example, the courts of more than one Member State satisfy the rule.70 
 
It would appear, therefore that Article 7(2) of the Regulation has the potential to encourage 
forum shopping in cross-border end-consumer collective claims flowing from a breach of 
EU competition law.  
 
2.4 The ‘anchor defendant’ 
 
Parties may wish to initiate a claim against multiple defendants. Article 8(1) of the 
Regulation states that a person domiciled in a Member State may be sued: 
 
‘where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of 
them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear 
and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from 
separate proceedings.’ 
 
This Article allows for the potential consolidation of claims against members of a cartel 
provided that one of them is domiciled in the jurisdiction in question (and so is subject to 
the jurisdiction of that court under Article 4). The English courts refer to such an entity as 
the ‘anchor defendant.’71 
 
This Article permits a centralisation of collective litigation by bundling together parallel 
claims against several defendants domiciled in different Member States. It presupposes a 
                                                                
70 J.N. Stefanelli, Parallel litigation and cross-border collective actions under the Brussels I Framework: 
Lessons from abroad, in D. Fairgrieve and E. Lein, Extraterritoriality and collective redress (OUP, (2012)), 
9.34. 
71 See for example, Cooper Tire & Rubber Co Europe Ltd. v Bayer Public Co Ltd. [2010] E.W.C.A. Civ 864. 
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close connection between the causes of action. Such a factual or legal connection is easy to 
argue in cartel claims. Hence, if several undertakings with headquarters in different 
Member States are sued for the same cause of action, the claimant may freely select among 
the courts of different Member States.72 Accordingly, this head of jurisdiction opens up the 
gateway for forum shopping in different courts and judicial systems of the different 
Member States. The CJEU rectified its former case law73 and held that the close 
connection between the parallel claims does not presuppose that the claims are based on an 
identical basis.74 
 
The operation of Article 8 can be demonstrated by a case before the High Court of 
Dortmund resulting from the Hydrogen Peroxide Cartel.75 Six undertakings were sued. 
The Commission sanctioned them by fines amounting to several hundred million Euros. In 
Dortmund, Cartel Damage Claims (CDC), a Belgian company, brought a lawsuit for 
damages sustained by 32 companies which had bought Hydrogen Peroxide from the 
members of the cartel. The claims had been assigned to CDC and the forum was seised on 
the basis of Article 8 as the anchor defendant, a German corporation, was domiciled in 
Essen. However, as the co-defendants operated the cartel in several EU Member States, 
jurisdiction could have also been founded under Article 8(1) in the fora of The 
Netherlands, Finland, Spain and Belgium.76 The Regional Court of Dortmund sent a 
                                                                
72 A. Nuyts (supra n.18), 63: This concept is expressly endorsed by Article 6(3)(b) of the Rome II Regulation. 
Under this provision, several defendants can be sued in the court of a Member State where one defendant is 
domiciled if the market in that Member State is directly and substantially affected by the anticompetitive 
behavior of all defendants. The common anticompetitive behavior constitutes the connecting link among the 
co-defendants. Its seems to be predictable that Article 8 will be interpreted systematically by reference to 
Article 6(3) of the Rome II Regulation. 
73 Case 539/03 Roche Nederland BV v Primus and Goldenberg [2006] E.C.R. I-6535. 
74 Case 145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH, [2012] E.C.D.R. 6 (CJEU), at 84; See also H. 
Sheraton, R. Massey, B. Uphoff, V. Schroder, T. Hauss and F. Mattina, CJEU rules on copyright protection 
of photographic portraits, available at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=16806e75-1106-4f29-
b6c9-e5966fc7b092 (accessed 01.08.2016); Case 645/11 Land Berlin v Sapir, [2013] C.E.C. 947 at 44 and 
47; See also CJEU, Press Release No 40/13, Luxembourg, 11.04.2013, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2013-04/cp130040en.pdf (accessed 01.08.2016). 
75 High Court Dortmund, Case No 13 0 23/09 (Kart) (Hydrogen Peroxide). 
76 Arnaud Nuyts (supra n.18), 63. 
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preliminary reference request to the CJEU in respect of the Hydrogen Peroxide Cartel 
damages claim.77 The CJEU has confirmed that cartel victims will be able to sue jointly 
multiple defendants in one EU Member State where only one of the cartelists is domiciled. 
This was also confirmed by the Court to extend to circumstances where the claimant has 
withdrawn proceedings against the sole domestic domiciled co-defendant after proceedings 
are properly instituted. In addition, the Court held that cartel victims can alternatively bring 
damages actions at the courts of either the Member State where the cartel or a particular 
cartel agreement were concluded, or of the Member States where they are domiciled. The 
CJEU’s judgment therefore widens the options for claimants, and significantly allows them 
to recover damages in their own domestic courts, consistent with the principle that victims 
of cartels should have an effective and real right to compensation.78 
 
The English courts have generally taken an expansive approach to questions of jurisdiction 
and a permissive approach to the use of ‘anchor defendants.’ They have accepted 
jurisdiction over many defendants domiciled in other Member States and outside the EU 
relying on the ‘anchor defendant’ mechanism in the Brussels Regime and a similar 
mechanism in the English courts’ rules applicable to non-EU defendants.79 The English 
courts have taken this approach even where the English ‘anchor defendant’ is not an 
addressee of the relevant infringement decision, but merely a subsidiary of a company 
                                                                
77 Case 352/13 Cartel Damages Claims Hydrogen Peroxide SA v Akzo Nobel NV EU:C:2015:335 (CJEU); 
See also Opinion of AG Jääskinen, Case 352/13 CDC Cartel Damages Claims Hydrogen Peroxide SA v 
Evonik Degussa GmBH, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2443;  See also S. Gartagani, N. Boyle, L. Hannah, Jurisdiction in 
follow-on damages claims: AG Jääskinen’s Opinion in the Hydrogen Peroxide Case, (2015) 8(3) G.C.L.R. 
R.53; See also O. Giess and D. Horst, Cartel damages claims Hydrogen Peroxide SA v Akzo Nobel NV and 
others: a summary and critique of the judgment of the European Court of Justice of May, 21 2015, (2015) 
36(10) E.C.L.R. 430. 
78 Arnaud Nuyts (supra n.18), 63; See also N. Boyle, G. Chhokar, S. Gartagani, Jurisdiction in follow-on 
damages claims: update on the judgement of the European Court of Justice in the hydrogen peroxide cartel 
claim, (2015) 8(3) G.C.L.R. R-58; See also R. Pike and Y. Tosheva, CDC v Evonik Degussa (C-352/13) and 
its potential implications for private enforcement of European competition law, (2015) 8(2) G.C.L.R. 82. 
79 J. Hitchin, P. Arnold, R. Galle, E. Besselink, Competition litigation in the European Union: recent 
developments, available at 
http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Global%20Trends%20in%20Antitrust%20PDFs/comp
etition_litigation_in_the_EU.PDF (accessed 01.08.2016). 
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which is.80 All this said, some cases before the English courts do suggest that there is a 
level of uncertainty as to the question of liability of various legal entities (forming part of 
the infringing undertaking) in cases where the infringement is committed by international 
groups of companies.81 The level of uncertainty would inflate costs, and as a result end-
consumers may decide to avoid attempting to centralise litigation under Article 8(1).82 
 
The concept of anchor defendants has also been invoked in the Netherlands. In the follow-
on proceedings in relation to the Natrium Chloride Cartel83 and the follow-on proceedings 
in relation to the Pre-stressing Steel Cartel,84 several cartel members contested the 
jurisdiction of the Dutch courts. The defendants argued, inter alia, that the necessary close 
connection between the claims submitted was lacking. However, the court held in both 
cases that there was a close connection, as both the cartels involved a single continuous 
infringement.85 
                                                                
80 See Toshiba Carrier UK Ltd. & ors v KME Yorkshire Ltd. & ors [2011] E.W.H.C. 2665 (Ch); [2012] 
EWCA Civ 1190; A. Gerbi and J. Shaerf, Toshiba Carrier: private antitrust actions in England, Corp. Brief. 
2013, Feb, 2-4; See also A. Maton and R. Dhillon, Case comment: Cooper Tyre and Rubber Co v Shell 
Chemicals UK Ltd., (2010) 3(1) G.C.L.R. 47; See also C. Brown, United Kingdom: procedure – follow on 
actions, (2011) 32(1) E.C.L.R. N22; See also J. Kwan, The Damages Directive: end of England’s eminence, 
(2015) 38(11) E.C.L.R. 455; See also J. Ratliff, Major events and policy issues in EU competition law, 2014-
2015: Part 1, (2016) 27(3) I.C.C.L.R. 65; See also T. Woodgate, P. Boylan and C. Owen, Jurisdiction 
revisited, (2015) 14(7) Comp. L.I. 16; See also N. Boyle, L. Hannah, S. Gartagani, Case comment: United 
Kingdom: Supreme Court clarifies time limits for damages claimants in the CAT, (2014) 7(3) G.C.L.R. R41.  
81 It is well established that the concept of ‘undertaking’ which is widely used for the purposes of establishing 
an EU competition law infringement, ‘can embrace a number of legal entities, as long as they act as a single 
economic unit, and no entity acts independently for any relevant purpose.’ (Provimi Ltd. v Aventis Animal 
Nutrition SA [2003] E.W.H.C. 961 (Comm), at 30; See also Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. Europe Ltd. v Shell 
Chemicals UK Ltd. [2010] EWCA Civ 864 at, 47). However, given the fact that many of the pan-European 
business activities are often performed by corporate groups which consist of numerous subsidiaries, a level of 
uncertainty may continue to exist insofar as it may not always be clear ‘which legal entities within a 
corporate group are liable for an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU and to what extent.’ (See the reference 
request by Mr Rabinowitz in Cooper Tire [2010] EWCA Civ 864, at 47) Should an ‘injured party’ (i.e. 
anyone who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of competition law as stated in the Directive at 
Article 4(6)) in relation to pan-European business activities be allowed to sue in any of the countries where 
any of the subsidiaries are incorporated? M. Danov (supra n.35), 489.  
82 M. Danov (supra n.35), 496. 
83 Case number 200 156 295/01 available at 
http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2015:3006 (accessed 01.08.2016). 
84 Case number C / 03/190094 / HA ZA 14-204 available at 
http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2015:1791 (accessed 01.08.2016). 
85 Maverick Advocaten, Dutch courts not afraid of high cartel damages claims, available at 
http://www.maverick-law.com/en/blogs/dutch-courts-not-afraid-of-high-cartel-damage-claims.html (accessed 
01.08.2016); See also Simmons and Simmons, Choosing where to litigate antitrust damages actions, 
available at http://www.simmons-
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2.5 Article 7(5) 
 
Article 7(5) may also be of relevance. It states that, ‘a person domiciled in a Member State 
may, in another Member State, be sued as regards a dispute arising out of the operation of 
a branch, agency or other establishment, in the courts for the place in which the branch, 
agency or other establishment is situated.’  
 
There are two requirements under this provision. First, the defendant domiciled in a 
Member State must have a ‘branch, agency or other establishment’ in another Member 
State. A ‘branch, agency or other establishment’ has been defined by the CJEU86in terms 
of the typical characteristics of a branch office. The branch, agency or other establishment 
must: (i) have a fixed permanent place of business; (ii) be subject to the direction and 
control of the parent; (iii) have a certain autonomy; and (iv) act on behalf of and bind the 
parent.87 Secondly, the dispute must arise out of the operations of the branch, agency or 
other establishment. This requirement is satisfied, inter alia, where there is a non-
contractual action arising out of the activities of the branch, agency or other 
establishment.88 
 
                                                                
simmons.com/~/media/Files/Articles/2015/Antitrust%20and%20merger%20control/Choosing%20where%20
to%20litigate%20antitrust%20damages%20actions.ashx (accessed 01.08.2016); See also M. Bredenoord-
Spoek, C. Swaak, J. Kortmann, Netherlands: parent company can serve as anchor defendant in sodium 
chlorate damages litigation, (2014) 7(3) G.C.L.R. R38. 
86 Case 14/76 De Bloos v Bouyer [1976] E.C.R. 1497; Case 33/78 Somafer v Saar-Ferngas [1978] E.C.R. 
2183; Case 139/80, Blanckaert and Willems v Trost [1981] E.C.R. 819; Case 218/86 Sar Schotte GmbH v 
Parfums Rothschild SARL [1987] E.C.R. 4905; Case 493/93 Lloyd’s Register of Shipping v Soc Campernon 
Bernard [1995] E.C.R. I-961.  
87 J. Fawcett, J. Carruthers, P. North, Cheshire, North and Fawcett: Private International Law, (OUP, 
(2008)), 258. 
88 J. Fawcett, P. Torremans, Intellectual property and private international law, (OUP, (2011)), 175. 
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The CJEU’s broad interpretation of this provision suggests by analogy that this provision 
would also apply to the acts of subsidiaries in the context of competition law 
infringements.89  
 
It is a very useful provision in infringement cases. It would allow, for example, an action to 
be brought in England against a French manufacturing company that markets an infringing 
product in England through its English branch office. The branch office cannot be sued as 
a defendant since it is not a separate legal entity. It follows that the principle of joint 
infringement does not help in this situation. The French manufacturing company, however, 
can be sued in England by virtue of Article 7(5), provided that the dispute arises out of the 
operations of the branch.90On the other hand, if the French manufacturer merely happens to 
have a branch office in England which plays no part in the infringement, Article 7(5) will 
not be engaged.91  
 
In cases where Article 7(5) is engaged, the question arises whether the jurisdiction is 
confined to damage to the claimant in the UK or if it can encompass damage that occurs 
abroad. In IBS Technologies (PVT) Ltd. v APM Technologies92Michael Briggs QC, sitting 
as deputy judge of the High Court, stated obiter93that it was confined to damage within the 
UK. He justified his conclusion through the analogy of the territorial limit under Article 
7(2) of the Regulation. However, if one considers the view of Fawcett and 
Torremans,94there is no such analogy to be drawn with Article 7(2). That provision allows 
                                                                
89 See e.g. Case 33/78 Somafer v Saar-Ferngas [1978] E.C.R. 2183; Case 439/93 Lloyd’s Register of 
Shipping v Campernon Bernard [1995] E.C.R. I-961; F. Cengiz, Antitrust damages actions: lessons from 
indirect purchasers’ litigation, (2010) 59(1) I.C.L.Q. 39, 57. 
90 See Somafer (supra n.89). 
91 J. Fawcett, P. Torremans (supra n.88), 175.  
92 [2003] All E.R. (D) 105. 
93 Ibid., at 61. 
94 J.P. Fawcett and P. Torremans (supra n.88), 176. 
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the claimant to recover for worldwide damage by using the ‘place of acting’ limb of 
Article 7(2). There is no such alternative under Article 7(5).95 
 
Article 7(5) could be used as a basis for jurisdiction in cross-border collective redress 
proceedings brought on behalf of end-consumers in competition law cases. One interesting 
element to consider for the purposes of Article 7(5) is where the subsidiary and parent 
company can be regarded as part of the same economic unit under the EU concept of 
‘undertaking.’ EU competition law denies the narrow legalistic approach of whether the 
subsidiary can bind a parent contractually and adopts the notion of the ‘single economic 
unit.’96 In other words, the end result of adopting the ‘single economic unit’ notion is 
making a foreign parent subject to jurisdiction by virtue of Article 7(5). Although it is true 
that the doctrine of ‘undertaking’ for the purposes of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is 
different from the concepts of ‘legal entity’ or ‘persons’ which must be used when 
establishing jurisdiction under the Regulation, one may still argue that the economic reality 
should prevail when establishing jurisdiction in private antitrust claims brought under 
Article 7(5).97 
 
  
                                                                
95 Ibid.; see also J. Fawcett, J. Carruthers, P. North (supra n.87), 260. 
96 T-112/05 Akzo Nobel NV v Commission (also known as Choline Chloride Cartel) [2007] E.C.R. II-5049; 
T-102/92 Viho Europe BV v Commission [1995] E.C.R. II-17. 
97 L. Gorywoda, N. Hatzimihail, A. Nuyts, Judicial cooperation in matters of market regulation, in A. Nuyts, 
N.E. Hatzimihail, W. de Gruyter, Cross-border class actions: The European Way (2013), 50. 
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2.6 The rules of jurisdiction, forum shopping and the risk of parallel claims 
 
Sections 2.1 to 2.5 have shown that rules of jurisdiction provide the potential to choose 
from a variety of fora in cross-border end-consumer collective competition cases. This can 
create two problems. First, the natural or most appropriate forum may not be chosen. 
Second, failure to consolidate an action concerning all victims of the anticompetitive 
conduct may result in the risk of parallel proceedings. This creates the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments.  
 
The Brussels I Recast Regulation is based on the lis pendens system. The standard rule is 
located in Article 29(1) of the Regulation. The Article requires that where proceedings 
concerning the same cause of action between the same parties are brought in the courts of 
different Member States, any court other than the court first seised shall of its own motion 
stay proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established. 
Generally, this Article will be of limited use in the context of parallel collective redress 
proceedings as the ‘same parties’ requirement contained therein will not be easily 
satisfied.98  
 
Article 30(1) tends to be of more relevance. Where related actions are pending in the courts 
of different Member States, any court other than the court first seised may stay its 
proceedings. For the purposes of this Article, actions are deemed to be related where they 
are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid 
the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.99 The Article is 
designed to deal with those situations that do not fall within the strict matching of pairs as 
                                                                
98Ibid., 52. 
99 Regulation 1215/2012, Article 30(3).  
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designated by Article 29.  The objective of Article 30 is to improve coordination of the 
exercise of judicial functions within the EU and to avoid conflicting and contradictory 
decisions,100 thus facilitating the proper administration of justice in the EU.101 
 
There is no requirement that the parties are the same, and proceedings can relate to 
different causes of action. If the second court seised chooses not to use its discretion to stay 
proceedings before it or decline jurisdiction in favour of the first court (assuming that the 
first court seised has jurisdiction), the consequence is that multiple courts will be 
entertaining litigation on collective claims that are closely related, and could result in 
irreconcilable judgments. Surely this is the very outcome that the lis pendens rules are 
designed to avoid.102 Article 30 could be usefully employed in the context of parallel cross-
border collective actions where Article 29 is inapplicable.103 However, its usefulness is 
tempered by the fact that its application is not mandatory. 
 
Article 30(2) of the Regulation may also be of relevance. It states that 'where the action in 
the court first seised is pending at first instance, any other court may also, on the 
application of one of the parties, decline jurisdiction if the court first seised has jurisdiction 
over the actions in question and its law permits the consolidation thereof.' This provides 
the courts with greater capacity to consolidate proceedings and avoid parallel litigation of 
related claims.104 Article 30(2) is essentially a loose form of forum non conveniens (FNC). 
FNC is a discretionary tool allowing the courts to decline jurisdiction in favour of another 
                                                                
100 Case 406/92 Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Tatry v Owners of the Maciej Rataj [1994] 
E.C.R. I-5439, at 32 and 52. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Regulation 1215/2015, Recital 21: 'In the interests of the harmonious administration of justice it is 
necessary to minimise the possibility of concurrent proceedings and to ensure that irreconcilable judgments 
will be given in different Member States. There should be a clear and effective mechanism for resolving 
cases of lis pendens and related actions...’ 
103 J.N. Stefanelli (supra n.70), 9.21.  
104 Ibid., 9.25. 
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court with jurisdiction, provided that the interests of justice would be better served if 
proceedings took place in another court.105   
 
Only consolidation prevents duplication of judgments and better guarantees the right of a 
public hearing within a reasonable time. In light of this, consolidation seems to be the most 
effective remedy.106 The problem is that consolidation is not mandatory and therefore does 
not guarantee that all actions be resolved consistently. Having such uniformity would 
promote legal certainty and enhance the functioning of Article 30. In the context of 
collective litigation, a test and determinative factors could help the courts sift through 
hundreds of claims and factual allegations in order to indicate when it is most appropriate 
to decline jurisdiction so that litigation can be consolidated.107 
 
Moreover, FNC may be appropriate when the court is first seised by a defendant who has 
filed an action for negative declaratory relief. In such cases, that forum may not necessarily 
be the most appropriate forum, especially in the context of collective proceedings. A 
natural response may be to cite the CJEU case of Owusu v Jackson.108 In this case, the 
                                                                
105 See R.A. Brand and S. Jablonski, Forum non conveniens: History, global practice and future under The 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (Oxford University Press, (2007)); G. Hogan, The Brussels 
Convention, forum non conveniens and the connecting factors problem, (1995) 20(5) E.L.R. 471; In the English 
case of Spiliada Maritime Corp v. Cansulex Ltd., The Spiliada, [1987] A.C. 460, Lord Goff considered the 
factors for engaging FNC. These were: (a) The burden of proof rests on the defendant to persuade the court to 
exercise its discretion to grant a stay (at 476), (b) The burden resting on the defendant is not just to show that 
England is not the natural or appropriate forum for the trial, but to establish that there is another available 
forum which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the English forum (at 477), (c) The natural forum 
was that 'which has the most real and substantial connections,' (at 478 referring to Lord Keith in The Abidin 
Daver [1984] A.C. 398, 415). The connecting factors include convenience or expense, the availability of 
witnesses, the residence of the parties and the governing law, (d) if there is no other available forum 'which is 
clearly more appropriate for the trial of the action,' it will ordinarily refuse a stay, (e) if, however, the court 
concludes at that stage that there is some other available forum which prima facie is clearly more appropriate 
for the trial of the action, the court will ordinarily grant a stay unless there are circumstances by reason of 
which justice requires that a stay should nonetheless be granted (at 478). 
106 Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A Economic an Scientific Policy, Collective 
Redress in Antitrust, 51, available at:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2012/475120/IPOL-
ECON_ET(2012)475120_EN.pdf (accessed 31.05.2016). 
107 J.N. Stefanelli, (supra n.70), 9.51.  
108 Case 281/02 [2005] E.C.R. I-1383; See C.J.S. Knight, Owusu and Turner: the shark in the water? (2007) 
66(2) C.L.J. 288; See also R. Fentiman, Case comment: English domicile and the staying of actions, (2005) 
64(2) C.L.J. 303. 
   
 
  73 
 
CJEU was asked whether it was permissible under the Regulation for a court to exercise its 
discretion in declining jurisdiction to hear a case in favour of the courts of a non-
contracting State. Answering in the negative, the CJEU held that allowing the application 
of FNC would negatively impact the uniform application of the Regulation which 
‘precludes a court of a Contracting State from declining jurisdiction conferred on it 
[…]’109and would undermine the legal certainty sought to be achieved by it.110 While this 
may appear to be the death knell for FNC under the Brussels Regime, two points must be 
highlighted. First, Owusu took place in the context of Article 4 of the Regulation and not 
within the provisions on lis pendens and related actions. Second, the fora at issue were not 
both contracting parties to the Regulation. The case dealt with the UK questioning the 
appropriateness of declining jurisdiction in favour of the Jamaican court.111 The Court of 
Appeal’s reference to the CJEU in Owusu contained an additional question: was the FNC 
doctrine incompatible with the Regulation in all circumstances, or only in some and, if so, 
then which?112 Unfortunately, the CJEU refused to deal with this question as it was 
deemed to be hypothetical in nature.113  
 
It is therefore unclear whether FNC is forbidden in every context under the Regulation. 
Indeed, its inclusion in Article 30 would seem to counsel in favour of its application at 
least in a limited context. That being the case, it is important that the Member State courts 
should have guidelines as to how best to determine whether it is appropriate to decline 
jurisdiction.114 
 
                                                                
109 Owusu (supra n.108), at 46. 
110 Ibid., at 41 and 45. 
111 A. Mills, Private international law and EU external relations: think local act global, or think global act 
local? (2016) 65(3) I.C.L.Q. 541. 
112 Owusu (supra n.108), at 59 et seq. 
113 Ibid., at 47-52; See also the Opinion of Advocate General Léger at 79-81, 217; I. Ovchinnikov, Owusu, lis 
pendens and the recent recast of the Brussels I Regulation, (2006) 19 Trinity C.L. Rev. 40.  
114 J.N. Stefanelli, (supra n.70), 9.54.  
   
 
  74 
 
In Owens Banks, AG Lenz evaluated the circumstances under which a decline of 
jurisdiction could be exercised. 115 AG Lenz set out three main criteria to consider relevant 
to the exercise of discretion under Article 30: (i) the degree of connection between the two 
proceedings and the risk of irreconcilable decisions; (ii) the stage reached in each set of 
proceedings; and (iii) the proximity of the courts to the subject matter of the case.116 He 
then went on to state that a decline of jurisdiction would be sensible in cases where only an 
interim measure could be taken in the proceedings before the second court seised, so as to 
obviate the risk of mutually irreconcilable decisions.117 Finally, he noted the importance of 
the court being in the best position to decide on the matter at issue.118 One waits to see 
whether the CJEU will follow up on this.119It is submitted that the general trend should be 
that wherever possible, the discretion should be exercised to avoid the risk of conflicting 
judgments. In relation to collective redress proceedings, particularly in an antitrust setting, 
this seems to be particularly paramount, as by definition, we are dealing with the same 
illegal activity, by the same corporate defendant that produces harmful events on a wide 
scale across borders.120 
 
The modern doctrine of FNC has been adopted and developed in the US. For example, the 
Supreme Court decision in Gilbert121 set out the basic principle that a court may decline 
jurisdiction if it is a seriously inconvenient forum, provided that another forum exists with 
jurisdiction. The Court then went on to list several private and public interest factors.122 
                                                                
115 Case 129/92 Owen Bank Ltd. v Fulvio Bracco and Bracco Industria Chimica SpA [1994] E.C.R. I-117, at 
74-9. 
116 Ibid., at 76. 
117 Ibid., at 77. 
118 Ibid., at 79. 
119 J.N. Stefanelli (supra n.70), 9.54.  
120 A. Nuyts (supra n.18), 81. See also Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. Europe & ors v Bayer Public Co Ltd. & ors 
at 117–118 which demonstrates that under the current framework a court can choose not to stay its proceedings 
by exercising its discretionary power to proceed with the action.  
121 J.N. Stefanelli (supra n.70), 9.55; Gulf Oil Corp. v Gilbert 330 US 501 (1947); J. Bies, Conditioning 
forum non conveniens, (2000) 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 489; E.L. Barrett, Doctrine of forum non conveniens, 
(1947) 35 Cal. L. Rev. 390; J.E. Ryan, Forum non conveniens, (1970) 1 Pac. L. J 532. 
122 Gulf Oil (supra n.121), at 508-9. 
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Private interest factors included: (i) accessibility of sources of proof; (ii) location of 
witnesses; and (iii) the availability of compulsory process for attendance of the unwilling. 
Public interest factors were described as administrative difficulties for courts, such as 
caseload build-up and the idea that jury duty should not be imposed on people from a 
community with no connection to the litigation.123 
 
Inspiration may also be drawn from a project of the American Law Institute (ALI) and the 
International Institution for the Unification of Private International Law (UNIDROIT). 
With regards to FNC, it has been suggested that: 
 
'Jurisdiction may be declined or the proceedings suspended when the court is manifestly 
inappropriate relative to another more appropriate court that could exercise jurisdiction.'124 
 
It is also suggested that: 
 
'the court should decline jurisdiction or suspend the proceedings when the dispute is 
previously pending in another competent court to exercise jurisdiction, unless it appears 
that the dispute will not be fairly, effectively, and expeditiously resolved in that forum.'125 
 
Commentary specifically identifies the manifestly inappropriate principle and emphasises 
that the existence of another more convenient forum is necessary in order to apply the 
principle properly.126 The implementation rules suggest that a forum should decline 
                                                                
123 Ibid. 
124 ALI/UNIDROIT, Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, Principle 2.5 (Cambridge University Press 
(2006)); See also International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/work-in-progress-studies/current-studies/transnational-civil-procedure (accessed 
02.08.2016). 
125 ALI/UNIDROIT, Principle 2.6.  
126 ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, Principle 2, Comment P-2F. 
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jurisdiction in three situations: (i) where an exclusive jurisdiction agreement chooses 
another forum; (ii) where the forum is manifestly inappropriate; or (iii) where the dispute is 
pending in another forum that was seised first.127 The forum may exercise its jurisdiction 
where it appears that the dispute would not be quickly and effectively solved, or for other 
compelling reasons, the latter of which are not specified in the implementation rules.128 
 
The above commentary is intended to illustrate the worth of having clear guidelines for the 
decline of jurisdiction under Article 30(2). The factors included in the examples above 
reveal that Member State courts should be considering the practical as well as the public 
interest when trying to justify the retention of jurisdiction in situations where it would be 
more sensible in terms of judicial economy and fairness for the parties to resolve the 
dispute in another forum.129 
 
In the context of collective actions, these factors become even more relevant. When faced 
with group litigation involving facts, witnesses, and evidence potentially from a multitude 
of jurisdictions, it is very important for a court seised to be able to evaluate properly 
whether it is indeed the most appropriate forum to hear the dispute, or whether it should 
decline jurisdiction in favour of a more appropriate forum in which most of the 
discoverable items and deposable witnesses are located.130 
 
  
                                                                
127 J.N. Stefanelli (supra n.70), 9.60.  
128 ALI/UNIDROIT (supra n.124), Principle 4.7.  
129 J.N. Stefanelli (supra n.70), 9.62.  
130Ibid., 9.53. 
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2.7 Strengthening communication and interaction between the courts 
 
In its Green Paper, the European Commission questioned whether problems encountered in 
the operation of the lis pendens and related actions provisions of the Brussels I Regulation 
might be solved by strengthening communication and interaction between the 
courts.131Judicial cooperation could be vital to the determination of whether parallel 
collective actions come within inter alia the ambit of Article 30. Cooperation such as this 
has been recognised as vital in both the United States and Canada.132  
 
The Manual for Complex Litigation (the Manual) is used by judges and lawyers in the US 
in order to assist them in dealing with and managing complex cases, such as multi-
jurisdictional litigation and class actions.133The Manual discusses coordination in several 
contexts, depending on whether the competing cases are filed in state or federal court. The 
Manual suggests that in situations where related actions are pending within different 
federal courts and consolidation is unavailable, judges should coordinate their proceedings 
in order to avoid duplication and conflicts. Specific suggestions include: (i) the designation 
of one case as ‘the lead case,’ which may include a stay in the other proceedings or an 
agreement that rulings in the lead can be given presumptive force; (ii) holding joint 
conferences of judges that might result in joint or parallel orders in the pending cases; (iii) 
encouraging methods by which to avoid duplicative discovery, for example, filing or cross-
filing disposition notices and requests for production in related cases; and (iv) drafting 
‘class definitions’ in order to prevent conflicts between class actions.134 
                                                                
131 Green Paper on the review of Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters COM (2009) 175, 7. 
132 J.N. Stefanelli (supra n.70), 9.38; See also Z.S. Tang, Class action in cross-border contracts in Electronic 
consumer contracts in the conflict-of-laws (Bloomsbury, (2015)), 295. 
133 Federal Judicial Centre, Manual for Complex Litigation, available at 
https://public.resource.org/scribd/8763868.pdf (accessed 02.08.2016).   
134 Ibid., at Part II, section 20.14 (related federal cases) and section 20.3 (related state and federal cases). 
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Where multiple cases are pending in federal and state courts, whether to coordinate 
proceedings is determined on a case-by-case basis according to need and opportunity.135In 
terms of necessity, the Manual specifies that ‘[t]he need to coordinate is especially acute 
where overlapping or multiple identical class actions are filed in more than one court.’136In 
such cases and as a threshold step, the Manual recommends that the courts direct counsel 
to identify all similar cases in other courts, their procedural posture, and the judges 
assigned to each case.137It goes on to suggest that as a minimum, judges should exchange 
case materials such as master pleadings, questionnaires, and discovery protocols.138 
 
In Canada, the Uniform Class Proceedings Act139was amended specially to include a 
cooperative model, as it was believed that Canadian class actions function effectively due 
in part to informal cooperation between class counsel.140Moreover, the Uniform Law 
Conference of Canada’s (ULCC) Committee on National Class and Related 
Interjurisdictional Issues recommended that Canadian courts adopt the American Law 
Institute’s (ALI) Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communications in Cross-
Border Cases (the Guidelines).141The Guidelines formally encourage courts to 
communicate with each other through various methods such as video-conferencing, or 
sending other courts copies of documents such as transcripts, orders, or judgments.142They 
                                                                
135 Ibid., at section 20.311-13.  
136 Ibid., at section 20.311. 
137 Ibid., at section 20.312. 
138 Ibid, at section 20.313. 
139 SO 1992, c 6 (consolidated 2006). 
140 Uniform Law Conference of Canada (ULCC), Civil Law Section, Report of the Uniform Law Conference 
of Canada’s Committee in the national class and related inter-jurisdictional issues: Background, analysis, 
and recommendations (ULCC Report) (2005), at 4-5, available at 
http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/299713/3665806/1248395359747/ULCC_Report.pdf?token=kUXzzHM
2WrJxNiWB0Nx53sIqF78%3D (accessed 02.08.2016). 
141 The American Law Institute, Guidelines applicable to court-to-court communications in cross-border 
cases, available at: www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=16C102A7-C52E-455B-A03A-
E7D1280C1F66 (accessed 06.06.16). 
142 Ibid., Guideline 6. 
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also discuss the possibility for joint hearings.143The EU may wish to consider the adoption 
of similar guidelines to establish a more formal method of coordination among Member 
States. 
 
Coordination and communication could be reinforced by a centralised registry of collective 
actions in the European Union. The creation of a registry in Canada was recommended by 
the ULCC,144and there is a specific legal basis for one in the Uniform Class Proceedings 
Act.145This has been developed into the Canadian National Class Action Database.146 
 
The US does not yet have a central database for class actions. In the context of the EU, a 
registry could be established at moderate cost and be managed by a pre-existing European 
Union-wide body such as the European Judicial Network (EJN). Indeed, the Law Society 
of England and Wales suggested that the EJN be given a role in effectuating improved 
communication.147 Moreover, the Czech Republic stated that it agrees that ‘the risk of 
negative conflicts of jurisdiction could be addressed by a cooperation and communication 
mechanism between the courts involved and by an obligation on the part of the court which 
declined jurisdiction to re-open the case if the court first seized declines jurisdiction.’148 A 
similar responses came from Hungary.149 As more Member States adopt legislation 
allowing for collective redress proceedings, a central registry could act as a clearing house 
                                                                
143 Ibid., Guideline 9. 
144 ULCC Report (supra n.140), at 16. 
145 The commentary to the Act provides in relation to s(2)(b) that ‘…a Canadian Class Proceedings Registry 
is to be established as a searchable electronic database of class proceedings [which] would include all class 
action filings and annotation of any subsequent material events.’  
146 The Canadian Bar Association, Class Action Database, available at https://www.cba.org/Publications-
Resources/Class-Action-Database (accessed 06.06.2016). 
147 Response of the Law Society of England and Wales, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/civil/opinion/files/090630/civil_society_ngo_academics_others/law_so
ciety_england_wales_en.pdf (accessed 22.08.2016), para 18. 
148 Response of the Czech Republic, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/civil/opinion/files/090630/ms_governments/czech_republic_en.pdf 
(accessed 22.08.2016), 8. 
149 Response from Hungary, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/civil/opinion/files/090630/ms_governments/hungary_en.pdf (accessed 
22.08.2016), 6. 
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for lawyers to consult in order to determine the existence of collective proceedings and 
better avoid the filing of parallel cross-border collective proceedings.150 At paragraph 35 of 
the Recommendation, it is stated that the Member States should establish a national 
registry of collective redress actions. Paragraph 36 states that the national registry should 
be available free of charge to any interested person through electronic means and 
otherwise. Websites publishing the registries should provide access to comprehensive and 
objective information on the available methods of obtaining compensation, including out 
of court methods. Moreover, paragraph 37 states that the Member States, assisted by the 
Commission should endeavour to ensure coherence of the information gathered in the 
registries and their interoperability. It is submitted that this could be carried out through the 
EJN. 
 
However, there may be disadvantages to enhanced cooperation between courts, or the 
creation of a body to regulate parallel cross-border collective actions. This can extend the 
length of proceedings by delaying pending litigation and possibly affording one side 
advantages over the other.151The creation of a body will also require political will-power 
which is often hard to garner in the context of supra-national initiatives. However, over all, 
it is argued that increased communication and cooperation is, for the most part, quite easily 
implemented and should be carefully considered at European level.152 
 
The EU may also wish to consider the possibility of assigning to one body the role of 
managing multi-jurisdictional collective actions. In the federal courts of the US, this is 
handled by the MDL Panel [Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation]. The MDL Panel 
consists of seven federal circuit and district judges designated by the Chief Justice of the 
                                                                
150 J.N. Stefanelli (supra n.70), 9.44.  
151 Ibid., 9.45. 
152 Ibid. 
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US and is authorised to transfer civil actions that involve common questions of fact to a 
common district for consolidation of pre-trial proceedings if it is determined that doing so 
would support the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and promote efficient 
resolutions of the actions.153  
 
When choosing the transferee district court, the MDL Panel considers factors such as: (i) 
which jurisdiction holds the largest number of pending cases; (ii) where discovery has 
occurred; (iii) where the cases have progressed the furthest; (iv) the site of the occurrence 
of the common facts; (v) the place where the cost and inconvenience would be most 
minimised; and (vi) the experience and caseloads of potential judges.154 
 
There may be scope for the EJN155 to act as a sort of MDL Panel and to make decisions 
regarding transfer and consolidation of proceedings under Article 30 of the Brussels I 
Regulation. It may be preferable to have an external body making objective determinations 
regarding the appropriate forum for collective actions when faced with related actions 
across multiple Member States. Coupled with management of a central registry, the EJN 
would have a unique ability to assess fully the appropriateness of consolidation.156 
Consolidation of proceedings should also be viewed as an important tool in reducing 
parallel litigation. It is provided for already under Article 15 of the Brussels II bis 
Regulation concerning matrimonial property.157 This is a discretionary mechanism that 
allows courts with jurisdiction to stay proceedings or transfer them to another court that: (i) 
'has a particular connection' to the case (or child, in the context of Regulation); (ii) is better 
                                                                
153 Ibid. 
154 See R. Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, (2000) 80(2) Boston University Law Review 462.  
155 See S. Weatherill, EU consumer law and policy, (Edward Elgar Publishing, (2005)). 
156 J.N. Stefanelli (supra n.70), 9.48.  
157 Regulation 2201/2003/EC concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation 1347/2000 OJ L 338 
23.12.2003 1. 
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placed to hear the case (or a specific part); and (iii) is in the best interests of the litigant 
(child).  
 
Consolidation was suggested by the Commission in its Green Paper in the context of 
former Article 6(1) [now Article 8(1)].158 It contemplated an extension of the Article which 
allows a claimant to sue one of a number of defendants in the forum where any one of 
them is domiciled, so long as the claim is very closely connected. The Green Paper 
suggested that the rule could be extended to allow for the consolidation 'if the court has 
jurisdiction over a certain quorum of defendants.' Consolidation in this manner did not 
make it into the Regulation. 
 
Member State courts should make use of consolidation of proceedings, especially in the 
context of cross-border collective actions where it may be more efficient to determine all 
the related claims together. The decision whether to consolidate proceedings could be 
made jointly through any of the cooperation methods previously described, or it could be 
made by a centralised body, such as the EJN.  
  
                                                                
158 Green Paper on the review of Regulation 44/2001, 7 (supra n.131). 
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2.8 The applicable law and competition law  
 
The next part of this chapter shall focus on the relationship between forum shopping and 
the applicable law in cross-border collective competition cases involving end-consumers.  
 
2.9 The rules governing the applicable law  
 
The Rome II Regulation159 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations sets out an 
important cornerstone in the European harmonisation of conflict-of-laws rules alongside 
the Brussels I Recast Regulation on the recognition and enforcement of civil jurisdiction 
and judgments. It establishes a unified set of conflict-of-law rules for all non-contractual 
obligations arising in civil and commercial matters including violations of competition 
rules and thus enables the courts in all EU Member States (with the exception Denmark)160 
to determine the applicable substantive law on a common basis. The scope of the 
substantive law determined in accordance with the Rome II Regulation covers a wide area 
of liability-related issues. This includes inter alia, the basis and extent of liability, the 
determination of the persons that can be held liable and the determination and assessment 
of any damage or any remedy claimed and the limitation period applicable to such 
claims.161 Also the burden of proof and presumptions of law are considered matters of 
substance that fall within the scope of the Regulation.162 With respect to competition law, 
this means that the Regulation determines not only the applicable set of rules of substantive 
competition law but also the entire legal regime that governs the civil law claims arising 
from an infringement.  
                                                                
159 Regulation 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ L 199 21.7.2007 
40. 
160 Ibid., Article 1(4). 
161 Ibid., Article 15. 
162 Ibid., Article 22(1); Article 1(3) states that the Regulation shall not apply to evidence and procedure. 
These issues are governed by the lex fori.  
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Instead of applying the general rule expressed in Article 4163 to competition law 
infringements, the Commission elected when drafting the Rome II Regulation to include 
applicable law rules which concern inter alia obligations arising from 'acts restricting free 
competition.' These rules, which are contained in Article 6(3) of the Regulation, 'may not 
be derogated from by agreement' and are accordingly mandatory. Recital 21 states that the 
special rule in Article 6 is not an exception to the general rule in Article 4(1) but rather a 
clarification of it.164 
 
Acts restricting free competition 
 
Recital 23 states that for the purposes of this Regulation, the concept of restriction of 
competition should cover inter alia prohibitions on agreements between undertakings 
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition 
within a Member State or within the internal market, as well as prohibitions on the abuse 
of a dominant position within a Member State or within the internal market. The rules as to 
private law antitrust claims are contained in Article 6(3), which provides as follows 
(emphasis added): 
 
3. (a) The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a restriction of 
competition shall be the law of the country where the market is, or is likely to be, affected.  
                                                                
163 Article 4(1) concerns the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in 
which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the 
indirect consequences of the event occur.  
164 See E.R. Pineau, Conflicts of laws comes to the rescue of competition law: The new Rome II Regulation, 
(2009) 5. J. Priv. Int’l L. 311; V. Boucek, European antitrust law in the Regulation Rome II, (2012) 62(5) 
Zbornik PFZ 1731; C.H. Kaminsky, Rome II Regulation: A comparative perspective on federalising choice 
of law, (2010) 85(1) Tul. L. Rev. 55. 
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(b) When the market is, or is likely to be, affected in more than one country, the person 
seeking compensation for damage who sues in the court of the domicile of the defendant, 
may instead choose to base his or her claim on the law of the court seised, provided that 
the market in that Member State is amongst those directly and substantially affected by the 
restriction of competition out of which the non-contractual obligation on which the claim is 
based arises; where the claimant sues, in accordance with the applicable rules on 
jurisdiction, more than one defendant in that court, he or she can only choose to base his or 
her claim on the law of that court if the restriction of competition on which the claim 
against each of these defendants relies directly and substantially affects also the market in 
the Member State of that court. 
 
The key element in determining the substantive law applicable to competition claims under 
the Rome II Regulation is the 'affected market.' If a market is affected (or is likely to be 
affected) only in one county, then the law of this country is applicable irrespective of where 
the claimant brings their claim. If a market is (or is likely to be) affected in more than one 
country, the claimant has the opportunity to choose the lex fori for their entire claim if the 
conditions of Article 6(3)(b) are met. The Regulation however remains silent on the 
applicable law in cases where the market is affected in more than one country, but the 
conditions of Article 6(3)(b) are not met. 
 
The 'affected market' 
 
The Regulation does not assist in determining when a market is 'affected.' Some 
commentators assume that in the absence of guidance, the usual methods of market 
definition have to be applied and thus the determination of the applicable law necessitates a 
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fully-fledged market definition as a prerequisite.165 Holzmueller and von Koeckritz166 do 
not share this view. They argue that market definition is a part of the substantive analysis 
of alleged restrictions of competition and thus a matter of substantive competition law. The 
purpose of Article 6(3) is the marking out of the laws of various jurisdictions and their 
respective territorial scope. This is in the first place a delineation of the geographical reach 
of national competition laws. An 'affected market' in a given country should be considered 
to exist if the goods or services that are allegedly subject to anti-competitive practices are 
sold/offered in or delivered into this country. In other words, it should be sufficient that the 
alleged conduct has (or is likely to have) effects in the territory of the relevant country.167 
It could be argued that Recital 21 speaks in favour of this interpretation. It states that the 
rules contained in Article 6 are not an exception to the lex loci damni principle of Article 
4(1), but rather a 'clarification' of this principle.168 Thus, the concept of the 'affected 
market' is meant further to specify the locus damni of a competition law violation. This is 
the geographic place where damage occurs or is likely to occur.  
 
In Article 2(1) of the Regulation, damage relates to any consequence arising out of a 
tort/delict. Therefore, an affected market would be the place where the restriction of 
competition leads to (or is likely to lead to) 'consequences.' This could be deemed to be any 
place where the anti-competitive conduct in question is aimed, where the products or 
services affected by the anti-competitive practices are offered, sold or delivered and where 
the anti-competitive conduct is capable of having detrimental effects for competitors and 
consumers. This finding essentially corresponds to the application of the 'implementation 
                                                                
165 A. Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation: The law applicable to non-contractual obligations, (OUP, 
(2008)), 6.63.  
166 T. Holzmueller and C. von Koeckritz, Private enforcement of competition law under the Rome II 
Regulation, (2010) 3(3) G.C.L.R. 91, 92. 
167 Ibid. 
168 M. Hellner, Unfair competition and acts restricting free competition, (2007) 9 Yearbook of Private 
International Law 49, 52. 
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doctrine’ that is used in the EU for delineating the scope of applicability of its own 
competition laws.169 Broadly speaking, a market in a certain geographic area is likely to be 
affected if it is likely that the anticompetitive practice is implemented in this territory. For 
this to happen, it is sufficient that the relevant goods or services affected by the alleged 
anticompetitive agreement are sold or delivered into the relevant geographic area.170 
 
Article 6(3)(a) and cases with several affected markets 
 
In most cases relevant under the Rome II Regulation, the actual or likely effects of 
anticompetitive conduct will not be limited to the territory of a single Member State. Under 
these circumstances, Article 6(3)(a) will require the application of the law of each of the 
countries covered by the affected market on a distributive basis.171 The domestic law of 
each country in which a market is affected must be applied. This so-called 'mosaic 
principle' is a consequence of the strictly territorial effects regime of Article 6(3)(a). 
Especially with regard to damage claims against participants of international cartels, this 
could lead to unsatisfactory results if it implied that claimants would have to split their 
damages claims into national parts and collect each part under the respective national law. 
The mosaic view has therefore been widely criticised for being impractical and 
establishing a de facto barrier to the recovery of multinational damages.172  
 
  
                                                                
169 See John E. Ferry, Towards completing the charm: the Woodpulp judgment, (1989) 11(1) E.I.P.R. 19. 
170 L. Lanucara, Globalization of antitrust enforcement: Governance issues and legal responses, (2001) 9(2) 
Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 433, 437. 
171 T. Holzmueller and C. von Koeckritz (supra n.166), 94. 
172 For a critical appraisal of the 'mosaic principle' on competition law claims see J. Fitchen, Choice-of-law in 
international claims based on restrictions of competition: Article 6(3) of the Rome II Regulation, (2009) 5(2) 
J. Priv. Int’l. L. 346, 355. 
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The lex fori in Article 6(3)(b) 
 
Article 6(3)(b) offers the possibility to achieve what Article 6(3)(a) is not able to secure. 
This offers the allocation of a uniform law for the assessment of a competition-law 
infringement and its consequences in 'transnational cases' (i.e. cases with affected markets 
in more than one Member State). The rationale of this rule is to concentrate claims arising 
from restrictions of competition affecting more than one national market.173 The rule is 
namely intended to facilitate the recovery of damages for international cartels and to limit 
the difficulties and costs arising from the application of foreign law.174 
 
Under Article 6(3)(b), the claimant may choose to select the application of a single law. 
This option is subject to several conditions that minimise the opportunity for the claimant 
to 'shop' for the appropriate law. First, Article 6(3)(b) will only apply to damages claims. 
Second, the claimant can only choose the lex fori and not the law of another country in 
which a market is (or may be) affected. Third, the choice of the lex fori is only possible if 
the claimant brings a claim in an EU Member State where at least one of the defendants 
has their domicile. This ensures that at least one of the defendants has a degree of 
familiarity with the local law given that it will be their own domestic law. Fourth, the 
claimant cannot choose the law of the forum state (domicile state of one of the defendants) 
only because the market in the forum state is likely to be affected. Rather, a market must be 
directly and substantially affected by the competition law infringement in question. This 
would seem to require a higher standard than the 'affected market’ standard in Article 
6(3)(a). It is not sufficient that the forum state is only very remotely or indirectly affected 
by the anticompetitive conduct in question, or that it is only 'likely' that the relevant 
                                                                
173 Rome II Regulation, Recital 22. 
174 T. Holzmueller and C. von Koeckritz (supra n.166), 94. 
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conduct may affect the market in this country. Nevertheless, it remains unclear to what 
extent the standard of 'directly and substantially affected markets' goes beyond the basic 
effect of Article 6(3)(a). The reasons lying behind the imposition of this additional test are 
thought by some to be quite obscure.175Holzmueller and von Koeckritz argue that Article 
6(3)(b) requires that the forum state must be one of the main places where the competitive 
practice in question is directly implemented by the defendant. There must be a 'genuine 
link' to the forum state.176 This means that, in cases of 'restrictions by object', the 
anticompetitive conduct must be directly aimed at restricting competition in the forum 
state. In cases of 'restrictions by effect,' the forum state must be one of the countries in 
which the anticompetitive effects are directly felt.177  
 
The difficulty of the ‘direct and substantial link may be demonstrated in practice. In price-
fixing cases, for example, one way would be to measure the number of goods sold at 
inflated prices on a given market. If, for example, the cartel covers Luxembourg and 
Germany and one million items are sold at cartelised prices in Germany whereas 50,000 
items are sold in Luxembourg, then only the German market would be ‘directly and 
substantially’ affected by the price-fixing. This solution would lead to the outcome that in 
most cases suits could not be concentrated in smaller EU Member States since in those 
States the number of goods sold is much lower than in larger countries with more 
demand.178  
 
                                                                
175 J. Segan, Applicable law 'shopping'? Rome II and private antitrust Enforcement in the EU, (2008) 7(3) 
C.L.J. 251, 260. 
176T. Holzmueller and C. von Koeckritz (supra n.166), 94. 
177 Ibid. 
178 S. Franq and W. Wurmnest, International antitrust claims under the Rome II Regulation, in J. Basedow, 
S. Franq, L. Idot, International antitrust litigation: Conflicts-of-laws and coordination, (Bloomsbury 
Publishing, (2012)), section vi, para. A. 
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Another way to demonstrate the required link would be to look at the coverage of the 
various markets. If, for example, a cartel manages to fix prices for 100 per cent of the 
goods sold in Luxembourg but not all suppliers of the German market join the price-fixing 
cartel such that only 40 per cent of the goods are sold in Germany at inflated prices, it can 
be argued that a plaintiff can invoke the concentration only before courts in Luxembourg. 
It may be argued that the latter interpretation would set too many incentives for forum 
shopping and should therefore not be followed.179  
 
Party autonomy  
 
The substantive law as determined by Article 6(3) Rome II is not subject to a deliberate 
choice of the parties. Article 6(4) excludes competition law claims from choice-of-law 
agreements pursuant to Article 14. Beyond the scope of Article 6(3)(b) the parties can 
therefore not exercise any influence on the applicable competition law. 
 
2.10 The Rome II Regulation and cross-border collective redress 
 
According to Article 6(3)(b) Rome II Regulation, in cartels affecting more than one 
country, the claimant can choose the application of the law that combines the forum, the 
defendant's domicile and the affected market. On the face of it, the provision in its 
formulation is not applicable to cross-border collective actions. It appears to require that 
the claimants suffered injuries in more than one market, whereas the issue in cross-border 
collective actions is that multiple claimants suffered their injuries each in a different 
market. Regardless of whether this is the correct literal interpretation; however, based on 
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its aims the provision should clearly apply to the multinational collective action, too.180 
Perhaps though, in the interests of certainty, some reference or guidance should be inserted 
into the Rome II Regulation. The Directive on rules governing damages actions for 
infringements of Articles 101 and 102181 which requires Member States to ensure full 
compensation by enabling an action for damages, has proved highly controversial. Aside 
from a fleeting reference in its explanatory memorandum to Article 6(3) of the Rome II 
Regulation, it does not address the questions of the law applicable to these mass damages 
claims.182 
 
2.11 A new conflicts-of-law rule specifically for collective redress in antitrust 
scenarios  
 
The collective action may be greatly simplified if a new choice-of-law rule could be found. 
For example, the applicable law could be allocated on the basis of the defendant's 
domicile. This is a familiar connecting factor, especially in contract law.183 From an 
antitrust perspective, as the defendant has allegedly caused the mass damage with victims 
in several countries, they must accept that for the sake of effective handling of the case, the 
law of the place of their conduct applies instead of the general lex loci damni rule.184 This 
rule can be questionable, however. Application of the defendant's home state law creates 
the risk that defendants may deliberately incorporate (or choose their main place of 
                                                                
180 R. Michaels, European class actions and applicable law, in in A. Nuyts, N.E. Hatzimihail, W. de Gruyter, 
Cross-border class actions: The European Way (2013), 131. 
181 Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union OJ L 349 
5.12.2014 1. 
182 A. Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation: The law applicable to non-contractual obligations updating 
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business) in low liability states,185including states outside the EU that do not comply with 
the acquis communitaire.  
 
If one wishes to establish a common law based on the claimants rather than the defendant's 
interests, it would be possible to consider the place where most of the victims are 
domiciled.186 A comparable approach would be to apply the law of the most affected 
market.187 However, this will not necessarily provide a satisfactory connection. In cases in 
which the vast majority of injuries is suffered in this one market, the result may be 
justifiable. If, however, a large number of markets are affected and none of them alone 
combines a very large portion of the overall injury, it is not obvious why all claims should 
be subject to that one law. Furthermore, such an approach is likely to prioritise the laws of 
big countries over those of small countries. Finally, the most affected market can 
sometimes be hard to determine, leading to uncertainty about the applicable law, which is 
why the Commission chose to reject it.188 
 
McCloud and Rosenberg advocate the use of applying the ‘average’ of differing State laws 
in order to overcome this choice-of-law impediment to the use of collective actions, yet 
without compromising the functionality of the civil liability in any significant way. 189 
They consider this from a US perspective: 
 
‘The existence of significantly different state laws currently poses a virtually insuperable 
obstacle to certification of multistate, diversity class actions. Interpreting and applying 
                                                                
185 See York-Erwin, 2009 84 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1815.  
186 See for example, European Parliament Resolution of 2 February 2012 on Towards a coherent European 
approach to collective redress (2011/2089 (INI)), 10, para. 27. 
187 Green Paper on consumer collective redress, COM (2008) 794, 14, para. 59. 
188 Commission Communication (supra n.4), 14.  
189 L. McCloud and D. Rosenberg, A solution to the choice-of-law problem of differing state laws in class 
actions: Average law, (2011) 79 G.W. L. Rev. 374. 
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many diverging, not infrequently conflicting state laws – often of all 50 states plus the 
District of Columbia and US territories – obviously can increase the complexity and cost of 
resolving numerous claims by class-wide trial. Indeed, though class actions rarely go to 
trial, it is presumed that a judge could not possibly, let alone practically, instruct the class 
action jury on the nuances and intricacies of the laws of the fifty states. In general, courts 
regard the potential management difficulties and diseconomies of this ‘daunting enterprise’ 
sufficient to tip the balance against class action certification. These concerns dominate 
even when all other indicators point in the direction of certifying the class, including the 
predominance of common factual questions, availability of formulaic, statistical, or other 
acceptable methods for estimating and distributing an aggregate damage award on an 
individual basis, and core policy favouring collectivised enforcement of recovery 
claims.’190 
 
McLeod and Rosenberg define the 'average law' as the mean recovery value that would 
result from resolving all collective claims under their respective governing state laws.191 
They consider this trans-substantively to any case, regardless of its formal or conventional 
classification such as, inter alia, tort, contract, property, environmental hazard or 
competition. Ultimately, their aim in demonstrating the utility of the average law solution 
is to facilitate the wider and more effective use of the collective action, which provides the 
best, most socially appropriate means of resolving mass injury cases. They argue that the 
use of average law to determine a defendant's aggregate liability and damages can increase 
the efficacy of collective actions generally.192 For high recovery claims, greater efficiency 
is seen as a function of the similarities among claims that enable courts and parties to 
capitalise on the scale efficiency from adjudication and litigating questions of common 
                                                                
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid, 375. 
192 Ibid. 
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import. Making a 'once-and-for-all' investment on those questions, and spreading the cost 
across all claims, avoids the expense of courts and parties having needlessly to repeat their 
efforts to resolve multiple, similar claims in separate actions. By spreading the collective 
or common question, the collective action yields great savings in processing costs, usually 
put in terms of absolute reductions in expenditures by the court and parties.193  
 
McLeod and Rosenberg offer a simple example of how the average law solution would 
work: 
 
‘Suppose a class comprised of two small-recovery claims, each governed by different state 
laws, one that would impose liability and one that would deny liability. Further, assume 
that the class would be certified but for the costs of applying the varying state laws at 
class-wide trial to determine the defendant’s aggregate liability and damages. In this case, 
the court could solve the choice-of-law problem by deriving the average (or mean value) of 
the two conflicting laws analytically by conceptualising some appropriate intermediate 
liability rule or statistically by random sampling. The reliability and comparatively low 
cost of statistical averaging renders it decidedly preferable to analytical averaging that 
necessarily requires finding words to express the mean value with a tolerable degree of 
precision. Our analysis proceeds on this preference for statistical over analytical averaging. 
Nevertheless, assuming their equivalent effectiveness in the example, both methods would 
produce identical results. Under the average analytically-derived liability rule or 
statistically-derived norm of probability discounted liability, the defendant would be liable 
on each claim for 50% of the causally-related loss, which by assumption the court could 
appropriately distribute among class members.’ 
 
                                                                
193 Ibid., 392. 
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McLeod and Rosenberg are not the first to consider the use of the average law solution. 
Most notably, the ALI’s Principles of the law of aggregate litigation194identified average 
law as one approach to solving the differing law problem in class action. However, they 
dismissed it as ‘foreclosed by the recognition that each body of substantive law derives 
from a particular sovereign and that courts lack authority to resolve choice-of-law disputes 
in class action through amalgamation of laws of multiple sovereigns’195This argument 
came from Judge Posner’s ruling over the certification of a national product liability class 
action. He held that there had been an abuse of discretion in part because of the district 
court’s effort to solve the choice-of-law problem by melding 50 differing state negligence 
standards into a single class-wide jury charge. Posner criticised the lower court for 
subjecting the defendants to class-wide trial under a law that was ‘no actual law of any 
jurisdiction’ but rather ‘a kind of Esperanto instruction.’196The Principles supplements 
Posner’s objections with the explanation that application of the average rather than the 
actual differing state laws ‘risks exposing the defendant to a legal standard for which it did 
not have notice at the time of underlying conduct.’197 
 
McLeod and Rosenberg argue that this outlook is mistaken.198 They state that this 
resistance to the average law stems from the prevailing view among courts and 
commentators that the nature of the governing law and businesses’ understanding and 
response to it at the time of the underlying conduct is the same regardless of whether the 
contemplated activity involves an intrastate or interstate risk. They state that their principal 
contribution is a basic, straightforward point: the average of differing state laws is in 
reality the actual law that in fact ultimately governs the choice a business will make and 
                                                                
194 American Law Institute, Principles of the law of aggregate litigation, (2010). 
195 Ibid., Principle 2.5. Comment. 
196 In re Rhone-Poulec Rorer, Inc., 51 F. 3d. 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995). 
197 American Law Institute, Principle 2.05, Comment b.  
198 L. McCloud and D. Rosenberg (supra n.189), 379.  
   
 
  96 
 
expresses the choice the multiple states involved expect and presumably want the business 
to make regarding whether and how safely it should engage in activities involving 
interstate risk.199 
 
Any attempt to create a choice-of-law rule exclusive to cross-border collective redress does 
not come without major obstacles. The primary issue is that choice-of-law rules are 
substantive in nature. They define the parties' rights. They must also be clear, reliable, and 
foreseeable. In the European context, a new conflicts rule designed particularly for mass 
litigation would be in clear contrast to Article 6 of the Rome II Regulation. Antitrust 
victims would have to accept the application of a different substantive law merely owing to 
the fact that they are not the only victims of the wrongdoing. The general concept of 
collective action is that a coherence of the claims already exists. To use a class action as 
the justification for altering choice-of-law rules would be 'to put the cart before the 
horse.'200 
 
Changing conflict-of-laws rules for the efficient use of litigation resources can be tolerated 
only where a public interest clearly prevails and no other solutions arise. For the US law, 
Larry Kramer argues that whatever choice-of-law is to be used, it should be the same both 
for ordinary and for complex cases:  
 
'[I]t should not change simply because, as a matter of administrative convenience and 
efficiency, we have combined many claims in one proceedings.'201 
 
                                                                
199 Ibid.  
200 L. Silberman, The role of choice-of-law in national class actions, (2008) 15(6) U. PA. L. Rev. 2001, 2022. 
201 L. Kramer, Choice-of-law in complex litigation (1996) 71 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 547, 549. 
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In the Commission Communication202 stakeholders raised the problem that, under the EU’s 
current conflicts-of-laws rules, a court to which a collective dispute is submitted in a case 
involving claimants from several Member States would sometimes have to apply several 
different laws to the substance of the claim. The Commission admitted that there can be 
situations where the conflicts-of-laws rules can render cross-border litigation complex, in 
particular if the court has to apply several compensation laws to each group of persons 
sustaining the damage. However, the Commission was not persuaded that it would be 
appropriate to introduce a specific rule for collective claims which would require the court 
to apply a single rule for collective claims which would require the court to apply a single 
law to a case. 
   
2.12 Concluding remarks on the conflicts-of-laws 
 
Where there has been anticompetitive conduct harming end-consumers in multiple 
Member States, it is desirable for collective damages actions to be consolidated as much as 
possible to ensure the equal redress of EU-wide anticompetitive harm. On the face it, the 
Commission's Recommendation seems to be a step forward in realising this ambition. It 
underlines that when a dispute concerns natural or legal persons from several Member 
States, a single collective action should be encouraged and that any rules on admissibility 
or issues to do with standing of the foreign groups or claimants or the representative 
entities originating from other national legal systems should be overcome. It also advocates 
that European civil procedural law and the applicable law should work efficiently in 
practice to ensure proper coordination of national collective redress procedures. The 
Commission desires a system of cross-border collective redress which focuses on the best 
                                                                
202 Commission Communication (supra n.4), 14.  
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placed venue to hear the case. However, none of the Member States are bound to follow 
the Recommendation. This leaves the opportunity for distortions.   
 
Moreover, the Commission advocates reliance on a conflicts-of-laws regime which was 
created for and guided by the leitmotiv of two-party proceedings. In many ways it is 
difficult to envisage how existing rules can be adapted to cope with collective proceedings 
in the aftermath of an EU-wide cartel. Arguably, one cannot deal with the jurisdictional 
aspects of both 'traditional two-party' proceedings and collective cross-border litigation 
with a one-size-fits-all approach. Cross-border collective redress may in many cases have 
very specific needs which are different from traditional two-party litigation. And they do. 
The main issue is the scale of the damage and making sure that each individual victim who 
has suffered from the same cartel is treated equally irrespective of where in the EU they 
have suffered that harm. The Commission appears to consider that the existing rules of 
both jurisdictions and choice-of-law should be fully exploited. From this, one should infer 
that no amendments shall be provided in the near future.  
 
At this juncture, one considers that so long as there is the opportunity for the claimant to 
choose between various laws and applicable fora, forum shopping remains relevant. There 
are tactical advantages and disadvantages for both claimant and defendant. Both the 
Brussels I Recast and the Rome II Regulations provide parties with an element of 
opportunity to influence the choice of forum and the applicable law. Some of the national 
courts would appear to encourage forum shopping.  
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CHAPTER 3 ARBITRATION AS AN APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR CROSS-
BORDER END-CONSUMER REDRESS IN THE WAKE OF ANTICOMPETITIVE 
CONDUCT  
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter considered the relationship between forum shopping and the 
conflicts-of-laws with particular reference to end-consumer cross-border collective redress. 
This made the assumption that the traditional court process is the best way to remedy 
cross-border mass harm situations. However, one must take in to account the growth of 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) practices and their potential to resolve mass disputes 
through mechanisms such as collective arbitration. In the US, class arbitration is a well-
known device. One of the hallmarks of arbitration is the ability of parties to tailor the 
arbitration agreement and process to meet their needs. While negotiating terms of the 
arbitration agreement, parties generally rely on the rules of arbitration institutions due to 
their ability to provide predictability, stability and expertise.1 
 
In paragraph 3.8 of the Commission Communication ‘Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress’2 it was mentioned that stakeholders recognised the 
benefits provided to parties by what the Communication refers to as ‘collective consensual 
dispute resolution.’ These include a fast, low-cost means of resolving a dispute. It was 
considered that parties to collective proceedings should therefore have the possibility to 
resolve their disputes collectively out of court with, inter alia, the intervention of a third 
party using mechanisms such as arbitration. In Recital 16 of the Recommendation on 
                                                                
1J. Tseng, The arbitration institution dilemma: achieving a balance on large-scale redress issues, (2016) 
19(1) I.A.L.R. 19, 19. 
2 COM (2013) 401. 
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common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanism in the 
Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law,3 it was 
recognised that ADR procedures can be an efficient way of obtaining redress in mass harm 
situations. In paragraph 25, the Recommendation mentions that the Member States should 
ensure that the parties to a dispute in a mass harm situation are encouraged to settle the 
dispute about compensation consensually or out-of-court, both at the pre-trial stage and 
during civil trial. Moreover, paragraph 26 states that the Member States should ensure that 
judicial collective redress mechanisms are accompanied by appropriate means of collective 
ADR available to the parties before and throughout the litigation. With this in mind, this 
chapter examines the US experience and assesses critically the appropriateness of a similar 
model for EU cross-border collective redress. 
  
3.1 The appeal of US-style class arbitration to an EU setting 
 
Collective litigation is well established in many jurisdictions as a means of resolving the 
grievances of a large number of claimants. Collective arbitration, by contrast, is a relatively 
novel entity (for the EU at least). It offers a neutral forum for resolving disputes flowing 
from international transactions and an opportunity to address large scale claims through a 
single mechanism (without a jury as would be the case in the US). From the claimant's 
perspective, collective arbitration offers the ability to seek satisfaction of claims that may 
be costly to pursue individually, as well as awards that are potentially enforceable in a 
broad range of jurisdictions. Arbitration clauses are being included as a dispute resolution 
mechanism of choice in a wide variety of consumer product contracts.4 Supporters of 
arbitration clauses argue that arbitration is cheaper, faster, and more effective as a means 
                                                                
3 OJ L 201 26.7.2013 60. 
4 Herbert Smith Freehills, Dispute Resolution, A matter of class: The spectre of class action arbitration in 
consumer product disputes, available at http://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2013/12/13/a-matter-of-class-the-
spectre-of-class-action-arbitration-in-consumer-product-disputes/ (accessed 03.08.2016). 
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for dispute resolution than litigation.5 Arbitral outcomes are said to be at least as 
favourable to consumers as the outcomes of litigation, and a majority of participants 
express satisfaction with the process.6  Large scale cross-border disputes are one of the 
biggest issues facing the international legal community today, and collective arbitration is 
uniquely placed to provide parties from different states with the opportunity to resolve 
their claims at a single time in a single, neutral venue, not only helping parties obtain 
justice more quickly and efficiently but also overcoming associated problems with 
obtaining jurisdiction over parties from a variety of states. The previous chapter 
emphasised that consolidated claims are more desirable while parallel claims have the 
potential to bring about irreconcilable judgments. 
 
In addition to its consensual nature and its procedural flexibility, arbitration is a desirable 
means of collective dispute resolution in the European cross-border consumer redress 
context because 'arbitral awards are almost universally easier to enforce internationally 
than court judgments.'7 
 
Generally speaking, most European countries strongly endorse international arbitration. In 
France, for example, the Court of Appeal and the Cour de Cassation highlight the strong 
                                                                
5 T. Eisenberg, G.P. Miller, E. Sherwin, Arbitration's summer soldiers: An empirical study of arbitration 
clauses in consumer and non-consumer contracts, (2008) 41 U. Mich. J. L. Rev. 871, 882; G. Blanke and R. 
Nazzini, Arbitration and ADR of global antitrust disputes: taking stock: Part 1, (2008) 1(1) G.C.L.R. 46, 47: 
‘In the light of their more streamlined procedures and their inbuilt flexibility, arbitration proceedings are 
generally more cost-efficient and can easily be adjusted to procedural and substantive requirements of 
competition law disputes. More importantly, the arbitrator can be selected on the strength of his competition 
law experience. In an increasingly globalizing and market driven world, a majority of international 
commercial agreements, many of which are prone to give rise to antitrust and competition law concerns, 
specify arbitration as their chosen dispute resolution forum.’  
6 L.B. Bingham, Is there a bias in arbitration of non-union employment disputes? An analysis of active cases 
and outcomes, (1995) 6 Int’l. J. Case Management 369, 378 (reporting favourable employee win-rates in 
employment related arbitration, for example). 
7 J. Beess und Chrostin, Collective redress and class action arbitration in Europe, where we are and how to 
move forward, (2011) 14(2) I.A.L.R. 111, 119. 
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support and deference given by the courts to arbitrators.8 In the Putrabali case,9 for 
example, the Cour de Cassation affirmed that an international arbitration award was 'not 
anchored in any national legal system' which in essence: 
 
'qualifies the arbitral award as an international judicial decision... [the Putrabali holding 
hence] confirms the existence of an arbitral legal order which is independent from national 
legal orders.'10 
 
The supranational element of international class arbitration would appear, prima facie, to 
remove concerns associated with forum shopping and the potential diversity associated 
with private enforcement of competition law by the national courts.  
 
Similarly, Germany, although still highly sceptical of collective dispute resolution, 
strongly endorses international arbitration. For example, even though appeals of arbitral 
awards to the German Supreme Court are possible, the court very rarely accepts such cases 
for review. This suggests that strong deference is given to arbitrators and their competency 
in deciding disputes.11  
 
It is submitted that The Netherlands has one of the best ADR regimes. All of industry and 
commerce is covered by sectoral boards to which companies are obliged to join to protect 
their reputation. There is an overarching Dispute Resolution Committee 
                                                                
8 See for example, G. Blanke and R. Nazzini, French Supreme Court confirms minimalist review of 
competition law awards, (2008) 1(2) G.C.L.R. R44. 
9 Case number 05-18.053, France, Cour de cassation, 29.6.2007, Société PT Putrabali Adyamulia v Société 
Rena Holding et Société Moguntia Est Epice; See also Reed Smith LLP, Enforcement of arbitration awards 
in France, available at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=296a065e-da7d-422c-b603-
b7da54f4439c (accessed 03.08.2016). 
10 P. Pinsolle, Recent significant French judicial decisions involving international arbitration, in A.W. 
Rovine, 
Contemporary issues in international commercial arbitration and mediation: The Fordham Papers, (2008), 
117. 
11 J. Beess und Chrostin (supra n.7), 119.  
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(Geschillencommissie) that assures standards and good practices. It also provides a single 
point for consumers wanting to know where to lodge a complaint. Once a complaint is 
lodged with any of the sectoral boards, it is processed and companies are obliged to obey 
its ruling. This system processes in excess of 11000 complaints each year.12 
 
There is no decision of the EU legal order explicitly pronouncing EU competition law to 
be arbitrable, although that is not doubted since it is an inference which can be drawn from 
cases such as Eco Swiss13. Here the CJEU wished not to interfere with arbitration and the 
finality of arbitral awards. In that case, moreover, it limited the required material review of 
arbitration awards to review for public policy violations. By inference then, in Eco Swiss, 
the CJEU, and with it the EU legal order, accepts the arbitrability of EU competition law.  
 
Class action, accepted as an extraordinary but acceptable procedure in the US, still instils 
an element of fear in European lawyers. Over the past 20 years, the US has developed a 
system of class arbitration, whereas, in Europe, collective arbitration provisions are rare.14 
Europe is a large market, benefiting from free movement of goods and services, with close 
to half a billion customers. As business becomes increasingly international, it becomes 
increasingly important to have an efficient system in place for resolving mass claims. 
However, the approach taken to collective redress differs across the EU Member States, 
and, whilst the EU Commission has been working for several years on developing 
European standards of collective redress, these are far from promoting a homogenous 
                                                                
12 European Justice Forum, Collective redress, available at http://europeanjusticeforum.org/faq/current-
issues/collective-redress.html (accessed 03.08.2016).  
13 Case 126/97 Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v Benetton International NV [1999] E.C.R. I-3055; See K.J. 
Dhuner, Arbitration and EC competition law: legal effects on arbitral awards¸ Arbitration 2009 75(1) 86; 
See also L. D’Arcy and M. Furse, Eco Swiss China v Benetton: EC competition law and arbitration, (1999) 
20(7) E.C.L.R. 392; See also D. Wong, The ‘middle way’ review standard of arbitral awards – safeguarding 
effective EU competition law enforcement: theoretical appraisal, practical application and potential 
obstacles, (2016) 9(1) G.C.L.R. 1. 
14 See R. Khodykin, Why is class arbitration unpopular across the pond? in A.W. Rovine, Contemporary 
issues in international arbitration and mediation: The Fordham Papers (2013). 
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landscape. The Recommendation ‘invites’ Member States to implement measures of 
collective redress but they are not bound to do so. In essence, the current picture of EU 
cross-border collective redress depicts a heterogeneous landscape. The advantage of 
collective arbitration over the traditional court process is that a procedure could be 
designed free from interference from Member States. If that procedure was more efficient 
and user friendly than collective litigation, it could attract considerable support. Where a 
significant number of persons have been harmed by the same anticompetitive practice, the 
availability of an effective collective redress mechanism is an important factor. Therefore, 
in global cartels, jurisdictions such as the United States, Canada and Australia will offer 
significant advantages over legal systems where no collective proceedings are available. In 
this area, the Commission has attempted to invite EU-wide reform. The White Paper on 
actions for damages for breach of Articles 101 or 102 of the TFEU stated that: 
 
'Due consideration should be given to mechanisms fostering early resolution of cases, e.g. 
by settlements. This could significantly reduce or eliminate litigation costs for the parties 
and also the costs for the judicial system.... The Commission therefore encourages Member 
States to design procedural rules fostering settlements, as a way to reduce costs.'15 
 
The Green Paper16 complements this approach by promoting 'collective mediation and 
arbitration',17 which could arguably also be leveraged in a competition context depending 
on the specific facts of each individual case.18  
 
                                                                
15 White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM (2008) 165, 9 (emphasis in the 
original). 
16 Green Paper on consumer collective redress, COM (2008) 794. 
17 European Commission, Press Release, MEMO/08/741, Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress--
Questions and Answers, para.4, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-741_en.htm 
(accessed 03.08.2016). 
18 See also D. Shapiro, Consumer class actions made easy, (2008) 7 Comp. Law 203. 
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As mentioned in the introduction, this is echoed in the Commission Communication and 
Recommendation.  
   
3.2 The class action experience in the US 
 
Class arbitration has been characterised as a 'uniquely American device'19. The US is one 
of the very few countries that accept class arbitration proceedings as a procedural variant. 
It is a somewhat controversial dispute resolution device that takes certain procedures more 
commonly seen in judicial class actions and transplants them into arbitration.20  Some 
argue that it developed in the US as a result of a unique confluence of facts: a strong public 
policy in favour of class relief, a robust view of arbitration as a legitimate means of 
resolving disputes, and an overwhelming need to maintain a consistent response to mass 
legal injuries, regardless of the forum chosen to hear those claims.21  
 
Class arbitration owes its existence to the US corporate community's opposition to judicial 
class actions and a belief, prevalent in the late 1980s and 90s, that arbitration would 
eliminate the possibility of class suits by forcing claimants to resolve their claims 
individually.22 However, it did not turn out this way. Instead, when class claims were 
asserted in cases involving arbitration agreements, the disputes were not automatically sent 
to bilateral arbitration. Judges viewed the situation as presenting several different 
possibilities. On the one hand, a court may give precedence to one form of dispute 
resolution over another (either arbitration over class actions or class actions over 
                                                                
19 S.I. Strong, Does class arbitration 'change the nature' of arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T, and a return to 
first principles, (2012) 17 Harv. Neg. L. Rev. 201, 206. 
20 S.I. Strong, Resolving mass legal disputes through class arbitration: The United States and Canada 
compared, (2012) 37 N. C. J. Int’l. L. & Com. Reg. 921, 922. 
21 Ibid., 936.  
22 Ibid.; See also M.R. Davis, The perspective of in-house counsel: organization, compliance/enforcement 
programs, negotiated sales, transfer, termination and advertising and franchise sales, (1989) 486 P.L.I.C. 
561, 590. 
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arbitration). On the other hand, a court might find a way to harmonise the two processes in 
some way on the ground that they were not mutually inconsistent. As time went on, an 
increasing number of judges chose to adopt the latter of the two alternatives, resulting in 
the creation of an entirely new form of dispute resolution: class arbitration. It was not until 
2003 when the US Supreme Court gave its implicit approval to the procedure in Green 
Tree Financial Corp v Bazzle23 that various US-based arbitral institutions promulgated 
their specialised rules on class arbitration. The Court also endorsed the arbitration of 
antitrust class actions by not prohibiting clauses that authorised the use of such procedures. 
The Court held that the question of whether an arbitration agreement allowed class action 
claims was a matter of contract interpretation to be decided by the arbitrator, not the courts. 
 
There are two sets of rules currently in use. These are the American Arbitration 
Association's Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration (AAA Supplementary Rules)24 
and the JAMS (Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services) Class Action Procedures.25 
They are very similar to one another. This is not surprising given that both were 
intentionally modelled on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure26 so as to allow 
courts and arbitrators to rely on existing case law when construing the provisions of new 
arbitral rules.27 Despite class arbitration's lengthy presence on the US legal stage, there has 
been no statute, state or federal, prescribing the rules of procedure for class arbitrations to 
ensure that the process is uniform, fair or efficient. Moreover, whether any level of court 
involvement is required is open to question. The issue of judicial involvement has become 
                                                                
23 Green Tree Financial Corp. v Lynn W. Bazzle 539 US 444 (2003). 
24 Available at 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/commercial/documents/document/dgdf/mda0/~edisp/adrst
g_004129.pdf (accessed 29.8.2016).  
25 Available at https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-
Rules/JAMS_Class_Action_Procedures-2009.pdf (accessed 29.8.2016).  
26 Available at https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-iv-parties/rule-23-class-actions/ 
(accessed 29.8.2016). 
27 S.I. Strong (supra n.20), 938.  
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particularly contentious following the US Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Stolt Nielsen 
SA (discussed below).28  
 
Class arbitration in the US is primarily used in large-scale consumer and employment 
disputes.29 and covers everything from insurance and finance to maritime and antitrust 
claims.30 The one notable difference is that class arbitrations do not generally arise in cases 
exclusively to do with tort, since parties to such disputes seldom have a pre-existing 
contractual relationship and thus rarely have an arbitration agreement in place at the time 
the injury arises. It is possible for the parties to agree to arbitration after the dispute has 
arisen, however post-dispute arbitration agreements are very difficult to come by, even in 
cases where there are only two parties involved.31  
 
3.3 When is class action available? 
 
The existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties must be demonstrated and 
created either before or after the dispute has arisen. There can be either one agreement 
                                                                
28 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v Animal Feeds International Corp. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
29 See Brief of American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Stolt-Nielsen 
S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010), at 22 (noting 37% of all class arbitrations 
administered by the AAA involved consumer actions, 37% involved employment actions, 7% involved 
franchising, 7% involved healthcare, 3% involved financial services, and 11% involved other business-to-
business concerns). 
30 E.F. Sherman, Group litigation under foreign legal systems: variations and alternatives to American class 
actions, (2002) 52 D.L.R. 401, 407: discussing areas where class actions are likely; See also L.G Radicati Di 
Brozolo, Arbitration and competition law: The position of the courts and of arbitrators, (2011) 27(1), 
Arbitration International 6: Since the seminal Mitsubishi judgment, courts and commentators almost 
universally accept that the relevance of an issue of competition law to the settlement of a dispute is not a bar 
to arbitrability. [Mitsubishi Motors Co V Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 US 614 (1985)] The consensus on 
this point rests to a large extent on the dual premise that arbitrators are under a duty to apply, and will apply, 
the relevant competition rules, more often than not just as national judges, if not more so; and that in any 
case, in setting aside and enforcement proceedings, the courts retain the possibility to take a 'second look' at 
the solution reached by the arbitrators. On a practical level, the justification for permitting the arbitrability of 
antitrust disputes rests on the fact that today the importance of competition law is almost universally 
recognized since more legal systems contain some form of competition rules. Given the potential relevance 
to competition in a broad range of disputes, if antitrust matters (just like matters of any other mandatory law) 
were not arbitrable, there would be enormous scope for tactical maneuvers aimed at interfering with the 
proper effect of the arbitration agreement.  
31 S.I. Strong (supra n.19), 209.  
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binding on all the parties or a series of bilateral agreements between each of the claimants 
and the respondent. In the latter case, the documents must each include an arbitration 
clause which is substantially similar to that signed by the class representatives and the class 
members.32  
 
Once it is established that the parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute, it is necessary to 
consider the procedure that will be used to resolve the matter. Here, there is more than one 
possible procedure. The agreement(s) in question will either (1) include language expressly 
contemplating a class action or (2) be silent and ambiguous to the point. Each shall be 
considered in turn. 
 
3.4 Express contemplation of arbitration agreement in the US 
 
If the agreement contains an express provision allowing class arbitration, that language 
will be given effect. If the agreement contains an express prohibition (i.e. a waiver of class 
treatment) then it is necessary to consider whether the waiver is effective. The issue was 
considered by the US Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion.33 Ultimately, 
the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) forestalls states from invalidating 
class action waivers in arbitration agreements because these invalidations stand as an 
obstacle to the purposes behind the FAA.34  It can be argued that the effect of this is to 
allow business to turn to their contracts for protection.35 By inserting class action waivers 
into their arbitration agreements (agreements that were part of larger contracts with 
consumers, employees and other actors in the marketplace) businesses attempted narrowly 
                                                                
32 S.I. Strong (supra n.20), 944.  
33 AT&T Mobility LLC v Vincent Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
34 Ibid., at 1753. 
35 F. Blechschmidt, All alone in arbitration: AT&T Mobility v Concepcion and the substantive impact of class 
action waivers, (2012) 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 543. 
   
 
  109 
 
to circumscribe the procedures available to their adversaries.36 In essence, once an 
opposing party agreed to arbitrate any future claims and also to waive their right to bring 
proceedings as a class, the only remaining option would be bilateral arbitration: arbitration 
between two individual parties. The viability of end-consumer claims suffers greatly if 
there is no collective mechanism in place.  
 
Writing for the majority in Concepcion, Justice Scalia described bilateral arbitration as 
streamlined, efficient and cheap.37 Interestingly, he did not provide empirical data to 
support his description of bilateral arbitration. He characterised class arbitration, by 
contrast as 'slower, costlier, and more likely to generate procedural morass.'38 The majority 
further asserted that class arbitration, with no effective means of judicial review, imposes 
higher risks on defendants who are unlikely to 'bet the company' on such a process.39 It was 
only a matter of time before this was disputed in court. In particular, consumers pleaded 
that class action waivers were exculpatory provisions in the small claims setting because 
the inclusion of these waivers in arbitration agreements effectively relieved businesses 
from liability.40 Without class proceedings, no individual consumer in the small claims 
setting have an incentive to file a claim.41 An early opinion in California (Discover Bank) 
held that such class action waivers provided defendants with a 'get out of jail free card.'42 
The waivers were also considered troublesome because they were almost always found in 
contracts of adhesion, or on a 'take it or leave it' basis.43  
                                                                
36 Ibid. 
37 Concepcion (supra n.33), at 1749.  
38 Ibid., at 1751. 
39 Ibid., at 1752. 
40 F. Blechschmidt (supra n.35), 544.  
41 For example, Scott v Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, at 1007. This case examined whether a class action 
waiver in a mobile phone contract's arbitration agreement 'effectively exculpated' its drafter from liability for 
a large class of wrongful conduct. The case noted that the customers in the dispute had brought no individual 
claims against the mobile phone provider over a six-year period.  
42 Discover Bank v Superior Court 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005); J. Rizzardi, Discover Bank v Superior Court of Los 
Angeles, (2006) 21(3) Ohio St. J. Disp. Res. 1093, 1097. 
43 E. J. Shustak, The US Supreme Court endorse arbitration clauses in consumer contracts which contain 
waivers of the right to class action resolution, available at http://www.shufirm.com/the-u.s.-supreme-court-
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Businesses justified the upholding of class action waivers on the basis that virtually all 
arbitration agreements in dispute were governed by the FAA,44 a federal statute that the 
Supreme Court has consistently held to proclaim 'a liberal federal policy favouring 
arbitration agreements.'45 Thus, the common argument defendants raised in motions to 
compel arbitration was that the FAA required courts to enforce the arbitration agreements, 
and with them, the class action waivers.46 Concepcion in a strongly divided court (5-4) 
upheld the waiver, based on the finding that the state law acted as a hindrance to 
arbitration, contrary to the pro-arbitration policy embodied by the FAA. In doing so, the 
majority appeared to operate on the assumption that class arbitration was in some way 
fundamentally different to bilateral arbitration, a conclusion that was challenged by four 
dissenting judges.47 
 
Although Concepcion has been heralded as marking the end for class arbitration and class 
actions in the US (since it is believed that the vast majority of corporate defendants will 
use arbitration agreements in conjunction with class waivers to eviscerate class suits in 
both court and arbitration), that conclusion may be somewhat precipitous. If we look, for 
example, at the case of Carey v 24 Hour Fitness, USA, Inc.48 the denial of a motion to 
compel arbitration was affirmed and a putative class action suit was permitted to go 
forward despite an arbitration agreement prohibiting class arbitration. In Feeney v Dell 
                                                                
endorses-arbitration-clauses-in-consumer-contracts-which-contain-waivers-of-the-right-to-class-action-
resolution (accessed 03.08.2016). 
44 9 US Code Chapter 1 section 2: The Act provides that 'an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an 
existing controversy out of...a contract, transaction, or refusal [involving commerce], shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist in law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.’ 
45 Howsam v Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., (2002) 537 US 79, 83 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v 
Mercury Constr. Corp., (1987) 460 US 483, 489).  
46 For example, in Scott v Cingular Wireless (supra n.41), at 1008 the defendant's argument was introduced 
that its phone contract was covered by the FAA.  
47 S.I. Strong (supra n.20), 945.  
48 Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness USA Inc., 669 F.3d 202 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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Inc.49a Massachusetts court found that arbitration agreements that precluded class 
arbitration were void as against public policy, distinguishing Concepcion on its facts, 
which it noted involved larger individual claims and a favourable procedure in place to 
arbitrate individual claims, whereas the claimants in Dell had small individual claims and 
no favourable individual claim resolution procedure. State policy against a class waiver 
prevailed, the court found, because arbitration of individual claims was 'infeasible as a 
matter of fact' leaving no 'federal interest with which the state law might conflict.'50  
 
Courts such as those above have treated arbitration agreements prohibiting class actions as 
a case-by-case factual issue and have measured them against a potential violation of a state 
law. The US Supreme Court, however, has been quick to issue some follow-up guidance. 
One of the Court's strongest signals came from its per curiam opinion in Marmet Health 
Care Centre, Inc. v Brown.51There, the Court reviewed a West Virginia Supreme Court's 
decision which invalidated an arbitration agreement on public policy grounds, where the 
underlying claims were personal injury claims against a nursing home. As an opening 
salvo, it cited the US Constitution's Supremacy Clause, and then stated, '[w]hen state law 
prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is 
straightforward; the conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.' It vacated and remanded.52 
Marmet signals a strong push back by the Supreme Court against any state law that would 
contravene the broad command of the FAA favouring arbitration as bargained for.  
 
However, in Brewer, the Missouri Supreme Court (having been reversed once already by 
the US Supreme Court's summary order citing Concepcion) issued a new decision a month 
                                                                
49  Feeney v. Dell Inc., 454 Mass. 192 (2009). 
50 Ibid.  
51 Marmet Health Care Centre v Brown 565 US (2012). 
52 J. Pitblado, Revisiting Concepcion: can you hear me now? available at 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e3851994-07f3-439f-92b6-58c8c788fc66 (accessed 
03.08.2016). 
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after Marmet that still invalidates an arbitration agreement. Noting the fact of reversal for 
'further consideration' in the light of Concepcion, the court stated: 
 
'The Court ... applies traditional Missouri contract law in looking at the agreement as a 
whole to determine the conscionability of the arbitration provision. This Court holds that 
Brewer has demonstrated unconscionability in the formation of the agreement. The 
appropriate remedy is revocation of the arbitration clause contained within the 
agreement.'53 
 
Like the Massachusetts court in Feeney, the Missouri court distinguished Concepcion on 
its facts. We shall soon see whether the Brewer opinion is simply one court's preference to 
sympathise with consumers perceived to be outmatched in bargaining power, or whether it 
ushers in a new phase of attack by state courts seeking to chip away at the Concepcion 
holding.54  
 
Another case which is interesting is D.R. Horton.55The National Labour Relations Board 
[NLRB] decided that class action waivers are unlawful under the National Labour 
Relations Act, even if the FAA pre-empts state laws from prohibiting them. The National 
Labour Relations Act is a federal law. The NLRB argued that a class action is a form of 
‘protected concerted activity’ and that requiring employees to waive their right to sue in a 
collective action is unlawful. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the 
Board. This was not the end of the matter however. The Seventh Circuit has ruled in favour 
of the NLRB’s position in a case involving a non-union employer’s motion to compel 
arbitration in a federal court. In Lewis56 the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
                                                                
53 Brewer v Missouri Title Loans 323 S.W. 3d 18 (Mo. 2010). 
54 John Pitblado, (supra n.52).  
55 In re D.R. Horton 357 N.L.R.B 2277 (2012). 
56 Lewis v Epic Sys. Corp., No 15-2997 U.S. LEXIS 9638 (7th Cir., 2016). 
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found that the company’s arbitration agreement, which prohibits employees from 
participating in ‘any class, collective or representative proceeding,’ violated the 
employees’ right to engage in concerted activity under the National Labour Relations Act. 
The decision therefore creates a Circuit split, and given the importance of the issue, sets 
the stage for further Supreme Court review. In the meantime, class and collective action 
waivers will not be enforced in federal courts sitting in Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin, the 
states within the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction. The very same agreement should not be 
enforced in federal courts sitting in the circuits that have rejected D.R. Horton, and federal 
courts within circuits that have yet to opine on the matter will have a choice. Further 
muddling the matter, state courts will not necessarily feel bound by the NLRB, thus 
creating more opportunity for inconsistency and confusion in a high-stakes area of the 
law.57 
 
Another case which is of relevance is the US Supreme Court’s decision in DIRECTTV58 in 
which it once again held that class action waivers contained in an arbitration agreement are 
enforceable under the FAA and cannot be invalidated on state law grounds inapplicable to 
any other contract.59 Again this is a clear message from the Supreme Court holding that 
state courts cannot single out and apply different standards to invalidate class waivers. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s decision, there is little doubt that the claimant’s employment 
bar will continue to attack the enforceability of class action waivers. See the Court of 
Appeals of the Seventh Circuit decision of Lewis referred to above as an example.60  
                                                                
57 H.D. Lederman, S.M. McCrory, W. Emmanuel, Seventh Circuit finds class action waivers in arbitration 
agreements are illegal and unenforceable under the NLRA, available at https://www.littler.com/publication-
press/publication/seventh-circuit-finds-class-action-waivers-arbitration-agreements-are (accessed 
07.06.2016). 
58 DIRECTTV, Inc. v Imburgia, No 14-462, 577 U.S, 2015 WL 8546242 (2015). 
59 S.P. Caplow, Case comment: US Supreme Court settles debate over the ‘law of your state, (2016) 82(2) 
Arbitration 198. 
60 G.D. Kennedy and J.A. Piesco, United States Supreme Court reaffirms use of class action waivers in 
arbitration agreements; next stop – employment contracts, available at 
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2015/12/us-supreme-court-reaffirms-use-of-waivers/ 
(accessed 03.08.2016). 
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When considering the feasibility of class arbitration in the EU, one is concerned that the 
survival of a class arbitration waiver would mean that end-consumers who have suffered 
from a breach of competition law would have to arbitrate on an individual basis. It is 
commonplace that this acts as a significant disincentive for many victims of 
anticompetitive conduct given the lack of individual benefit versus the effort and costs 
associated with filing a claim. Rational apathy and behavioural economics will always 
prevail. If class arbitration becomes a permanent fixture in the EU, counsel responsible for 
managing an EU-based company's dispute resolution program will hope that the US 
Supreme Court's decision in Concepcion will be followed. Companies may insert into a 
standard-form contract a clause which expressly forbids collective treatment or 
consolidation of separate arbitrations. They may take a further step and use a 'choice-of- 
law' clause that refers to the internal law (exclusive of conflict-of-law principles) of a 
jurisdiction that (a) has ruled that no collective actions are permitted in arbitration unless 
the parties expressly agree to such procedure and/or (b) has been willing to enforce no-
collective-action clauses. Of course, to have enforceable effect, especially in consumer 
contracts, the forum whose law is to be selected must have some plausible relation to the 
parties or the transaction.61 
 
Philip Allen Lacovera submits that counsel may advise their clients to consider whether, if 
a class waiver is struck down, the company would rather confront a class action in an 
arbitral forum or in court. He argues that the problem is one of 'severability'. When courts 
strike down these clauses, some find that they are not 'severable' from the obligation to 
arbitrate, so the arbitration clause itself will become unenforceable and the claimant is free 
                                                                
61 P.A. Lacovara, Class action arbitrations: The challenge for the business community, (2008) (24)(4) 
Arbitration International 541, 559. 
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to proceed in court, with a class action, if the claimant desires. Other courts simply 
disregard the waiver clause and leave the company committed to arbitrate but on a class-
wide basis. This may be the worst course for companies, because arbitral rulings both on 
establishing a collective and granting ultimate relief will be subject to far less judicial or 
appellate review than would be comparable rulings in court. Lacovera would advise 
counsel that the contract language should therefore specify what happens if a court decides 
that the arbitration may proceed on behalf of a class, despite the presence of a class action 
waiver.62  
 
If Europe follows closely the decision of Concepcion, undertakings will inevitably seek to 
promote class action waivers. A consumer would have no option other than to pursue their 
claim individually, hence with no option at all.63 This may signal the end of EU consumer 
class arbitration before it even begins. Companies may wish to argue that the avoidance of 
such aggregate claims will help to save money. However, there is absolutely no guarantee 
that the savings will be passed on to consumers. 
 
3.5 US class action waivers specific to antitrust 
 
In Italian Colors64a sharply divided Supreme Court stated that 'antitrust laws do not 
guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim,' and ruled that 
courts must enforce arbitration agreements that contain class action waivers under the 
FAA. In doing so, the Supreme Court rejected a 'judge-made' exception to arbitration that 
some courts applied when claimants demonstrate that the cost of pursuing an antitrust or 
other statutory claim on an individual basis would exceed the amount of any potential 
                                                                
62 Ibid. 
63 G. Pailli, Global deterrence of wrongful behaviour and recent trends in class action and class arbitration: 
Is the US stepping down as the world's problem solver? (2014) 33(3) C.J.Q. 266, 277. 
64 American Express Co. v Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
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recovery. The Supreme Court noted that the 'vindication of statutory rights' exception 
derives from dicta in its 1985 opinion in Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth Inc.65In that case, the Supreme Court expressed a willingness on public policy 
grounds to invalidate arbitration agreements that 'operate as a prospective waiver of a 
party's right to pursue statutory remedies.'66 The Mitsubishi court dismissed concerns that 
the arbitral forum was inadequate, stating 'so long as the prospective litigant effectively 
may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to 
serve both its remedial and deterrent function.'67 
 
In Italian Colors, the Supreme Court again recognised the adequacy of the arbitral forum. 
The Supreme Court noted that there could be limited instances in which an arbitral forum 
was inadequate and operates as a 'prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory 
remedies,' such as 'a provision in an arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of 
certain statutory rights' or 'filing and administrative fees attached to arbitration that are so 
high as to make access to the forum impracticable.'68 However, in rejecting the rationale of 
the 'effective vindication' doctrine, the Supreme Court held '[b]ut the fact that it is not 
worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the 
elimination of the right to pursue a remedy.'69'Too bad', the Supreme Court's majority 
effectively said, it did not matter that the claimants could not afford to bring the 
arbitration.70 
                                                                
65 Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 US 614. 
66 Ibid., at 637. 
67 Ibid. 
68 See R. Wolf, ‘To a hammer everything looks like a nail’: The Supreme Court’s misapplication of the 
vindication of rights doctrine, (2013) 21(4) American University Journal Gender Social Policy and Law 953, 
963. 
69 D. Brown, American Express Co v Italian Colors Restaurant: a contractual waiver of class arbitration is 
enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, even when pursuit of an individual claim would be irrational, 
(2013) 6(3) G.C.L.R. R-61, R-62. 
70 L. Guth Barnes, Calling on Congress: How mandatory arbitration agreements and class action waivers 
undermine consumer rights, available at http://www.hbsslaw.com/newsroom/Calling-on-Congress-How-
Mandatory-Arbitration-Agreements-and-Class-Action-Waivers-Undermine-Consumer-Rights (accessed 
03.08.2016). 
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The Supreme Court also rejected the claimant's arguments that relied on the existence of 
Rule 23 FRCP. It did not 'establish an entitlement to class proceedings for the vindication 
of statutory rights,' and '[t]he individual suit that was considered adequate to assure 
'effective vindication' of a federal right before adoption of class action procedures did not 
suddenly become 'ineffective vindication' upon their adoption.'71 The Court further 
observed that, 'truth to tell, our decision in [Concepcion] all but resolves this case' because, 
in Concepcion, the Supreme Court 'invalidated a law conditioning the enforcement of 
arbitration on the availability of class procedure because that law 'interfered with 
fundamental attributes of arbitration.’ 
 
The dissent argued that this was a 'betrayal of our precedents, and of federal statutes like 
the antitrust laws.'72 They argued that the arbitration agreement, 'imposes a variety of 
procedural bars that would make pursuit of the antitrust claim a fool's errand...If the 
arbitration is enforceable, AmEx has insulated itself from antitrust liability - even if it has 
in fact violated the law...'73The dissent warns that in the hands of the majority, rather than 
facilitating the redress of injuries, 'arbitration threatens to become more nearly the opposite 
- a mechanism easily made to block the vindication of federal claims and insulate 
wrongdoers from liability.’74  
 
Another thing to note is that in Italian Colors, the claimants were merchant clients of 
American Express, including Italian Colours, which was a restaurant. It was testified that 
the maximum recovery for each merchant in the putative class would be $12,850 ($38,549 
                                                                
71 Italian Colors (supra n.64), at 2312.  
72 Ibid. at 2313. 
73 D. Brown (supra n.69), R-63.  
74 Italian Colors (supra n.64), at 2320.  
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if trebled under US law).75 For the purpose of its consideration, the majority essentially 
acknowledged that even with the possibility of treble damages, the antitrust laws would not 
provide an 'affordable procedural path' to vindicate the merchants' claim on an individual 
basis.76 If this is not an affordable business path for an established business, then this begs 
the question as to how end-consumers would be able to afford to vindicate their own 
claims on an individual basis. One wonders whether Italian Colors will stretch that far. 
 
The Supreme Court's decision in Italian Colors removes the last significant defence to 
avoiding an individual arbitration clause when a consumer would prefer to pursue a class 
action. Counsel for plaintiff Italian Colors Restaurant, Deepak Gupta, stated that the 
decision was 'a near bloodbath for class-action plaintiff's lawyers.'77 The erosion of the 
effective vindication rule by Italian Colors continues the Court's trend of limiting the basis 
for challenges to the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate claims on an individual basis. 
As other countries around the world begin to experiment with class adjudication, the Court 
seems determined to reverse the trend in the US.78 It is interesting that in the EU, Advocate 
General Jääskinen has stated that it would undermine the effectiveness of competition rules 
if cartelists could act in advance to disperse claims by requiring counter-parties to agree to 
arbitration clauses when their involvement in a cartel was not yet known.79 It remains to be 
seen how these issues would be dealt with in the EU. In the US, Lauren Guth writes that 
congressional action is essential. Without it, 'these ubiquitous binding arbitration clauses 
and class-action bans will continue to lead to the predictable result of both unfairness to 
                                                                
75 Ibid., at 2304.  
76 Ibid., at 2304, 2309–2310. See also 2316–2317 (cost of bringing an individual antitrust claim prohibitive 
because: ‘[n]o rational actor would bring a claim worth tens of thousands of dollars if doing so meant 
incurring costs in the hundreds of thousands’). 
77 J. Schurz, Consumer class actions take another hit: Supreme Court rules class action arbitration waiver 
covers antitrust claims, available at http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/130712-Arbitration-
Waiver-Covers-Antitrus-Claims.pdf (accessed 03.08.2016). 
78 S. Caplow, Case comment: US Supreme Court Italian Colors decision raises the white flag on the effective 
vindication rule, (2014) 80(1) Arbitration 113, 113. 
79 R. Pike and Y. Tosheva, CDC v Evonik Degussa (C-352/13) and its potential implications for private 
enforcement of European competition law, (2015) 8(2) G.C.L.R. 82, 85.  
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injured consumers and a systematic failure to hold accountable those companies who 
abused the trust placed in them. Consumers - indeed, the whole American public - lose.'80 
This is just a piece of a much broader picture. The US legislatures and courts are making it 
increasingly difficult for claimants to bring cases. One of the most prominent antitrust 
cases is Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly81 in which the Supreme Court raised the threshold 
that antitrust claimants must meet when they file their initial pleadings. Another prominent 
example is the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,82 which restricts class actions in state 
courts and imposes restrictions on certain types of remedies. The US – the pioneer of 
private enforcement in antitrust and collective redress – in many ways seems to be taking 
back some of its claimant-friendly reputation. 
 
  
                                                                
80 S. Berman, Calling on Congress: How mandatory arbitration agreements and class action waivers 
undermine consumer rights, available at http://www.hbsslaw.com/newsroom/Calling-on-Congress-How-
Mandatory-Arbitration-Agreements-and-Class-Action-Waivers-Undermine-Consumer-Rights (accessed 
03.08.2016). 
81 Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly 550 US 544 (2007). 
82 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 
28 U.S.C.). 
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3.6 Class arbitration in the absence of an agreement 
 
The other issue to consider is when the availability of class arbitration is not mentioned in 
an agreement. In the US, the case of Stolt-Nielsen83 addressed the availability of class 
arbitration where the arbitration clause did not explicitly address it. The two sentence 
arbitration agreement was a standard 'charter party' shipping agreement and provided for, 
'[a]ny dispute arising from the making, performance or termination of' the agreement to be 
settled in the state of New York by a panel of two arbitrators, one selected by each party.'84 
The parties stipulated that the arbitration clause was 'silent' on whether the clause allowed 
for class arbitration. They had reached no agreement on it. The arbitration panel concluded 
that the arbitration clause did allow class arbitration. The district court vacated the award, 
finding that the arbitrators acted in manifest disregard of the law by not conducting a 
choice-of-law analysis and analysing the arbitration clause under federal maritime law. The 
Second Circuit reversed, holding that the arbitrators did not manifestly disregard the law 
because the defendants pointed to no rule against class arbitration in federal maritime or 
state law. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 'whether imposing class 
arbitration on parties whose arbitration clauses are 'silent' on that issue is consistent with 
the [FAA]'85  
 
First, the Supreme Court set forth the standard of review for vacating the arbitration panel's 
award. A serious error was not enough to show that the arbitrator exceeded their powers 
under the FAA. Because 'the task of an arbitrator is to interpret and enforce a contract,' an 
arbitration award may be vacated 'only when [an] arbitrator strays from interpretation and 
                                                                
83 Supra n.28. 
84 Ibid., at 1765. 
85 Ibid., at 1764. 
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application of the agreement and effectively dispens[es] his own brand of industrial 
justice.'86 
 
Next, the Court explained that the arbitration panel's decision must be evaluated based on 
'the basic precept that arbitration 'is a matter of consent, not coercion.'87 Arbitrators 
construing an agreement must effectuate 'the contractual rights and expectations of the 
parties.'88 It was said to follow, 'that a party may not be compelled by the FAA to submit to 
class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the parties agreed to 
do so.'89 Thus, an arbitrator may not infer '[a]n implicit agreement to authorise 
arbitration...solely from the fact of the parties' agreement to arbitrate.'90 The Court noted 
that a class action arbitration fundamentally changes the nature of the proceeding by 
adjudicating the rights of absent parties in high stakes disputes with limited judicial 
review.91 The Court found 'the differences between bilateral and class-action 
arbitration...too great for arbitrators to presume, consistent with their limited powers under 
the FAA, that the parties' mere silence on the issue of class action arbitration constitutes 
consent to resolve their disputes in class proceedings.'92 
 
Applying these principles to the facts at issue, the court held that the arbitration panel 
exceeded its powers by 'impos[ing] class arbitration even though the parties concurred that 
they had reached 'no agreement' on that issue...'93 The panel's decision centred on the fact 
that the defendants failed to show that the parties 'intended to preclude class arbitration' 
                                                                
86 Ibid., at 1767. 
87 Ibid., at 1773. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid.  
90 Ibid., at 1775. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid.  
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and 'regarded the agreement's silence on class arbitration as dispositive.'94 The panel failed 
to apply any rule of contractual interpretation to determine whether class arbitration was 
available under the agreement in the absence of express consent, but based its decision on 
its perception of an arbitral consensus in favour of class action, which the court viewed as 
the panel 'impos[ing] its own conception of sound policy.'95This contradicted the 
circumstances of the arbitration clause, where the 'parties are sophisticated business 
entities, there is no tradition of class arbitration under maritime law, and the standard 
shipping agreement chosen by the parties had never been the basis of a class 
action.'96Therefore, the arbitrators impermissibly inferred the availability of class 
arbitration solely from the parties' agreement to arbitrate. The court was careful to note, 
however, that it had 'no occasion to decide what contractual basis may support a finding 
that the parties agreed to class action arbitration,' because the parties stipulated that there 
was no agreement on this issue.97 The majority decision placed great emphasis on the 
importance of party intent, holding that differences between bilateral and class action 
arbitration are too great for arbitrators to presume, consistent with their limited powers 
under the FAA, that the parties' mere silence on the issue of class action arbitration 
constitutes consent to resolve their disputes in class proceedings.98 
 
Another interesting point which came out of Stolt-Nielsen was the majority's appearance 
(albeit in dicta) to be very much in favour of allowing early review of partial final 
rewards.99 The court may be seen as taking an interventionist road despite the fact that the 
parties had expressly and unambiguously agreed to submit the question of class treatment 
to a panel of arbitrators under the so-called 'Class Rules' of the AAA, which require an 
                                                                
94 Ibid.  
95 Ibid., at 1769. 
96 Ibid., at 1775. 
97 Ibid., at 1776. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid., at 1767. 
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arbitrator to decide as a threshold matter whether the applicable arbitration clause permits 
the arbitration to proceed on a class basis. The aspect of the case moved Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg to write in her dissent, '[t]he court acts without warrant in allowing Stolt-Nielsen 
essentially to repudiate its submissions of the contract-construction issue to the arbitration 
panel, and to gain, in place of the arbitrators' judgment, the court's de novo 
determination.'100 Nonetheless, after acknowledging that petitioners would need to 'clear a 
high hurdle' to obtain a reversal of the arbitral panel's ruling, the court ruled that this 
standard had been met, because in its view, the panel had failed to 'identify and apply a 
rule of decision derived from the FAA or on maritime or New York law,' but instead had 
'imposed its own policy choice and thus exceeded its powers.'101 Indeed, the court refused 
even to remand the class treatment decision to the arbitral panel for further consideration. 
Instead, the court concluded that there was 'only one possible outcome on the facts,' and it 
conclusively vacated the class action arbitral order, leaving the arbitration to proceed on a 
bilateral basis.102  
 
The decision in Stolt-Nielsen is unquestionably one of the Supreme Court's most 
significant cases in the arbitration field since its decision in Hall Street Associates. L.L.C v. 
Mattel, Inc.103 in which the Court declared that the statutory grounds for judicial review of 
arbitration awards provided by the FAA are exclusive. The decision in Hall Street was 
understood in many quarters as providing strict limits on the extent to which US courts 
acting under federal law could review arbitral awards. Indeed, the Hall Street decision led 
                                                                
100 Ibid., at 1780. 
101 Ibid., 1765. 
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the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to go so far as to reject the notion that US courts can 
overturn arbitral awards, issued in 'manifest disregard of the law,' holding that Hall Street 
now forecloses such judge-made standards for review.104 Moreover, three days after the 
court handed down Stolt-Nielsen, the Eleventh Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit in holding 
that ‘manifest disregard of the law’ could not form the basis for a legal challenge to the 
validity of an arbitral award.105 Whatever one thinks of the correctness of the reasoning in 
Stolt-Nielsen, the case raises the immediate question of whether, by reaching out to 
overturn what was arguably a considered decision of an arbitral panel, the court erased the 
limits on review of arbitral awards it had confirmed only two years before in Hall Street.  
 
The practical effect of Stolt-Nielsen is to return business interests essentially to where they 
were before Bazzle. They may avoid class arbitrations where the parties do not explicitly 
agree to class arbitrations in their contract. In other words, an agreement to arbitrate claims 
is not an agreement to class arbitration. If a party wants to have its claims subject to class 
arbitration, the party must include such a term in the agreement to arbitrate. Moreover, if a 
rogue arbitrator orders class action when a contract is silent on the issue, the Supreme 
Court has provided a roadmap for appeal of that decision even though appeals of 
arbitration decisions generally are precluded. While Stolt-Nielsen appears to have a 
dramatic effect on class arbitrations, the ultimate scope of the decision is really yet to be 
determined. Stolt-Nielsen involved negotiated contracts by sophisticated businesses. In her 
dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg seems to imply that a different rule could apply to 
claims brought by consumers, especially if they have no other way to vindicate their rights 
than class arbitration.  However, one must bear in mind the case of Italian Colors. 
Questions of scope aside, there is little doubt that, by requiring class arbitration clauses to 
                                                                
104 See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 353-55 (5th Cir. 2009). 
105 Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., L.L.C., 604 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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be explicit, Stolt-Nielsen will have the effect of at least reducing the number of class 
arbitrations.106 
 
The Second Circuit was one of the first courts to limit the reach of Stolt-Nielsen to the facts 
of the case. In Jock v. Sterling Jewellers Inc.,107 the court upheld an arbitrator’s 
interlocutory decision allowing an employment case to proceed to class arbitration. The 
court reasoned that the employer’s ADR program clearly 'intended' to make available all 
remedies and rights that would be available in court. Because neither the arbitration 
agreement nor the law categorically prohibited the arbitrator from ordering class 
arbitration, the court determined that an arbitrator could decide whether an arbitration 
clause allowed class arbitration. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case.108 
 
In Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans L.L.C.,109 the Third Circuit affirmed an arbitrator’s 
decision to allow class arbitration based on an arbitration agreement that was silent on the 
issue. The court determined that the arbitration decision could not be vacated because the 
arbitrator had performed his duty appropriately by basing his decision on a thorough 
analysis of the text of the arbitration agreement. The court stated that had the arbitrator 
merely inferred the parties’ intent to authorise class arbitration from their failure to 
preclude it, the court’s decision would have been different. 
 
The court stressed that Stolt-Nielsen did not establish a fixed rule that class arbitration is 
allowed only under an arbitration agreement that expressly provides for aggregate 
                                                                
106 D.M. Allen and R.N. Shwayri, The Supreme Court's class action arbitration 'do over' in Stolt-Nielsen, 
Bloomberg Law Reports, available at 
https://www.carltonfields.com/files/upload/The%20Supreme%20Court's%20Class%20Action%20Arbitration
%20-%20Do%20Over.pdf (accessed 03.08.2016).  
107 Jock v Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F. 3d 113 (2011). 
108 J.J. Range, Alternative Dispute Resolution, (2013) A.B.A. Recent. Dev. Pub. Util. Comm. & Transp. 
Indus. 1, 16. 
109 John Ivan Sutter v Oxford Health Plans L.L.C. 675 F.3d. 215 (2012). 
   
 
  126 
 
procedures. Instead Stolt-Nielsen 'established a default rule' that parties may not be 
compelled to class arbitration unless the contract indicates the party consented to class 
arbitration. The court's holding is narrow, applying only in cases where (1) the parties' 
arbitration agreement does not expressly preclude class-wide arbitration and (2) the parties 
delegate to the arbitrator, either in their agreement or by stipulation, the question of 
whether the parties agreed to class-wide arbitration.110 
 
In Reed v. Florida Metropolitan University, Inc.,111 the Fifth Circuit vacated an arbitration 
award that permitted class arbitration. The court explained that it was abandoning the 
deference that it typically grants to decisions by arbitrators because of the two recent 
Supreme Court decisions, Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion. The court based its holding on the 
fact that neither of the arbitration clauses cited by the arbitrator could properly be 
interpreted as constituting a contractual basis upon which to conclude that the parties 
agreed to authorise class arbitration.  The Fifth Circuit's decision in Reed appears to create 
a Circuit split as to how Stolt-Nielsen is to be applied.  The ultimate answer as to when an 
arbitrator exceeds its powers by engaging in class arbitration may have to await yet another 
decision from the Supreme Court. More broadly, Reed evidences the difficulty of 
determining how much leeway arbitrators have in construing a contract before they exceed 
their powers.112 
 
The Second and Third Circuits have now concluded that broadly worded arbitration 
clauses may permissibly give rise to an inference by an arbitrator of an intent by the parties 
                                                                
110 R.M. Haggerty and M.P. Daly, United States: Supreme Court allows class-wide arbitration in Oxford 
Health Plans L.L.C. v Sutter, available at 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/246128/Class+Actions/Supreme+Court+Allows+ClassWide+Arbitrat
ion+In+Oxford+Health+Plans+LLC+v+Sutter (accessed 07.09.2015). 
111 Jeffrey H. Reed v Florida Metropolitan University, 681 F.3d 630 (2012). 
112 J. Carnegie, United States: Class arbitration: who decides and when are they wrong? available at 
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to engage in class arbitration. Courts in these circuits may not use the presence or absence 
of words such as 'class arbitration' or 'class action' as the sole basis on which to rule on the 
availability of class arbitration. In sharp contrast, the Fifth Circuit has concluded that broad 
phrases such as 'any dispute' or 'any remedy' do not constitute a valid contractual basis 
upon which to conclude that the parties agreed to submit to class arbitration.113 
 
Judge Colleen McMahon issued a decision in Edwards v Macy's114 demonstrating that 
businesses do not have complete control when drafting their arbitration agreements. The 
claimant in Edwards had opened a credit card account at Macy's department store. This 
card was offered by DSNB, a subsidiary of Citibank that issues credit cards for retail 
stores. When the claimant opened the account she accepted enrolment in a 30-day free trial 
of DSNB's 'Credit Card Protection Program.' The Program's terms and conditions were 
contained in an amendment to the credit card agreement, both of which contained 
arbitration clauses. The claimant sued in federal court alleging individual and class claims, 
citing fraud, unjust enrichment and unlawful trade practices. The defendants moved to 
compel arbitration under the FAA, but asked the court to order arbitration only as to the 
claimant individually, asserting that they would rather litigate in the event the court 
declined to limit the arbitration to the claimant's individual claims.  
 
Finding that the claimant had agreed to arbitrate disputes related to the program, and that 
the arbitration agreement prima facie was valid, Judge McMahon issued an order 
compelling arbitration between the claimant and the defendant. She declined, however, to 
grant the defendant's request that she determine that arbitration proceed only against the 
claimant and not on a class-wide basis. Judge McMahon held that whether the arbitration 
                                                                
113 P.J. Baker, Associational Arbitration: First circuit finds a new way to limit Stolt-Nielsen, available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/adr/articles/spring2013-062413-associational-arbitration-
first-circuit.html (accessed 07.09.2015). 
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should proceed on an individual or a class basis should be decided by the arbitrator, and 
not by the court (at least in the circumstances relating to the facts of the case).  
 
She began her analysis with the proposition that under Stolt-Nielsen, the arbitration 
agreement was silent on the question of class arbitration and the parties had stipulated that 
they had reached no agreement on the issue. This was a fact that the Supreme Court found 
dispositive, holding that in the absence of such an agreement there was no basis for which 
consent to class arbitration could be inferred.  
 
By contrast, the agreement in Edwards had what Judge McMahon termed 'a most unusual 
coda.'115 Even though the agreement did not mention the word 'class' or ‘class-wide 
arbitration,' it provided broadly that in addition to arbitration of any dispute or controversy 
out of or relating to the agreement, '[i]f we, a claimant, or a third party have any dispute 
that is directly or indirectly related to a dispute governed by the arbitration provision, the 
claimant and we agree to consolidate all such disputes.'116  
 
Reasoning that the claims of putative class members arising from the same agreement 
arguably related to the claimant's dispute under arbitration with the defendants, and that the 
term 'consolidate' may also permit class arbitration, Judge McMahon concluded that '[t]his 
reference to consolidation of plaintiff's dispute with related third party disputes can 
certainly be read to authorise class-wide arbitration.' Acknowledging that there might be 
other ways to read the agreement, she held that under principles of contra preferentum, 
                                                                
115 Edwards (supra n.114), at 3; E.M. Spiro and J.L. Mogul, Class arbitration: Dying but not dead, available 
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because the defendants had drafted the agreement, it might be best to read it as consent to 
class arbitration.117  
 
Entities whose business relationships with the public are governed by form agreements 
such as the one at issue in Edwards have virtually complete control over the scope of the 
arbitration agreements to which their customers will be bound. Stolt-Nielsen made clear 
that a broad 'any and all disputes' arbitration clause that is silent on the question of class 
arbitration does not permit class arbitration, and cases such as Judge Marrero's decision in 
Anwar v Fairfield Greenwich118 provides strong support for the proposition that courts may 
compel an individual to forgo class litigation and arbitrate their claims individually. 
Edwards, however, serves as a cautionary reminder that broader is not always better, and 
that trying to sweep third party claims within the scope of an arbitration clause may 
radically reduce the protections such clauses are designed to provide.119 
 
In response to the Supreme Court judgments, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB) 2015 Arbitration Study,120 released in conjunction with a speech by CFPB 
Director Richard Cordray, lays the groundwork for rule-making to restrict broadly the use 
of arbitration provisions, including class action waivers, in consumer financial services 
contracts. The CFPB's Study arose under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act's121 requirement that the CFPB prepare to submit to Congress a 
report on the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer financial contracts. This 
Study took three years and foreshadows a seismic change for any company that operates a 
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retail banking unit or, more broadly, any business that offers or provides to consumers a 
financial product or service through a contract that includes arbitration clauses. In the 
credit-card industry alone, the Study estimates that contracts containing such clauses could 
bind at least 80 million Americans.122 The initial effect of this Study will impact on banks. 
However, the long term outlook is that the ultimate effect will spill over into many other 
consumer contracts. The intention is to restrict significantly both the use of arbitration 
provisions and class-action waivers in most consumer contracts even when the business at 
issue is not involved directly in the provision of financial products to consumers.123 
 
The Study was based on an empirical review of at least 850 consumer finance agreements, 
1800 consumer finance arbitration disputes, 562 consumer finance class actions filed in 
federal or state courts, 40,000 small claims filings, 400 consumer finance class action 
settlements in federal court, and over 1,100 government enforcement actions in the 
consumer finance context. The Study inter alia, found that: 
 
 Consumer arbitration clauses are prevalent; credit card issuers representing more 
than half of all credit card debt have arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts; 
 Consumers are sometimes afforded an opportunity to opt-out of arbitration clauses, 
but they are generally unaware of this option or do not exercise it; 
 The private sector may not be doing enough to stem potentially unfair practices, 
and further regulation is needed; 
 Arbitration clauses are effective for eliminating class actions; for instance, when 
credit card issuers with an arbitration clause were sued in a class action, the issuers 
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invoked arbitration clauses to dismiss the class action nearly 66 percent of the 
time.124 
 
Never before has a federal regulator proposed rules that would make it unlawful to force 
consumers to go to arbitration. This represents a sea change in the ability of companies to 
resolve consumer disputes by arbitration. The CFPB will likely conclude that arbitration 
clauses (or at least class arbitration waivers) have a very limited place in consumer 
financial services contracts. If this is the ultimate result of the CFPB's rule making efforts, 
almost all consumer financial services disputes will need to be resolved in court rather than 
by arbitration or arbitration tribunals will see greater attempts by consumers to proceed on 
a class basis.125  
 
3.7 The relevance of the US experience to Europe and the appropriateness of a class 
arbitration mechanism for end-consumer redress following anticompetitive conduct 
 
The benefits of arbitration are well known. Arbitration offers a degree of flexibility 
towards dispute resolution which the court process perhaps could not. It is also recognised 
as a viable mechanism in most countries throughout the EU. However, the question 
remains whether arbitration, more specifically arbitration in a collective setting, is the most 
appropriate way forward in addressing end-consumer harm in the wake of anticompetitive 
conduct. 
 
The whole point of arbitration is that it is a consensual practice. One wonders whether a 
well-informed undertaking would elect to proceed to arbitration at all if it knew it would 
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most likely have to progress on a collective basis. The answer is, probably not. Apathy 
most likely prevails. Collective arbitration is a high cost and high stakes process with an 
uncertain preclusive effect on collective members. Even if Europe was to ban US-style 
class action waivers in their entirety (or at least strictly regulate them), the end result would 
most likely be for arbitration as the chosen forum to disappear completely from any 
contract. Litigation would remain the only method. Given the diversity of collective 
litigation mechanisms throughout Europe, a well-informed undertaking would surely 
sooner take its chances in the court setting than be forced to commit itself to collective 
arbitration and in essence make it easier for aggregate claims. This may well induce forum 
shopping with companies establishing themselves in defendant-friendly jurisdictions.  
 
Consent is therefore key, and undertakings surely will do everything in their power to 
absolve themselves from liability. The US experience is telling. This country essentially 
pioneered class arbitration and is arguably closing it down. Even in circumstances where it 
is clear that individual claims are not financially viable, making claimants unable to seek 
vindication of their rights, the Supreme Court has insulated wrongdoers from liability by 
refusing to interfere with the fundamental attributes of arbitration. The court has given 
effect to the class waiver and refused to take into account the imbalance of bargaining 
power between the parties. It remains to be seen whether an EU arbitration mechanism 
would maintain this outlook. It may be that EU collective arbitration becomes mandatory.  
However, this could infringe the right of access to the courts under Article 6 ECHR. An 
interesting case126 was decided by the CJEU in relation to the implementation of the 
Universal Services Directive127 requiring that Member States shall ensure that transparent, 
simple and inexpensive procedures are drawn up for dealing with users' complaints. It was 
                                                                
126 See J. Davies and E. Szyszczak, ADR: Effective protection of consumer rights? (2010) 35(5) E.L. Rev. 
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alleged that the general principle of effective judicial protection was compromised by the 
Italian law which made mandatory an out-of-court dispute resolution procedure before a 
dispute was admissible in the ordinary court process. The court was of the opinion that the 
USD does not set out the precise content or specific nature of the out-of-court procedures 
that have to be introduced at national level. The only criteria were those set out by the 
USD: the principles of effectiveness, legality, liberty and representation. The court found 
that none of those principles limited the power of the Member States to create out-of-court 
procedures for the settlement of telecoms disputes between consumers and service 
providers.128 The only requirements are the maintenance of the right to bring an action 
before the courts for the settlement of disputes and for ensuring that the Directive remains 
effective.129 It could be the case that collective arbitration be mandatory as long as the right 
of access to the court is maintained. 
 
Even if these issues were resolved, one is also concerned that these aggregate claims may 
be decided by private arbitrators who may seek to ingratiate themselves with companies 
that frequently use their services.130 It may also be argued that arbitration is detrimental to 
the public interest in open resolution of legal controversies.131Typically, arbitration 
proceedings are held in private and do not result in published opinions. Therefore, 
decisions rendered by arbitrators contribute nothing to the body of the law, have little 
deterrent effect on future wrongdoing, and fail to stimulate interest in legal reform.132 The 
lack of transparency and the 'closed' setting of the arbitration process really lead one to 
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wonder whether this forum is appropriate for end-consumer redress.133This is particularly 
the case in terms of competition law which has a clearly visible public interest element. 
This then begs the question whether dispute resolution can be independent and unbiased, 
particularly if it is left to the private sector. Techniques have been developed to achieve 
this. They rely first on applying the essential requirements through combinations of 
scrutiny by customers, competitors, regulators and the media. A leading example includes 
the criteria and systems established in the UK for the telecommunications sector by 
Ofcom.134  
 
Moreover, one has to wonder whether arbitrators would be qualified to deal with collective 
cases. In Stolt-Nielsen, the majority spent a lot of time outlining the complexity of class 
arbitrations and remarked on the amount of money at issue in such disputes. Furthermore, 
Justice Ginsburg suggests in her dissenting remarks in Stolt-Nielsen that the majority takes 
the view that arbitrators ordinarily are not equipped to manage class proceedings.135 This 
could, of course, implicate the adjudicatory aspect of arbitration, in that arbitral procedures 
must be conducted in a manner which affords the parties an opportunity to be heard in an 
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial manner.136One wonders whether there would be checks and 
balances in place to police collective arbitration and if there would be a system in place to 
make sure that it was uniform and fair across the whole of the European Union. 
 
                                                                
133 R.M. Alderman, Pre-dispute arbitration in consumer contracts: A call for reform, (2001) 38 Houston Law 
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In addition, if the private nature of arbitration was a concern, there is the question of 
whether we could have arbitration in a public setting. One could also consider the role of 
ombudsmen in collective arbitration. Ombudsmen are independent, neutral parties. They 
investigate whether the law has been observed and handle complaints about malpractices 
allegedly committed by traders and businesses. Consumer ombudsmen are of particular 
importance to protect collective interests of consumers. Scandinavian countries have 
equipped ombudsmen with legal powers to require businesses to observe the law. The 
Danish Consumer Ombudsman, for example, is an enforcer of consumer law with 
collective redress powers. The Ombudsman may seek a collective redress order against a 
trader to agree to pay restitution or work out repayment plans with infringers. Collective 
actions are also possible in Sweden, where the Konsumentombudsmannen has the power to 
bring proceedings before the National Board for Consumer Complaints (Allmäna 
reklamationsnämnden) on behalf of a group of consumers seeking settlement of a series of 
individual claims stemming from the same circumstances. The National Board for 
Consumer Complaints is a cross-sectoral ADR scheme with national coverage. If the 
Ombudsman takes no action, group proceedings can be initiated by a consumer 
association. This type of representative collective ADR mechanism requires no 
identification of the individual victims in order for the Board to take action. This claim 
extends automatically to all members of the group.137 
 
Beyond Scandinavia, a system for identifying and processing mass cases has also been 
developed by the UK Financial Ombudsman Service which offers consumer protection in 
relation to financial services products. Although it has no specific collective redress 
mechanisms, the FOS has developed certain case handling strategies to handle mass claims 
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(for example the miss-selling of Payment Protection Insurance), which represent around 
half of its case load. Recently, a consumer ombudsman system was introduced in Greece. 
It will have the authority to mediate in all business to consumer disputes. Although it may 
deal with individual claims, the ombudsman may also engage in the protection of 
collective consumer interests. Collective cases have also been brought by the Rail 
Ombudsman Service in Belgium, before which a complaint can be filed concerning 
disputes between the rail company and its customers. The service offers to mediate 
between the parties to reach an amicable agreement. If no agreements can be reached, non-
binding recommendations are used.138 
 
3.8 The relevance of ‘unfair terms’ in consumer contracts 
 
This section refers to the impact of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts139 on consumer arbitration. Article 3 states that ‘a contractual term which has not 
been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of 
good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising 
under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.’ This general requirement is 
supplemented by a list in the Annex to the Directive of examples of terms that may be 
regarded as unfair. The Directive’s Preamble states that contracts should be drafted in 
plain, intelligible language and that when in doubt, the interpretation most favourable to 
the consumer should prevail.140 
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This Directive has been interpreted by the CJEU in relation to consumer arbitration clauses 
in two important cases. The first case is Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium SL.141The 
case arose before the CJEU following proceedings in Spain between Ms. Mostaza Claro 
and Móvil. The Spanish proceedings concerned the validity of an arbitration clause 
included in a mobile telephone contract concluded between Mostaza Claro and Móvil. The 
arbitration clause referred any disputes arising from the contract to the European 
Association of Arbitration in Law and Equity (AEADE). 
 
As Mostaza Claro did not comply with the minimum subscription period, Móvil initiated 
arbitration proceedings before the AEADE. Mostaza Claro was granted a period of 10 days 
in which to refuse arbitration proceedings. In the event of refusal, she could bring legal 
proceedings. Mostaza Claro presented arguments on the merits of the dispute, but did not 
repudiate the arbitration proceedings or claim that the arbitration agreement was void. The 
arbitration proceedings subsequently took place and the arbitrator found against her. 
Mostaza Claro subsequently contested the arbitration decision delivered by the AEADE 
before the referring court, submitting that the unfair nature of the arbitration clause meant 
that the arbitration agreement was null and void.  
 
The referring court stated that there was no doubt that the arbitration agreement included 
an unfair contractual term, and was therefore null and void.142 However, as Mostaza Claro 
did not plead that the agreement was invalid in the context of the arbitration proceedings, 
and in order to interpret the national law in accordance with the Directive, the Spanish 
court decided to stay the proceedings and refer to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.143 The 
Spanish court asked the following question: 
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‘May the protection of consumers under Council Directive 93/12/EEC…require the court 
hearing an action for annulment of an arbitration award to determine whether the 
arbitration is void and to annul the award if it finds that that arbitration agreement contains 
an unfair term to the consumer’s detriment, when that issue is raised in the action for 
annulment but was not raised by the consumer in arbitration proceedings.’144 
 
The CJEU found that the system of protection introduced by the Directive was based on 
the idea that the consumer was in a weak position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier (as regards 
both their bargaining power and level of knowledge). This leads to the consumer agreeing 
to terms drawn up in advance by the seller or supplier without being able to influence the 
content of those terms.145 Such an imbalance could only be corrected by positive action 
unconnected with the actual parties to the contract.146 It was on the basis of those principles 
that the CJEU ruled that the national court’s power to determine of its own motion whether 
a term is unfair constitutes a means of achieving the result sought by Article 6 of the 
Directive, namely preventing an individual consumer from being bound by an unfair 
term.147 Moreover, if the court undertakes such an examination, this may act as a deterrent 
and contribute to preventing unfair terms in contracts concluded between consumers and 
sellers or suppliers.148 The nature and importance of the public interest underlying the 
protection that the Directive conferred on consumers justified the national court being 
required to assess of its own motion whether a contractual term was unfair, compensating 
in this way for the imbalance that existed between the consumer and the seller or supplier. 
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Consequently, the Directive was to be interpreted as meaning that a national court seised of 
an action for annulment of an arbitration award had to determine whether the arbitration 
agreement was void, and annul that award where that agreement contained an unfair term, 
even though the consumer had not pleaded that invalidity in the course of the arbitration 
proceedings, but only in that of the action for annulment.149  
 
The second relevant case before the CJEU is Asturcom Telecommunications SL v 
Rodriguez Nogueira.150A mobile telephone contract between Asturcom and Mrs. 
Rodriguez Nogueira contained an arbitration clause under which any dispute concerning 
the performance of the contract was to be referred for arbitration to the AEADE. 
Rodriguez Nogueira defaulted on her payments and terminated the contract before the 
agreed minimum subscription period had expired. Asturcom initiated arbitration 
proceedings against her before the AEADE. The award ordered Rodriguez Nogueira to pay 
€669.60. Asturcom brought an action before the court in Bilbao for enforcement of the 
arbitration award, once the award became final. Up to this point, Rodriguez Nogueira did 
not participate in the arbitral procedure nor did she initiate proceedings for the annulment 
of the award.  
 
The Spanish referring court stated in its order for reference that the arbitration clause in the 
contract was unfair because: (1) the costs incurred by the consumer in travelling to the seat 
of the AEADE arbitration tribunal were greater than the amount at issue in the dispute in 
the main proceedings;151 (2) the arbitration seat was located at a considerable distance from 
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168/05 Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium SL – The Unfair Contract Terms Directive: the ECJ’s third 
intervention in domestic procedural law – the Dutch case note, (2008) 15(5) E.R.P.L. 735.    
150 Case 40/08 Asturcom Telecommunications SL v Rodriguez Nogueira, (2009) I-09579.  
151 Ibid., para 25. 
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the consumer’s place of residence and its location was not indicated in the contract;152 (3) 
AEADE itself draws up the contracts which are subsequently used by telecommunications 
undertakings.153  
 
The referring court also pointed out that arbitrators were not permitted under Spanish 
arbitration law to examine of their own motion whether unfair arbitration clauses were 
void. Moreover, the relevant law on Spanish civil procedure did not contain any provision 
dealing with the assessment to be carried out by the court or tribunal having jurisdiction as 
to whether arbitration clauses were unfair when adjudicating on an action for enforcement 
of an arbitration award that become final. Therefore, doubts were cast as to whether 
domestic procedural rules were compatible with EU law and the Bilbao court decided to 
stay the enforcement of the award proceedings and to refer to the CJEU the following 
question for a preliminary ruling: 
 
‘in order that the protection given to consumers by Directive 93/13 should be guaranteed, 
is it necessary for the court hearing an action for enforcement of a final arbitration award, 
made in the absence of the consumer, to determine of its own motion whether the 
arbitration agreement is void and, accordingly, to annul the awards if it finds that the 
arbitration agreement contains an unfair clause that is to the detriment of the consumer?’154 
 
The CJEU held that: 
 
‘Council Directive 93/13/EEC….must be interpreted as meaning that a national court or 
tribunal hearing an action for enforcement of an arbitration award which has become final 
                                                                
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid., para 27.  
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and was made in the absence of the consumer is required, where it has available to it the 
legal and factual elements necessary for that task, to assess of its own motion whether an 
arbitration clause in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer is 
unfair, in so far as, under national rules of procedure, it can carry out such an assessment in 
similar actions of a domestic nature. If that is the case, it is for the court or tribunal to 
establish all the consequences thereby arising under national law, in order to ensure that 
the consumer is not bound by that clause.’155 
 
The court reached its conclusion distinguishing the present case from former cases in that: 
  
‘Mrs Rodriguez Nogueira did not in any way become involved in the various proceedings 
relating to the dispute between her and Asturcom and, in particular, did not bring an action 
for annulment of the arbitration award made by the AEADE in order to challenge the 
arbitration clause on the ground that it was unfair, so that that award now has the force of 
res judicata.’156 
 
It was therefore necessary to determine whether the need of an effective balance which re-
establishes equality between the parties to the contract requires the national court 
responsible for enforcement to ensure that the consumer is afforded absolute protection, 
even where the consumer has not brought any legal proceedings in order to assert their 
rights and notwithstanding the fact that the domestic rules of procedure apply the principle 
of res judicata.157 Then, the CJEU then stated that: 
 
                                                                
155 Ibid., para 60. 
156 Ibid., para 33.  
157 Ibid., para 34. 
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‘Community law does not require a national court to disapply domestic rules of procedure 
conferring finality of a decision, even if to do so would make it possible to remedy an 
infringement of a provision of Community law, regardless of its nature, on the part of the 
decision at issue.’158 
 
Nevertheless, national rules governing finality and res judicata applicable to Community 
law actions must not be framed in such a way as to make it in practice impossible or 
excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by Community law (principle of 
effectiveness) and must be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic 
actions (principle of equivalence).  
 
Concerning the principle of effectiveness, the CJEU found that a two-month time limit, 
running from the date of notification of the arbitration award, such as that laid down in the 
relevant Spanish arbitration law, upon the expiry of which, in the absence of any action for 
annulment, an arbitration award becomes final and thus acquires the authority of res 
judicata does not make it impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights 
conferred on consumers by Directive 93/13.159 
 
Concerning the principle of equivalence, the CJEU placed on the national court the burden 
to decide whether the national procedural law is consistent with that principle.160 However, 
the national court had to consider Article 6 of the Directive as a mandatory provision of 
equal standing than national rules of public policy. Moreover, the CJEU stressed that 
according to the Spanish Government, the court or tribunal responsible for enforcement of 
an arbitration award which has become final has jurisdiction to assess of its own motion 
                                                                
158 Ibid., para 37. 
159 Ibid., para 42. 
160 Ibid., para 49. 
   
 
  143 
 
whether an arbitration clause in a contract concluded between a consumer and a seller or 
supplier is null and void on the ground that such a clause is contrary to national rules of 
public policy; and that a number of recent judgments of the Audiencia Provincial de 
Madrid and Audiencia Nacional have acknowledged that jurisdiction.161 Therefore it seems 
clear that the referring Spanish court was wrong in confronting Spanish procedural law to 
EU law, since the former is interpreted by higher courts allowing ex officio judicial control 
of unfair arbitration clauses in consumer contracts.162  
 
3.9 Proposals for harmonised collective ADR  
 
If class arbitration was something with which the EU wished to move forward, perhaps one 
could consider the outline as constructed by Jessica Beess und Chrostin.163She argues that 
the EU should implement an EU directive specifically to deal with collective redress to 
ensure some degree of uniformity. She prescribes the following features.  
  
3.10 Arbitration agreement and opt-in procedure 
 
As the US Supreme Court pointed out in Stolt Nielsen, arbitration is a purely consensual 
private means of dispute resolution. As such, it requires that all parties to the arbitration 
have consented to having their claims defended in an arbitral procedure. Jessica Beess und 
Chrostin suggests that having a collective redress mechanism that takes the form of 
collective arbitrations with an opt-in procedure would hence comport with European 
notions of individualised justice because it would ensure that all participants in the suit are 
aware of and have consented to having their rights bound by the collective representatives. 
                                                                
161 Ibid., para 55. 
162 M. Torres, Case C-40/08 Asturcom Telecommunications SL v Rodriguez Nogueira: European Union – 
unfair contract terms – arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, (2010) 21(2) I.C.C.L.R. N11. 
163 J. Beess und Chrostin (supra n.7), 111.  
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Consumer awareness of arbitration would therefore have to be increased. It may be argued 
that this does not go far enough. From the claimant's perspective, it is generally accepted 
that opt-out systems are more desirable than opt-in systems.164 The opt-in system in the 
court setting does not garner a great deal of uptake by potential claimants.165 
 
3.11 Discovery 
 
Beess und Chrostin argues that the greater flexibility of discovery procedures offered by 
arbitration would appear to provide a further reason in favour of adopting collective 
arbitration as the predominant mechanism for collective redress in Europe.166 As the 
various international arbitration associations have slightly varying provisions concerning 
the scope of discovery permitted, arbitration would give parties to the proceeding the 
option to choose the set of discovery rules that seem best suited to their needs. As it is 
likely, however, that the parties might disagree as to which arbitration association provides 
the most favourable discovery guidelines, the European class arbitration mechanism here 
proposed should have a fall-back discovery similar to that provided by the International 
Centre for Dispute Resolution [ICDR].167  
 
The ICDR guidelines state that it is their primary goal to provide a dispute resolution 
mechanism that is 'simpler, less expensive and more expeditious' than resort to litigation in 
                                                                
164 Ibid., 120; See also S.I. Strong, The sounds of silence: Are US arbitrators creating internationally 
enforceable awards when ordering class arbitration in cases of contractual silence and ambiguity? (2009) 
20 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1017, 1053. 
165 R. Khodykin, Class arbitration: Is there an appetite for it in Europe? Available at 
https://www.blplaw.com/expert-legal-insights/articles/class-arbitration-appetite-europe/ (accessed 
04.08.2016). 
166 J. Beess und Chrostin (supra n.7), 120.  
167 Ibid.; See International Centre for Dispute Resolution, ICDR Guidelines for Arbitrators on Exchange of 
Information, available at 
https://www.icdr.org/icdr/faces/icdrresources/icdrarbitratorsmediators;jsessionid=1hpVbBV9lulRCvyJbdt8B
Oob2IbhOTX5lo0iRNhhsMIT1nOE4hxB!509556955?_afrLoop=1154975353995667&_afrWindowMode=0
&_afrWindowId=null#%40%3F_afrWindowId%3Dnull%26_afrLoop%3D1154975353995667%26_afrWind
owMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dac6ycv81s_4 (accessed 04.08.2016). 
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national courts.168 In this vein, the guidelines instruct arbitrators to manage their exchange 
of information between parties with a view to maintain efficiency and economy. The ICDR 
further requires that arbitrators: 
 
'endeavour to avoid unnecessary delay and expense while at the same time balancing goals 
of avoiding surprise, promoting equality of treatment, and safeguarding each party's 
opportunity to present its claims and defences fairly.'169 
 
According to Beess und Chrostin, the ICDR's guidelines for discovery appear to strike a 
desirable balance between permitting discovery that is extensive enough to meet the 
parties' needs and ensuring that such discovery does not become exorbitantly expensive. 
Especially today, when electronic discovery is becoming increasingly common, the costs 
of discovery procedures appear to be increasing and a focus on economical yet practical 
discovery is hence crucial to any successful system for collective dispute resolution, 
especially one that depends on the voluntary agreement of all parties concerned.170 
 
Additionally, the ICDR guidelines provide that arbitrators only grant requests by one side 
for documents in the possession of the opposing party if the documents are reasonably 
believed to exist and to be relevant and material to the outcome of the case. 
 
These requirements ensure that discovery will likely be more limited than in the US and 
therefore less costly and more similar to European discovery procedures. This is especially 
advantageous should a party to an arbitration need to request a local European court to 
enforce the discovery order, a likely scenario should the opposing side refuse to comply 
                                                                
168 ICDR Guidelines for Arbitrators on Exchange of Information, 1. 
169 Ibid.  
170 J. Beess und Chrostin (supra n.7), 120.  
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with the arbitrators' orders. The necessity for such enforcement procedures, however, 
should be minimal given that the ICDR guidelines provide that the arbitrators may draw 
adverse inferences from a party's refusal to comply with discovery orders and may take 
such refusal into account in allocating costs.171 
 
Such a flexible procedure admittedly gives the arbitrators broad discretion in determining 
the scope of appropriate discovery. However, given that the guidelines provided under the 
ICDR procedures are likely to be no less detailed than discovery rules for judges hearing a 
case in a local court, it is unlikely that the parties will be adversely affected by these 
provisions, especially since the parties are free to choose the arbitrators hearing their case. 
Additionally, should a party believe that the arbitrators' discovery orders are generally 
unfair or in violation of the discovery guidelines, that party is still free to defend their 
position should the opposing side decide to seek enforcement in a local court. In sum, this 
flexible approach to discovery provides pragmatic guidelines that allow for sufficiently 
broad discovery to ensure that each side can adequately present their case while striving to 
keep discovery costs as low as possible.  
 
3.12 Consumer Agency Approval 
 
The EU Member States under consideration currently permit agencies, associations or 
other public bodies to bring claims to protect the rights of consumers, even in countries 
that do not allow individuals to bring claims on behalf of a collective. This comports with 
the general European tradition of preferring regulatory solutions over individual 
litigation.172 Given the importance of regulatory schemes in European legal jurisprudence 
                                                                
171 Ibid.; ICDR Guidelines for Arbitrators on Exchange of Information, 3. 
172 J. Beess und Chrostin (supra n.7), 120.  
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and the need for effective funding solutions, a collective redress mechanism that 
incorporates an element of regulatory supervision might be more acceptable to those 
European nations that are currently still sceptical of a uniform system of collective dispute 
resolution than one that has no place for regulatory involvement. The following structure 
would give consumer agencies a place in the collective dispute resolution mechanism 
while ensuring that individuals are still free to defend their own rights in class proceedings 
should they prefer to do so.173  
 
For cases in which the underlying contract(s) contains an arbitration clause that is 
construed to permit collective arbitrations or where all parties agree to arbitrate their claim, 
a regulatory government branch such as a national or EU consumer agency should be 
required to approve a claim before a collective representative or claimants' attorney 
proceeds to arbitration. In this scenario, the agency does not decide whether a claim is 
likely to succeed on the merits or whether an arbitrator is likely to certify the plaintiff 
class: the approval procedure should focus solely on whether the claim appears to be 
frivolous. This is a very low standard of review, but one that provides a safeguard against 
abusive filing of claims to harass or coerce a defendant business into settling. To assuage 
fears that consumer agencies might, consciously or subconsciously, (dis-)approve claims 
based on the perceived merits of the case, the agency's decision should be appealable in 
court where the decision should be reviewed de novo.174 
 
For cases in which there is no arbitration clause and the parties affected by the claim 
cannot unanimously agree to class arbitration, the consumer agency should decide whether 
a regulatory response would effectively address the problem and redress the harm. If so, a 
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regulatory response to the problem should be adopted to save the cost of litigation. 
However, where a regulatory response will either be less effective in rectifying the wrong 
or determining future wrongdoing, or where such a response will not adequately 
compensate the harmed consumers, the claim should proceed on a collective basis. While 
this structuring would give consumer agencies significant leeway in deciding how to 
respond to large-scale wrongdoing, such a scheme would simply follow the already 
existing tradition of preference for regulatory responses while simultaneously at least 
opening the door for the option of collective actions where such a procedure would be 
superior.175  
 
3.13 Fee-shifting Provision - Loser pays 
 
The 'loser pays' principle is an embedded feature of civilian litigation tradition. This 
principle could be retained in arbitration, with one difference. It may only apply where the 
arbitrators determine that a claim is so meritless that it could have been brought for 
improper purposes. This procedure would complement the agency approval stage and 
provides a further safeguard against abusive litigation. In the approval stage, the agency is 
only permitted to disprove a claim if it finds the claim to be frivolous.176 In reaching its 
decision, the agency is limited to a consideration of the basic allegations and facts of the 
case as alleged by the claimant collective. As this means that the agency has no recourse to 
independent investigation of the veracity of the factual allegations or to the defendant's 
side of the case, it is possible that the meritless and/or maliciously motivated claims might 
proceed to arbitration. Providing that the loser pays the opposing side's costs where the 
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arbitrator determines that a claim was filed for abusive purposes will dissuade such 
claims.177  
 
3.14 Capped punitive damages 
 
Jessica Bees und Chrostin argues that although punitive damages have traditionally not 
been available in most European countries, they should be introduced in the consumer 
collective arbitration context for intentional or reckless wrongdoing for two reasons. First, 
widespread harm to consumers might frequently involve small claims that would not be 
worth litigating individually. In the US, where class actions involve an opt-out procedure, 
the value of the individual claim is less problematic because the onus is on the class 
member to opt-out, an unlikely event if the individual has no incentive to litigate the claim 
on their own. In the European scheme proposed here however, the value of the claim might 
be so small as to render it not worth opting-in to a class proceeding. In order to ensure that 
small but widespread wrongs, that in the aggregate likely benefit the wrongdoing company, 
are redressed by the system, punitive damages should be permitted where the defendant 
has acted either intentionally or recklessly in causing harm to the group of consumer 
claimants. Secondly, punitive damages should be permitted as an additional deterrent 
against defendant misconduct.178  
 
Recognising, however, that punitive damages are not part of the European legal tradition 
and that the frequency of exorbitant punitive damages awards in class action litigation in 
the US is perceived as one of the sources of abusive litigation, the availability of such 
damages should be strictly limited in Europe. The cap should allow punitive damages high 
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enough to provide an incentive for individuals with valid claims to bring a collective 
arbitration to hold a wrongdoing defendant accountable, but not high enough for a potential 
claimant to assume the risk of triggering the fee-shifting loser pays provision described 
above.  
 
One also has to keep in mind that the EU’s latest offering towards collective redress in the 
form of the Recommendation maintains a strict refusal to endorse punitive damage. 
Paragraph 31 states that ‘the compensation awarded to natural or legal persons harmed in a 
mass harm situation should not exceed the compensation that would have been awarded, if 
the claim had been pursued by means of individual actions. In particular, punitive 
damages, leading to overcompensation in favour of the claimant party of the damage 
suffered, should be prohibited.’ 
 
3.15 Concluding remarks on collective arbitration 
 
The model proposed above by Beess un Chrostin would result in radical changes to the 
currently available mechanisms for collective redress in Europe and one remains uncertain 
whether the EU and its Member States would have the political will and drive to make 
such changes.  
 
Class arbitration by US standards is not appropriate for addressing the gap in end-
consumer redress flowing from anticompetitive behaviour. The consensual nature of 
arbitration, and the fact that agreements are drafted by the expert legal teams of powerful 
undertakings leave too much of an imbalance of power in favour of these companies. The 
private nature of arbitration and the lack of contribution to the body of law may be 
dangerous, particularly when one considers the wide-spread public interest flowing from 
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mass consumer claims. That is not to say that class arbitration, or indeed other forms of 
ADR are unwelcome to the table. The flexibility that these systems provide, the speed of 
proceedings and high regard that certain Member States hold for such proceedings cannot 
be ignored. What is being suggested is that if class arbitration is going to be a viable game-
change in the mass redress sphere, the EU has to approach it in a different manner. Using 
public ombudsmen and sectoral regulation may ensure transparency and legitimacy in 
these proceedings. Encouraging undertakings to submit to certain arbitral regimes which 
are held in high esteem by both commerce and the regulators may instil trust in the 
process. This may also benefit the reputations of big undertakings that choose to submit 
only to transparent and highly regarded regimes. Sectoral processes could also be set up to 
maintain decisions which are tailor-made to the specific needs of industry and its 
respective consumers.  
 
What this chapter has shown is that in the light of criticism surrounding traditional court 
procedure and its ability to deal with aggregate harm, class arbitration and other forms of 
ADR (although not entirely resolved at present) may well form part of the remedy in 
moving forward.  
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CHAPTER 4 THE NEED TO REALIGN THE FOCUS AND CONSIDER THE 
APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR END-CONSUMER REDRESS 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
It has been considered that the current conflicts-of-laws rules are open to forum shopping. 
There is a great diversity in approach towards consumer collective redress across the 
Member States. The opportunity to improve and align collective redress procedures 
throughout the EU by adjusting civil procedure and/or introducing more flexible 
mechanisms of alternative dispute resolution such as collective consumer arbitration has 
also been considered. However, perhaps one needs to take a further step back and question 
what the appropriate remedy should be for an end-consumer.  
 
There are lots of questions to be resolved. For example, one wonders whether the courts 
should award a lump sum to be divided between all end-consumers. Furthermore, there is 
the issue of what should be done with any unclaimed funds. It may be given to charity, to 
representative organisations, or simply returned to the defendant. No EU-wide consensus 
has emerged on how to reconcile these issues of economics and justice.1 
 
  
                                                                
1 See for example, C. Hodges, From class actions to collective redress: a revolution in approach to 
compensation, (2009) 28(1) C.J.Q. 41. 
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4.1 Private enforcement goals: ideals and realities 
 
Compensation is considered to be the ultimate goal of private enforcement of EU 
competition law. Article 3 of the Damages Directive2 states that: 
 
 'Member States shall ensure that any natural or legal person who has suffered harm caused 
by an infringement of competition law is able to claim and obtain full compensation for 
that harm.' 
 
The ratio for this is to deliver the person who has suffered harm back to the position in 
which they would have been had the infringement not taken place. Compensation includes 
recompense for actual loss and loss of profit, plus payment of interest.3 The Directive does 
not provide for punitive or multiple damage.4 The problem with the broad scope of this 
Article is that it implies a one-size-fits-all approach to compensation.   
 
When one compares the difference between the actual loss suffered by an individual end-
consumer and an undertaking, the levels of damage are unparalleled. For an end-consumer, 
the overcharge as a result of a cartel will generally amount to a few cents. On the converse, 
an undertaking which has suffered as a result of a cartel may suffer a much more 
substantial loss. The latter will have a much greater interest to launch a claim given the 
higher stakes and the potential damage to their business. Also, as they are closer to law 
                                                                
2  Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union OJ L 349 
5.12.2014 1.  
3 Ibid., Article 3(2). 
4 Ibid., Article 3(3). 
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breaking firms on the supply chain, traders (suppliers and buyers) may be better aware of 
the existence of hardcore cartels than final consumers.5  
 
The asymmetry in financial stakes leads us to a dichotomy, a gulf between viable and non-
viable claims. Despite the fact that on paper both groups have the same rights to 
compensation, the end-consumer as a lone individual has little incentive to sue for 
compensation when the costs of litigation outweigh the anticipated compensation. Indeed, 
in this context, Judge Posner indicated that, 'only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.'6 This 
is rational apathy. To an extent, rational apathy has been overcome by the initiation of 
collective actions. However, there are ongoing disagreements within the EU as to the 
correct procedure for such actions (i.e. whether to have an opt-in or opt-out mechanism), as 
well as issues with funding and judgment recognition and enforcement. Access to justice 
for end-consumers has become entangled in a quagmire. The inability to agree upon and to 
deliver a coherent and effective private enforcement system with the aim of redressing 
end-consumers for actual loss leads us to question whether compensation as the ultimate 
goal is the correct remedy for this category of claimant. 
 
4.2 Consumer attitudes 
 
To explain this better, one must consider the attitudes of consumers towards 
anticompetitive harm as well as low-value harm to each consumer more generally. For 
example, consider the scenario of one consumer from another EU Member State going to 
Milan on holiday and purchasing a handbag costing €80 from an Italian department store. 
                                                                
5 R. Van den Bergh, Private enforcement of European Competition Law and the persisting collective action 
problem, (2013) 20(1) M.J. 12, 17; See R. Nazzini, The objective of private remedies in EU competition law, 
(2011) 4(4) G.C.L.R. 131. 
6 Carnegie v Household International Inc 376 F 3d 656, 661 (2004), referred to in B. Wardhaugh, Bogeymen, 
lunatics and fanatics: Collective actions and the private enforcement of European competition law, (2014) 34 
L.S. 1, 2.  
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They return to their home Member State to discover it is faulty. Clearly this is an 
inconvenience and a disappointment to the purchaser. They may take no further action and 
put it down to experience. They may complain to the seller via email. They may write an 
online review of the department store if the seller fails to take any satisfactory remedial 
action. In the absence of a satisfactory remedy, one wonders whether the wronged 
consumer would be willing to launch a cross-border action for damages against the Italian 
department store. The costs of instructing a solicitor and going to court as well as the costs 
associated with the cross-border element would most likely outweigh any potential 
compensation. 
 
Consider another scenario. A consumer from the UK visits Spain and purchases a Real 
Madrid football strip from the official store. Seven years later a cross-border cartel has 
been uncovered following a joint investigation by the UK and Spanish competition 
authorities. It has been discovered that there has been the price-fixing of certain replica 
football kit. The Real Madrid football strip purchased by that consumer 7 years ago is one 
of the lines involved in the cartel. One questions how strongly that consumer would feel 
about claiming compensation for a product they purchased 7 years ago.  The compensation 
they would likely receive would equate to a few Euros. The effort of filling out forms, 
establishing proof of purchase etc. would surely outweigh the potential benefit. If we think 
about the cost of going to court, the length of time that has passed (a cartel usually takes a 
long period of time to uncover) and establishing harm, then the award of a small sum in 
compensation at the end of a lengthy process would not (for most people) equate to a 
worthwhile payoff.  
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4.3 Consumer attitudes towards cross-border trade and consumer protection 
 
Consumer attitudes are well documented by the EU which regularly conducts surveys on 
consumer perceptions of cross-border trade and consumer protection.7For this reason, this 
thesis has chosen not to undertake its own empirical research. In one survey it was 
established that following an unsatisfactory resolution of their complaints to sellers/service 
providers, nearly one in two (46%) consumers had given up and taken no further action.8 
The youngest consumers (15-24 year olds) and full time students were the least likely to 
have taken action (55% and 61% respectively).9 Around one in three of this group of 
unsatisfied consumers chose to take their complaint to a third party consumer complaint 
body: 16% had asked for advice from a consumer association or helpdesk.10 8% had 
complained to a consumer authority, 3% had taken the matter to arbitration, mediation or 
conciliation body. 7% of these unsatisfied consumers had consulted a lawyer and 2% had 
taken the matter to court.11 
 
Consumers who had encountered a problem when buying goods or services but who had 
not made a complaint about it to the seller or provider were asked for their reasons for not 
doing so.12 Two reasons were prevalent: the amount of recovery being too little and the 
lack of confidence in getting a satisfactory resolution to the problem.13 
 
                                                                
7 See for example, European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer: Consumer attitudes towards cross-border 
trade and consumer protection, analytical report, (2011), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_299_en.pdf (accessed 04.08.2016).  
8 Ibid., 7. 
9 Ibid., 45. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 7. 
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When presented with various statements about the protection of their rights as consumers, 
in all EU Member States (with the exception of Hungary), a majority of respondents 
agreed that they would be more willing to defend their rights in the court if they could join 
with other consumers who were complaining about the same thing (from 60% in Estonia to 
90% in Ireland). Furthermore, in 4 Member States, roughly half of consumers strongly 
agreed with this proposition: Sweden (48%), France (49%), Greece and Malta (both 
50%).14 
 
Member States' national reporters were asked to estimate the threshold for claims under 
which a rational consumer would refrain from seeking individual redress through ordinary 
court procedures. The answers provided varied widely and depicted certain diversity in 
consumer willingness to bring individual claims in different Member States. What can be 
deduced from the relevant responses is that in all Member States consumers are reluctant to 
file a claim if its value is lower than €50.15 However, it seems that generally consumers 
would be reluctant to start procedures even if their claim amounts to €100 or more.16 In 
addition, the complexity of competition claims would also influence consumer willingness 
to undertake competition litigation since this directly impacts on their chances of success.17 
With reference to the Small Claims Regulation18 Maria Ioannidou suggests that as much as 
€2,000 could serve as an upper limit for consumers deciding whether to become involved 
in a claim for competition damages.19 Given the complexity of competition claims it seems 
unlikely for consumers to bring claims exceeding several hundred Euros and in any case 
                                                                
14 Ibid., 55. 
15 Since this was the lowest threshold provided in Germany, M. Ioannidou, Enhancing consumers’ role in EU 
private competition enforcement: A normative and practical approach, (2011) 8(1) Comp. L. Rev. 59, 70; 
See also generally M. Ioannidou, Consumer involvement in private EU competition law enforcement, (OUP, 
(2015)). 
16 M. Ioannidou, Enhancing the consumers' role in EU private competition law enforcement (supra n.15), 70.  
17 Ibid.; See also footnote 60 of this article: ‘According to rational choice theory a consumer would only 
undertake court procedures if the value of his/her claim exceeds judicial costs multiplied by his/her chances 
of success.’ 
18 Regulation 861/2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure OJ L199 31.7.2007 1, Article 2(1). 
19 M. Ioannidou (supra n.15), 70.  
   
 
  158 
 
consumer damage flowing from a competition law violation would in the majority of cases 
be lower than this threshold.20 
 
Indeed, one also has to consider that individual consumers have different outlooks on 
price. Where one person may feel that they have been over-charged, another may feel that 
they have paid a reasonable price. This is evident particularly in the luxury product sector. 
It has been shown that certain categories of consumers perceive high prices to reflect the 
high quality of the product.21 Monetary value associated with an item is subjective and 
varies from person to person. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for the value an individual 
places on a particular object to be above or below its actual market price.22 In addition, 
outlook and expectation might vary as a result of individual characteristics such as age, 
sex, hobbies, and income level. 
 
These characteristics may point towards the difficulty of gaining consumer consensus that 
their rights have been violated, and indeed whether they intend to vindicate such rights. As 
a bystander, one may see people queuing up overnight outside electronic shops to buy the 
latest games console or smart-phone. When new products come to market, they are usually 
more expensive, yet many consumers will proceed to purchase in the knowledge that prices 
may drop after the initial hype. Some people are driven by the emotional appeal and 
response to a recognisable style and participation in the lifestyle associated with a 
particular brand.23 Of course, one is careful to point out that this research is linked closely 
                                                                
20M. Ioannidou, 71.  
21 A. Khare, D. Achtani, M. Khattar, Influence of price perception and shopping motives on Indian 
consumers' attitudes towards retailer promotions in malls, (2014) 26(2) Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing 
and Logistics 272, 277. 
22 A. Brun, C. Castelli, The nature of luxury; a consumer perspective, International Journal of Retail & 
Distribution Management (2013) (41)(11) 823, 836. 
23 Ibid., 841. 
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to luxury products. Consumers may have different attitudes regarding everyday essential 
products such as food or fuel.  
 
One should not make too general an assumption. Consider a consumer of dairy products by 
way of an example: whether a consumer who has purchased a product from an infringing 
store, when presented with the choice, would not rather take their custom elsewhere than 
seek compensation in order to vindicate their rights. Here we arrive back at rational apathy. 
The effort of claiming outweighs any potential gain from making a claim.  
 
The experience with football shirts in JJB Sports24 shows in a nutshell the difficulty of 
encouraging consumers to come forward and state that their rights have been violated. 
When the case was settled at the beginning of 2008, £20 was paid to each registered 
claimant and £10/15 to unregistered claimants. Operating under an opt-in system meant 
that uptake was very low considering the degree of publicity, the resources spent and the 
external legal costs.25  
 
Which? (the consumer body acting on behalf of the collective) argued that had there been 
an opt-out mechanism available, the case would have made a greater financial impact 
thereby ensuring that affected customers were properly compensated, either directly or 
indirectly, and tangentially this would have the effect of acting as a stronger deterrent to 
companies from engaging in activities that cause consumer detriment.26 In an interview, 
Deborah Prince, then head of legal at Which? commented that after dedicating 20 per cent 
of her workforce to a collective action against the sports retailer JJB Sports and amassing 
                                                                
24 The Consumers Association v JJB Sports Plc. (1078/7/9/07). 
25 Which? Collective redress case study, available at http://www.which.co.uk/documents/pdf/collective-
redress-case-study-which-briefing-258401.pdf (accessed 01.10.2014). 
26 Ibid. 
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significant legal costs, 'it's not looking likely that [they] would do it again.'27 Despite an 
intensive media campaign by the consumer association, including a front page feature in 
The Sun newspaper, take up on the compensation was low, and the action named just 500 
individuals.  
 
Prince submitted that the case had been a 'journey of discovery' that had thrown up some 
practical issues with collective actions. Passage of time is the biggest problem, she 
commented. Anyone wishing to make a claim would need proof of purchase. Prince added: 
'I have a 17-year-old son who I've bought clothes for. How am I supposed to remember 
what I bought six years ago? Would anybody? Who would be expected to keep receipts for 
that length of time?'28 The low value of individual pay-outs (£20 per consumer) also gave 
little incentive for claimants to participate. A lot of time was dedicated to the case by case-
handlers. One person worked on the case for six months.29  
 
Mulheron examined comparative figures for participation in collective actions across opt-
in and opt-out regimes. She confirmed that opt-out 'catches more litigants in the fishing 
net.'30 Where modern empirical data exists, the median opt-out rates have been as low as 
0.1% and no higher than 13%.31 Where widespread empirical data does not exist as yet, 
judicial summations of opt-out rates indicate a range of opt-outs between 40% (which is 
rare on the cases surveyed) and 0% with a tendency for the rates of participation under opt-
out regimes to be high.  On the other hand, whilst the experience in English group 
                                                                
27 The Lawyer, Class action is one big headache, says Which? Available at  http://www.thelawyer.com/class-
action-is-one-big-headache-says-which/135901.article (accessed 01.10.2014). 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid.  
30 R. Mulheron, Reform of collective redress in England and Wales: A perspective of need, available at 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/CJC/Publications/Other+papers/reform-
of-collective-redress.pdf (accessed 04.08.2016), 147 - 160; See also J. Sorabji, Coping with complexity and 
securing justice through multi-party litigation: Lessons from the CAT and JJB Sports,  (2014) 25(4) E.B.L.R. 
527, 533. 
31 R. Mulheron (supra n.30), 160.  
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litigation indicates that, under an opt-in regime, the opt-in rates vary considerably, from 
very low percentages (<1%) to almost all group members opting to participate in the 
litigation, European experience sometimes indicates a very low rate of participation (less 
than 1%) where resort to opt-in was necessary in consumer claims and where the size of 
the collectives were very large.32 In the US too, a much lower participation rate has been 
evident under opt-in than under opt-out. In that respect, the dual pillars (i.e. access to 
justice and judicial efficiency in disposing of the dispute once and for all) are enhanced by 
the opt-out regime.33 
 
Had JJB Sports been pursued on an opt-out basis rather than opt-in (which had a 0.07% 
participation), an opt-out regime would have produced a class of 60-100% participation 
(participation here ranging from an active choice to remain in the collective to apathy 
whether to do so or ignorance as to the existence of the collective).34 This, prima facie 
appears to be a far more effective means of securing rights-vindication. However, on closer 
inspection the class is likely to contain end-consumers within the class who are at best 
indifferent to the question whether their rights are vindicated or not.35  
 
What is really insightful about JJB Sports is the rate at which the collective members made 
a claim under the settlement reached in the JJB Sports claim.36 Only 1% of the eligible 
collective members claimed under the settlement. The settlement was open to all affected 
collective members, whether or not they had opted-in to the claim. In other words, the 
settlement applied as if the action was brought on an opt-out basis and no collective 
member had opted-out.37 Yet, of the potential 1.2 to 1.5 million members, the fact was that 
                                                                
32 Ibid., 154. 
33 Ibid., 161.  
34 J. Sorabji (supra n.30), 533.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
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99% of eligible members did not seek compensation for their loss. They did not seek to 
vindicate their rights. While many would not have been able to produce proof of purchase, 
many more undoubtedly took the view that the £15 loss they had suffered was simply not 
worth it, even if all they had to do was claim under a settlement. They took the view that 
they did not want to vindicate their rights; the claim was de minimis.38 Of course, one may 
put this down to consumer education and knowledge of their ability to claim under the 
settlement. Having said that, Which? did launch a high profile media campaign which did 
not appear to have any success in increasing levels of interest.  
  
4.4 Lessons to be learned from consumer attitudes 
 
With consumer interest limited, perhaps one needs to reconsider the role of the end-
consumer in private enforcement of competition law and the goals that such participation 
seek to achieve. One avenue to explore may be the redress of end-consumers in a much 
broader sense (rather than the payment of compensation to each individual). The Civil 
Justice Council 2008 Report39 acknowledges that following an opt-out collective action, or 
collective settlement, there is often a very significant amount that goes unclaimed. In some 
jurisdictions, the courts have been provided with a cy-pres power so that the residue can be 
distributed either for a purpose that will benefit the collective generally or benefit, for 
instance, a charity related to the issue which gave rise to the collective action. 
 
Indeed, the publication, 'Private actions in competition law: a consultation on options for 
reform - government response,'40 by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
                                                                
38 Ibid. 
39 Civil Justice Council, Annual Report 2008-9, available at https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/CJC/Publications/Annual+reports/cjc+annual+report+2008-09.pdf 
(accessed 04.08.2016). 
40 Department for Business Innovation & Skills, Private actions in competition law: a consultation on 
options of reform – government response, available at 
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concluded that the optimum choice would be to ensure that such a residue, where it arose 
in opt-out proceedings, must be given to the Access to Justice Foundation, a charity that 
provides funding for pro bono legal advice and to support agencies and bodies.41 However, 
given the difference in stakeholder opinions on this matter, the Government proposed to 
ensure that future legislation in this area included a provision to allow the destination to be 
changed in future.42 Regard must be made to the Consumer Rights Act 201543 which 
heralded the introduction, via Sch. 844of the UK’s opt-out collective action. Moreover, 
where an opt-out is settled, any unclaimed damages sum can be paid to any destination 
which is judicially approved such as a cy-pres distribution, or a reversion to the defendant, 
or other. This differential treatment, as between a judgment and a settlement, was a 
deliberate decision on the Government’s part,45and means that the CAT may be called 
upon to determine the reasonableness of a reversion, or of a cy-pres recipient at a fairness 
hearing. Quite late in the reform process, the Government reiterated that, in the case of a 
judgment, there would be no reversion to the defendant: 
 
‘[w]e believe that the decision not to allow defendants to recoup undistributed damages 
will play a significant role in the deterrence effect of the reformed private actions 
regime.’46 
                                                                
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/70185/13-501-private-actions-
in-competition-law-a-consultation-on-options-for-reform-government-response1.pdf (accessed 30.08.2016). 
41 John Sorabji (supra n.30), 534.  
42 G. Downie and M. Charrier, UK and EU developments in collective action regimes for competition law 
breaches, (2014) 35(8) E.C.L.R. 369, 374. 
43 2015 c.15. 
44 Schedule 8 inserts new relevant provisions into Pt 1 of the Competition Act 1998 and into the Enterprise 
Act 2002. The text of the Act is available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/contents/enacted 
(accessed 04.08.2016). 
45 Department for Business Innovation & Skills, Private actions in competition law: A consultation on 
options for reform (2012), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31528/12-742-private-actions-
in-competition-law-consultation.pdf (accessed 04.08.2016), paras, 5.64-5.65; and the Government Response 
(2013), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/70185/13-
501-private-actions-in-competition-law-a-consultation-on-options-for-reform-government-response1.pdf 
(accessed 04.08.2016), 26. 
46 Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) Rules of Procedure: 
Government Response (2015), available at 
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Whether such a reversion would be appropriate in a settlement, however, could well 
become a ‘live’ issue, early in the life of the UK Competition Collective Action.47 
 
4.5 The cy-pres doctrine  
 
The cy-pres doctrine originated in the US as a rule in the law of trusts and estates, allowing 
courts to provide for the next-best use of gifts or fair disposition of charitable trusts or wills 
that would otherwise fail.48 The doctrine allows a reinterpretation of the terms of a 
charitable trust when the literal application would amount to impossibility or illegality. 
Under this doctrine, trust funds can be applied towards a purpose that is ‘cy-pres comme 
possible’ (in medieval French: ‘as near as possible’) to the stated purpose of the trust. In 
the context of US class actions, the doctrine is used to justify the allocation of unclaimed 
class action funds to charitable causes. The result is a complete departure from the 
charitable compensatory principle.  
 
As a next best scenario in the antitrust sense, it has a three-fold purpose: to protect or 
restore competition in the market, to deter anticompetitive behaviour, and to compensate 
victims of illegal conduct.49 Allowing courts to formulate broad cy-pres distribution of 
damages has several significant benefits. First, deterrence is served because, after an 
amount of damages having been determined, the unclaimed funds do not return to the 
defendant. Second, the defendant is not unjustly enriched if all potential claimants do not 
                                                                
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/460442/BIS-15-357-
competition-appeal-tribunal-rules-of-procedure-government-response.pdf (accessed 04.08.2016), 38. 
47 See R. Mulheron, A spotlight on the settlement criteria under the United Kingdom’s new competition class 
action, (2016) 35(1) C.J.Q. 14. 
48 A.A. Foer, Enhancing competition through the cy-pres remedy: Suggested best practices, (2010) 24(2) 
Antitrust 86, 87. 
49 See United States v Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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assert their claim. Third, because the funds will be used to promote competition or 
dissuade anticompetitive conduct, class members who did not assert a claim are indirectly 
benefited.50  
 
Adapting a cy-pres system at EU-level might be complex on the basis that the ultimate 
goal of private enforcement is compensation and not deterrence. However, note that recent 
moves by the UK to encourage the cy-pres doctrine make explicit reference to the 
‘deterrent’ function of private actions.51  
 
Previously, and in an effort to maximise the potential of private enforcement, the 
Commission in its Green Paper attempted to put the goals of compensation and deterrence 
on an equal footing.52 The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) felt, however, that 
the general enforcement of competition law should remain the task of the Commission and 
the national competition authorities and that deterrence should never be an objective of 
private actions.53 The White Paper was amended to reflect the preference that 
compensation was the guiding principle for improving private enforcement. Deterrence, 
previously a stand-alone principle, would inherently flow from the Commission's 
commitment to improving compensation.54 Compensation is observed to be the primary 
objective of the Damages Directive.55 Note that the Damages Directive refers to deterrence 
                                                                
50 A.A. Foer (supra n.48), 86.  
51 Supra n.46. 
52 Green Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM (2005) 672, 1.1. 
53 International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Comments on the Commission Green Paper on damages actions 
for breach of the EC antitrust rules, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_green_paper_ comments/icc.pdf> (accessed 
01.10.2014). 
54 White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM (2008) 165, 1.2.  
55 Supra n.2; The Directive reaffirms the acquis communitaire on the Union right to compensation for harm 
caused by infringements of Union competition law...Anyone who has suffered harm caused by an 
infringement can claim compensation for the actual loss (damnum emergens), for the gain of which he has 
been deprived (loss of profit or lucrum cessans) plus interest.  
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only in the context of private enforcement potentially deterring cooperation with the 
competition authorities.56  
 
If one looks at the case law of Courage57 and Manfredi,58 the CJEU would appear to accept 
the potential for damages actions to increase compliance with competition law norms and 
therefore act in the public interest. The CJEU's wording and reasoning attribute greater 
importance to the functional aspect of the right to damages in contributing to the effective 
application of competition law than the actual provision of compensation to the victims.59 
As the Advocate General in Courage points out, the deterrent effect is seen as an 
implication of the direct effect of the competition provisions.60 
 
The above analysis indicates that private enforcement of EU competition law not only 
caters for the effective judicial protection of victims. It also, and perhaps even more 
importantly from an overall enforcement perspective, contributes to the functioning of 
effective competition by increasing compliance with the relevant substantive norms.61 
European courts place particular emphasis on the latter function. Regretfully, the 
Commission has distanced itself in its rhetoric from the relevant case law.62 Instead, the 
Commission chose to conceal the deterrence goal, thereby risking the success of any future 
initiative in the field of private competition law enforcement.63 
  
                                                                
56 Damages Directive (supra n.2), Recital 26.  
57 Case 453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan [2001] E.C.R. I-6297. 
58 Joined Cases 295/04 to 298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi and Others v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and 
Others [2006] E.C.R. I-6619. 
59 M. Ioannidou (supra n.15), 64.  
60 Opinion of AG Mischo in Courage at 56-58. 
61 Ibid., 65. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
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It is submitted that exploiting further the deterrence component of private enforcement EU 
competition law would open up many possibilities for end-consumer actions. Where the 
likelihood of consumer participation is low and where there is a potentially large fund in 
the wake of a successful collective litigation which would otherwise go unclaimed, a cy-
pres mechanism could become useful. 
 
In the US, it has been established that the essence of the cy-pres doctrine is that 
distributions should be made 'for a purpose as near as possible to the legitimate objectives 
underlying the lawsuit.'64 
 
In the US it is not necessary for the nexus between the injured consumers and the cy-pres 
recipients to be direct in order to be adequate. For example, it has generally been sufficient 
for the proposed use of cy-pres funds to be related to the industry in which the antitrust 
violation occurred, without requiring a relationship to the particular product in the case.65 
 
Judge Kollar-Kotelly's Diamond Chemical Opinion provides one of the most interesting 
discussions of an antitrust cy-pres award.66 The class claimant sought distribution of the 
undistributed settlement funds, which amounted to more than $5 million, to George 
Washington University Law School for the purpose of establishing an endowment for a 
new Centre of Competition Law. In approving this, the court noted that the award would 
be closely related to the underlying action (price fixing by an international cartel) and 
would benefit members of the injured class because the new centre would focus on 
problems of globalisation and private antitrust enforcement.67  
 
                                                                
64 In re Airline Ticket Comm'n Antitrust Litigation., 307 F.3d 679, 682 (8th Cir. 2002).  
65 A.A. Foer (supra n.48), 87.  
66 Diamond Chem. Co v Akzo Nobel Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d. 1392 (N.D. Ga. 2001). 
67 A.A. Foer (supra n.48), 87.  
   
 
  168 
 
It was made clear that a class action cy-pres settlement may be approved, even over the 
defendant's objection, where the proposed expenditure will support pro-enforcement 
activity aimed at the type of violation that occurred, even without connection to the 
specific industry involved.68 Put differently, education, research and advocacy involving 
the enhancement of the antitrust enterprise can be appropriate 'next best' uses of a class 
action remedial fund in an antitrust case.69 
 
Another case resulted in a cash settlement with a creative remedy that: (i) funded the 
development of a public entity that provides risk management education and technical 
services to small business, public entities and non-profits; and (ii) provide funds to the 
states to develop risk databases for municipalities and local governments.70 
  
In the EU, the cy-pres concept may have a proper role in the context of private 
enforcement of competition law. For example, if we assume that the JJB Sports case had 
proceeded on an opt-out basis it would have produced a situation where damages of £15-20 
per collective member could have been awarded i.e. a total aggregate sum of between £20-
30 million.71 
 
Assuming, as happened under the JJB Sports settlement, which operated as if the 
proceedings had been opt-out and no class member opted-out, that 15,000 class members, 
each of whom could prove they had suffered a loss, actually then claimed their damages, 
and thereby ensured their loss was made good and their rights vindicated, that would have 
left a sum (assuming all claimed £20) of between £19.7-29.7 million unclaimed.72 
                                                                
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., 88. 
70 R.H. Lande and J.P. Davis, Of myths and evidence: an analysis of 40 cases for countries considering a 
private right of action for competition law violations, (2009) 2(3) G.C.L.R. 126, 131. 
71 John Sorabji (supra n.30), 534.  
72 Ibid. 
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John Sorabji considered that the sum could simply be paid to the Access to Justice 
Foundation, a body that had nothing whatsoever to do with the litigation in question.73 He 
argued that the vast majority of the damages would thus be paid out in a way that in no 
way vindicated the rights in question.74 Notwithstanding the fact of opt-out proceedings, 99 
per cent of the infringed rights would remain unenforced: they would not have been 
vindicated and a charitable body would have obtained a windfall payment.75  
 
The US Chamber Institute stated that, ‘the goal of collective redress, if implemented, must 
be to provide compensation to claimants who have actually been injured by the 
defendant.'76 It went on to say that 'it is also ill-suited to promote social objectives through 
cy-pres awards distributions. Cy-pres awards do not provide compensation to injured group 
members, and thus depart from the objectives of the system.'77 Professor Martin Redish of 
North-western University School of Law has argued that 'cy-pres awards merely create the 
illusion of compensation.'78 As one critic of cy-pres distribution noted: 'allowing judges to 
choose how to spend other people's money is not a true judicial function and can lead to 
abuses.'79 It could be argued that cy-pres awards also create the potential for conflicts of 
interest between group counsel and the absent group members, particularly where group 
counsel has a relationship with the recipient charity. One class action settlement in a US 
antitrust case, for example, included an award of $5.1 million of unclaimed settlement 
                                                                
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., 535.  
76 Response of the United States Chamber Institute for Legal Reform to the consultation on collective 
redress, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/us_chamber_institute_en.pdf 
(accessed 31.08.2016). 
77 Ibid. 
78 M. Redish, Wholesale justice: Constitutional democracy and the problem of class action lawsuit, (Stanford 
Law Books, (2009)), 14. 
79 A. Liptak, Doling out other people’s money, N.Y. Times, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/students/pop/articles/26bar.html (accessed 30.08.2016). 
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funds to the claimant's lawyers’ alma mater.80The diversion of funds to an organisation in 
which class counsel has such a personal interest clearly runs counter to class counsel's duty 
to 'fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.'81 Moreover, cy-pres awards 
create the potential for representative parties to steer money to a favoured charity to satisfy 
their own financial interests. For example, in a recent AOL case, the cy-pres settlement 
was heavily criticised in the US because one of the named claimants was employed by the 
recipient charities.82 The Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee has objected to the 
introduction of the cy-pres principle:  
 
‘The damage actually suffered must be compensated for. The doctrine of cy-pres derived 
from common law (apportionment that is as accurate as possible) contradicts this principle, 
since the damages actually incurred are not paid out. Neither must portions of the damages 
sued for be left in the hands of the representative association, since this would raise the 
incentive for the association to lodge possibly unfounded claims and since it runs counter 
to the concept of compensation.’83 
 
However, Which? in its submission to the 2011 European Commission Consultation on 
Collective Redress pointed out that most consumers were happy that action was being 
taken in respect of the football shirts. They were satisfied that cartelists were being denied 
their unlawful profit and would be far happier for the money to go to a good cause which 
may or may not benefit affected consumers indirectly. Which? acknowledged that this was 
not in line with the general legal principles of damages being paid to the affected 
                                                                
80 A. Roberts, Law School gets $5.1 Million to fund new center, in T.H. Frank, Statement before the House 
Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on the constitution and civil justice examination of litigation abuse, cy-
pres settlements, (2013), available at https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Testimony%20-%20Cy%20Pres.pdf 
(accessed 08.08.2016). 
81 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23(a)(4). 
82 Brief for Objector-Appellant at 7-8, Nachsin v AOL, LLC, No. 10 - 55129 (9th Cir. 20 July 2010). 
83 European Parliament, Report on the White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
(2008/2154(INI)) 9.03.2009, 10. 
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individuals. However, they believed that this should not necessarily be viewed as a legal 
issue but as a policy issue and as such accommodation should be made for consumers' 
clear preference for all unlawful profits to be extracted from law-breaking companies, and 
used for good causes if not all affected consumers claim what is due to them.84 
 
It is submitted that it depends on how one views 'rights vindication.' In order for a 
collective to be vindicated one questions whether that means that every single person must 
physically receive their compensation. Perhaps not. Perhaps the focus needs to be shifted 
to consider rights vindication in a much broader sense, i.e. in the public interest. The 'next 
best use' concept allows for the collective to benefit indirectly. Surely this assuages doubts 
regarding rights vindication when it is impossible to compensate victims directly. 
 
Which?'s response to the EU Consultation on Collective Redress makes the point that the 
common reasons cited for consumers not signing up to actions (rational apathy, proof of 
purchase etc.) should not be taken to indicate that consumers are happy with cartelists 
keeping the spoils of their breach. Many consumers want to see action taken and are happy 
for undistributed money to be applied to charitable causes rather than stay with the 
cartelist. Alternatively, customers would be happy for a benefit of some sort being 
generally applied to an affected group. For example, had common grocery goods been 
subject to cartel activity, given the difficulty in proving personal eligibility, individual 
sums of compensation being low and the prevalence of loyalty cards, the majority of 
consumers would favour a fixed credit to be applied to a retailer loyalty card. Even if this 
                                                                
84 D. Prince, Head of In-House Legal at Which?, Consultation Response: Towards a coherent European 
approach to collective redress, 26.04.2011 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/which_en.pdf  (accessed 08.08.2015); 
See also R.J. Gaudet, Hard teeth, dentures or gums: The European Commission’s options for consumer 
protection, (2009) 20(10) I.C.C.L.R. 347. 
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did not benefit all victims, it would most likely benefit and avoid expensive repayment 
processes for small amounts of money.85 
 
Rachel Mulheron, in her research for the Civil Justice Council in the UK, used the example 
of the Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) milk price-fixing case.86 It was 
reported that the CMA fined Sainsbury's, Asda, Safeway, Dairy Crest, Wiseman and the 
Cheese Company a total of £116 million for their parts in a price-fixing conspiracy.87 It 
was also reported that the '...price collusion is estimated to have cost consumers £270m in 
higher prices.'88Mulheron cited this case as an occasion that would have been ideal for an 
'opt-out' collective action with the ability to apply the cy-pres doctrine, if such an option 
had been available. Mulheron advocated the use of the doctrine: 
 
'...in respect of the milk price-fixing case where the profits made from the cartel clearly 
outstrip the fines imposed, where the purchasers have no prospect of proving the fact of 
purchase, where the amount per claim is very small, but where the aggregate profits have 
no realistic prospect of being stripped without aggregate damages and cy-pres 
distributions...'89 
 
In some Member States of the EU, some notable cy-pres distributions have occurred. One 
of the principal cases which demonstrates this remedial approach was that instituted by the 
                                                                
85 D. Prince (supra n.84).  
86 Office of Fair Trading, OFT welcomes early resolution agreements and agrees over £116 penalties, 
Investigations continue against other supermarkets and a dairy processor, available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140525130048/http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-
updates/press/2007/170-07 (accessed 08.08.2016). 
87 Ibid. 
88 R. Smithers, Supermarkets fined £116m for price fixing, The Guardian, 8.12.2007, available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2007/dec/08/supermarkets.asda (accessed 08.08.2016). 
89 Irish Competition Authority, Submission to the European Commission public consultation: Towards a 
coherent European approach to collective redress, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/irish_competition_authority_en.pdf 
(accessed 08.08.2016), 14. 
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Portuguese Association for Consumer Protection, DECO, against Portugal Telecom, 
pursuant to the opt-out regime implemented in Portugal in 1995.90 In an action for 
telephone rates overcharges, DECO represented a collective of Portuguese consumers 
(around 2 million or so), in a case involving around €120 million. Portugal Telecom and 
DECO reached a cy-pres settlement that allowed customers to make free phone calls every 
Sunday for one year and on Consumers' International Day.91 
 
In the Royal Dutch Shell settlement, any money that was left over after the distributions to 
class members was to be disbursed as a ‘charitable contribution.’92  
 
Moreover, one notes that the US District Court of the Southern District of California 
considered whether a cy-pres damages distribution should be ordered in respect of the 
BA/Virgin price-fixing action that affected English consumers (the fact that this case was 
determined by a US court in the first place is in part as a result of the (then) non-
availability of an opt-out class action regime in England).93 One English consumer, 
following the BA/Virgin fuel surcharge settlement, commented that: 
 
'I strongly suspect that... the airlines will rely on the inertia and difficulty [of the claims 
process] to put passengers off claiming. In order to avoid this type of accusation, perhaps 
                                                                
90 E. Falla, The role of the court in collective redress litigation: comparative report (Primento, (2014)), 3.4. 
91 R. Mulheron, A new era for consumer redress, (2009) 20(2) E.B.L. Rev 307, 311; R. Mulheron, The 
impetus for class actions reform in England arising from the competition law sector, in S. Wrbka, S. Van 
Uytsel, M. Siems, Collective actions: Enhancing access to justice and reconciling multilayer interests? 
(2012), 394; See also R. Mulheron, The modern cy-pres doctrine: Applications and implications, (Routledge 
Cavendish, (2006)), chapters 7 and 8.  
92 Royal Dutch Shell Settlement Agreement, 13; See generally R. Gaudet, Jr., Lessons learned from Swedish, 
Danish, Dutch, and Norwegian class actions: Comments on the White Paper on damages actions for breach 
of the EC antitrust rules, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments/gaudet_en.pdf (accessed 
31.08.2016). 
93 Rachel Mulheron, A New Era for Consumer Redress (supra n.91), 307  
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they should both make a commitment to donating any unclaimed funds to charity after a 
set cut-off date.'94 
 
If a cy-pres doctrine were to be developed in the EU, one issue would be regarding the 
proportion of damages. Once a fund is created, the question remains whether the cy-pres 
distribution should be available from the outset as soon as the judgment or settlement is 
reached. Alternatively, it may only be the unclaimed amount is available for cy-pres 
distribution. 
 
Judge Weinstein has favoured only the unclaimed amounts being dealt with by cy-pres 
distribution. This is because the overall procedure 'eliminates the need for representative 
litigation of individual damages claims, while allowing courts to hold defendants liable for 
the harm caused by them, and compensating those harmed.'95The last phrase is significant. 
The primary aim of the collective action is to compensate the members insofar as it is 
possible, especially in a modern age in which purchasers and consumers can, increasingly, 
be electronically tracked (and paid).96 Moreover, to permit a time frame for individual 
claimants to file their claims, whilst enhancing the compensatory objective of the 
collective action, also reiterates that a cy-pres distribution was not the main purpose of 
creating the fund but a supplementary device to cope with large-scale litigation. Other 
American cases reiterate that an opportunity for individual claims must be permitted before 
cy-pres can arise. In Masters v Wilhelmina Model Agency Inc.,97 the US Court of Appeal 
for the Second Circuit referred to unclaimed funds as being the proper province of a cy-
pres award. A Texas District Court subsequently noted that Masters exemplifies that the 
                                                                
94 BBC News, BA and Virgin to pay out refunds, 15.02.2008, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7246242.stm (accessed 08.08.2016).  
95 Schwab v Phillip Morris USA Inc., 449 F Supp 2d 992, 1254 (EDNY 2006), certification reversed. 
96 J. Kleefeld, Book review: The modern cy-pres doctrine: applications and implications, (2007) 4 Canadian 
Class Action Rev 203, 209.  
97 Masters v Wilhelmina Model Agency Inc., 473 F 3d 423, 436 (2nd Cir. 2007).  
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parties cannot invoke cy-pres without making diligent efforts to locate class members 
whose settlement cheques remained un-cashed.98 
 
The ALI's report which was published in 2008 stated that any consideration of cy-pres 
must 'begin from the premise that funds generated through the aggregate prosecution of 
divisible claims are presumptively the property of the class members.’99 Circumstances, 
however, may arise where having allowed an appropriate time frame, any distribution was 
always, and will necessarily be impracticable.100 Therefore, in order for a cy-pres doctrine 
to be implemented in the case of EU cross-border collective redress for antitrust damages, 
the fund should only incorporate funds which are not claimed by a certain date.  
 
4.6 How best to use the cy-pres doctrine 
 
Instead of allocating the funds to a charity or foundation, a European cy-pres doctrine 
could ensure that unclaimed funds are distributed to the party representing the collective in 
order to finance future litigation. In 2007, an important Discussion paper published by the 
CMA, ‘Private Actions in Competition: Effective Redress for Consumers and Business,’101 
proposed an enhanced representative action procedure for consumers and businesses 
seeking redress for breaches of competition law. This contained a proposal for a cy-pres 
doctrine within the ambit of possible reforms. The CMA mooted that residual funds could, 
for instance, be used for consumer education or finance other representative actions.102  
                                                                
98 In re Paracelsus Corp Securities Litigation, 2007 US Dist LEXIS 8316, 9-10 (SD Texas 2007). 
99 Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation: Tentative Draft No 1 (2008) 266. 
100 R. Mulheron (supra n.30), 329.  
101 Office of Fair Trading, Private actions in competition law: effective redress for consumers and business, 
(Discussion Paper), available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_
policy/oft916.pdf (accessed 08.08.2016); OFT Press Release, OFT announces consultation on private actions 
in competition law, 18.04.2007, available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http:/www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-
updates/press/2007/63-07 (accessed (08.08.2016). 
102 Discussion Paper (supra n.91), 4.36-4.37.  
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This idea has also been advocated by commentators such as Charlotte Leskinen.103 Where 
possible, and first and foremost, the aggregate sum of damages should be used to 
compensate directly the harm suffered by the victims represented in the action. Only in 
exceptional cases (such as when individual victims do not come forward or where it is 
impossible to compensate each consumer directly) might it be necessary to consider 
awarding damages to the representative body, which would then make a so-called cy-pres 
distribution of the damages to related entities or use them for related purposes in order to 
achieve a result which would be as close as possible to compensating the victims. This idea 
of ‘related purposes’ could be used as leverage to argue that the funds could be used to 
fund future litigation.104  
 
A major drawback of collective actions is the limited financial resources of representative 
bodies. The financial risks involved would in all likelihood encourage representative 
bodies to bring only actions that they would be certain of winning, while they would avoid 
bringing complex cases.105 If they lack adequate funding, then they will refrain from 
bringing representative actions for damages in cases of competition law infringements.  
 
There has been the long running question as to who should pay for consumer associations 
to launch collective actions. Perhaps it should be the members of the collective action.  If 
the budget of the consumer association must be financed out of membership fees paid in 
advance, enough funding will not be available if the members of the association prioritise 
other activities and are not willing to pay a higher fee to finance litigation expenditures.106 
                                                                
103 C. Leskinen, Recent Developments on collective antitrust damages actions in the EU, (2011) 4(2) 
G.C.L.R. 79, 83. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Office of Fair Trading, Private actions in competition law: effective redress for consumers and business: 
recommendations from the Office of Fair Trading, 23.  
106 R. Van Den Bergh (supra n.5), 31.  
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The membership can be seen as an insurance premium that end-consumers, who expect 
only small losses (for example, in the case of price-fixing agreements) are not willing to 
pay.107  
 
Apart from donations received from private sponsors, an obvious candidate to provide 
funding is the government.108 Using taxpayers' money can be defended as a way to 
guarantee that cases are brought when this is in the interest of consumers as a whole. 
Germany offers an example of public funding. The national consumer association is almost 
entirely financed by the federal government.109 In other countries, consumer organisations 
are not so well-funded. Government funding may go a long way to overcome lacking 
financial incentives to initiate litigation but it is not a miracle solution.110 Governments 
have limited budgets. In the wake of recent financial crises and austerity measures, 
governments may not be able to provide enough funding to consumer associations that 
would be sufficiently large to bring meritorious claims. In addition, financing by the 
government makes the consumer associations vulnerable to capture by politicians who may 
pursue an agenda that does not necessarily coincide with the economic interests of 
consumers.111  
 
If the consumer association's budget is too small and sufficient funding is not available, 
one could look at cost reduction. From a financial perspective, both court fees and the loser 
pays rule may impede the initiation of representative actions. A first step could be to 
exempt consumer associations entirely from paying court fees and attorney's fees and 
                                                                
107 R. Van den Bergh and L. Visscher, The preventative function of collective actions for damages in 
consumer law, (2008) 1(2) Erasmus Law Review 24, 46. 
108 R. Van Den Bergh (supra n.5), 31.  
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
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finance these costs out of the state budget.112 This approach has the disadvantage that state 
appointed lawyers may lack sufficient expertise in antitrust matters.113 The maintenance of 
the 'loser pays' rule seems to be the biggest hurdle to overcome. This rule requires 
claimants to be insured and commercial insurance can be very difficult to obtain or very 
costly. The loser pays rule is usually justified as a deterrent to unmeritorious suits but it 
may also discourage risk-averse claimants to bring meritorious claims. Reduction of court 
fees and moderation of the 'loser pays' rule reduces the costs and risks of litigation but does 
not make it financially attractive to bring lawsuits. Here, the German experience is telling. 
Section 10 of the Unfair Competition Law allows consumer associations to bring claims 
for skimming-off the illegal gain achieved by traders who deliberately violate rules of fair 
trade.114 This procedure for disgorgement of illegal profits has been characterised by 
German commentators as a 'paper tiger', since it has turned out to be a largely ineffective 
remedy.115 The reason for this seems to be that the disgorged profits do not accrue to the 
consumer organisation but flow to the state after deducting the costs of the claim.116 Recent 
proposals suggest enlarging the scope for the skimming-off procedure by including 
violations of German competition law and to allow consumer associations to keep a part of 
the obtained payments.117 Clearly, this option is nothing more than allowing contingency 
fees under another name.118 
 
Given the difficulties of remedying the funding problem, it is submitted that the best way 
forward would be to make consumer associations the leading beneficiaries of the cy-pres 
regime. Instead of the residue being allocated to a charity, it could be reinvested by the 
                                                                
112 Ibid., 32. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb/UWG. 
115 Roger Van Den Bergh (supra n.5), 32.  
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid. 
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consumer association and used to launch future private enforcement actions against 
infringing undertakings. An opt-out system would automatically include every end-
consumer who has fallen victim to the illegal conduct. It would then be up to each 
individual to claim from the fund if they felt strongly enough that their rights had been 
violated and that claiming from the fund would vindicate such rights. After a set period, 
the residue could then be allocated to financing future private antitrust actions led by the 
consumer association. Both the goals of compensation and deterrence (if it is confirmed 
that deterrence is a goal of EU private antitrust actions) would be satisfied. Compensation 
would be available for those who want it. Deterrence would flow from a stronger, better 
resourced consumer association and infringing undertakings would not benefit from the 
spoils of their illegal conduct.  
 
Of course, the controversy surrounding opt-out actions and the prevalence of opt-in 
mechanisms in most jurisdictions remains as a fundamental barrier to effective private 
enforcement for this category of claimant. One would urge Member States to be more open 
minded in order to facilitate better access to justice. Without engaging in novel concepts, 
private end-consumer claims remain under-enforced and the only entities that benefit are 
the infringing undertakings which retain the illegal gains.    
  
Such a proposal is not entirely 'off the wall.' In Greece, the Act of Consumer Protection 
(2251/1994) states that after a successful collective action, consumer organisations are 
entitled to receive a percentage of pecuniary compensation due to moral damage. The 
amount granted by court is directed for the purposes of education and the protection of 
consumers and after the subtraction of court expenses, it is given the following rules: 
 
a) 35% to the plaintiff consumers' union, 
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b) 35% to the consumers' union of second decree, 
c) 30% to the State budget. 
 
Issues pertaining to the above and every relevant detail are settled by decision of the 
Minister of Development. Unfortunately, as the ministerial decree for the effect has not 
been adopted, the mechanism does not work in practice. 119  
 
In Portugal a specific fund was established as a result of the government decision to ban an 
overcharge on certain consumer bills by public services providers. As most providers had 
already charged the consumers, they were obliged to reimburse them. However, many 
affected consumers did not have the evidence required and so did not request the 
reimbursement. As a result, the government created a specific fund for the promotion of 
consumer rights to which the remainder of the amount was transferred. All NGOs can 
apply for money from this fund, providing the funding will be used for the promotion of 
consumer rights (including promotion of ADR, consumer education etc.).120 
 
  
                                                                
119 The European Consumer Organization, BEUC, Redirecting Justice - Competition fines as a source for 
funding consumer-related projects and organizations, Ref: X/2012/069 17.09.2012, available at 
http://www.beuc.eu/publications/2012-00561-01-e.pdf (accessed 08.08.2016).  
120 Ibid. 
   
 
  181 
 
4.7 Concluding remarks on consumer attitudes and the cy-pres doctrine 
 
In many consumer competition law cases, there is limited feasibility of providing 
compensation of the very small amounts that indirect purchasers are overcharged. The cy-
pres mechanism could play a part in European collective actions. As Kalajdzic observes,121 
the nature of mass wrongs creates a number of obstacles to distributing settlement funds: 
class members may be unknown to the parties, and it may also be prohibitively expensive 
to distribute what are essentially nominal damages to a large class. In the case of Tesluk,122 
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that distributing $30-$70 to 520,000 class 
members would not be economically feasible.  
 
In Europe, an adapted cy-pres mechanism could make sure that a) compensation is made 
available for a period to those who want it and b) that unclaimed funds do not revert to 
defendants, deterring undertakings from future anticompetitive conduct. 
 
The concern about cy-pres awards is that the residue is allocated to a charity which has no 
meaningful connection with the case at hand. A cautious approach is therefore 
warranted.123 This could be overcome by instead allocating the funds to the consumer 
association which has acted on behalf of the class. It would bolster the effectiveness of 
private enforcement for end-consumers and would vindicate the rights of end-consumers, 
perhaps not individually, but in the much broader sense, acting in the public interest. End-
consumers would be in the knowledge that the undertaking has paid the heavy price for its 
infringement and that they will benefit in the future from a more competitive market.   
                                                                
121 J. Kalajdzic, Consumer (In)Justice: Reflections on Canadian consumer class actions, (2010) 50 Canadian 
Business Law Journal 356, 369. 
122 Tesluk v Boots Pharmaceutical PLC (2002), 21 CPC (5th) 196 (Ont. SCJ). 
123 J. MacLean, Going down the Illinois Brick road (if the Hanover Shoe fits)? Economic complexity and 
judicial competence in the context of Canadian Competition Law’s possible futures – Part 1, (2013) 6(2) 
G.C.L.R. 85. 
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The bottom line is that consumer redress has to change to reflect trending attitudes. 
Individual distribution of compensation simply is not viable. For this reason, Europe has to 
take a more open-minded, broader outlook in order to overhaul the effectiveness of end-
consumer claims in the private enforcement of competition law.124 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
124 See also G.U Jois, The cy-pres problem and the role of damages in tort law, (2008) 16 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & 
L. 258; M.H Redish, P. Julian, S. Zyontz, Cy-pres relief and the pathologies of the modern class action: a 
normative and empirical analysis, (2010) 62 Fla. L. Rev. 617; C.R. Leslie, Antitrust damages and dead 
weight loss, (2006) 51 Antitrust Bull. 521; R.H. Lande, New options for state indirect purchaser legislation: 
protecting real victims of antitrust violations, (2009) 61 Ala. L. Rev 447; R.R. Douglas, What makes an 
antitrust class action remedy successful: a tale of two settlements, (2005) 80 Tul. L. Rev. 621; D. van Horn, 
D. Clayton, It all adds up: Class action residual funds support pro bono efforts, (2009) 45 Tenn. B.J. 12; 
M.G, Class dismissed: contemporary judicial hostility to small-claims consumer actions, (2009) 59 DePaul 
L. Rev. 305; T. Reddy, B. McGrath, Proposal for reform to private competition law claims under UK law: 
all change please? (2012) 5(4) G.C.L.R. 138; R. Mulheron, Building blocks and design points for an opt-out 
class action, (2008) J.P.I. Law 4 308; B.T. Fitzpatrick, Do class action lawyers make too little? (2009) 158 
U. Pa. L. Rev 2043; R. Gaudet, Turning a blind eye: the Commission’s rejection of opt-out class actions 
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Howells, Collective redress procedures: European debates, (2009) 58(2) I.C.L.Q. 379. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE INTERFACE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
ENFORCEMENT IN COMPENSATING END-CONSUMERS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Some academics1 have noted that compensation does not always have to be exclusive to 
private enforcement of competition law. Bourgeois, Strievi, Ioannidou and Ezrachi, for 
example, propose that, at the end of the public investigation, the competition authority 
should be able to impose not only a fine but also award a certain form of compensation to 
the injured parties, either individually identified or defined more broadly as an injured 
collective.2In essence, this means blurring the boundaries between the pillars of public and 
private enforcement.  
 
The past chapters have identified that private enforcement of competition law and 
collective redress face many challenges. The diversity of EU Member State legal systems, 
forum shopping, consumer apathy and procedural obstacles (incentives to litigate and the 
financial risks associated with launching a claim) play to the detriment of end-consumer 
redress following a breach of EU competition law.  
 
This chapter does not argue that public enforcement should replace private enforcement 
and the pursuit towards achieving a homogenous and effective EU-wide end-consumer 
redress mechanism. However, in situations where launching a collective action is difficult, 
and where it is clear that a certain category of victims has suffered loss as a result of an 
anticompetitive infringement, public enforcement could be used as one of a range of 
                                                                
1 For example, J.H.J. Bourgeois, S. Strievi, A. Ezrachi and M. Ioannidou. 
2 A. Ezrachi and M. Ioannidou, Public compensation as a complementary mechanism to damages actions: 
From policy justifications to formal implementation, (2012) 3(6) Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice 536. 
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methods to bolster effective redress. By being able to enforce compensation in this way, 
one may also be able to increase deterrence and encourage greater consumer involvement 
in competition law enforcement.  
 
5.2 The public/private interface 
 
EU competition law enforcement is traditionally viewed as consisting of two separate 
pillars, each with their own specific role. Public enforcement is in place to impose fines 
and deter undertakings from partaking in anticompetitive conduct. Private enforcement is 
concerned with compensating victims who have suffered harm. Consider Wils' outlook.3 
He considers that public enforcement of competition law is the superior instrument to 
pursue the objectives of clarification and development of the law and of deterrence and 
punishment, whereas private actions for damages are superior for the pursuit of corrective 
justice through compensation.4 This approach corresponds to the classic, time-honoured 
conception of the different roles of public enforcement and private actions for damages, 
not just in the area of competition law but in the law more generally, as notably set out by 
John Locke in 1690 in his Second Treatise on Civil Government.5 Paragraph 3.1 of the 
Commission Communication6 continues this theme on the basis that: 
 
‘There is a consensus among stakeholders that private and public enforcement are two 
different means that should normally pursue different objectives. Whereas it is the core 
task of public enforcement to apply EU law in the public interest and impose sanctions on 
infringers to punish them and to deter them from committing future infringements, private 
                                                                
3 W.P.J Wils, The relationship between public antitrust enforcement and private actions for damages, (2009) 
32(1) W.C. 3. 
4 Ibid., 12. 
5 J. Locke, The Second Treatise on Civil Government (1690), Chapter II. 
6 Commission Communication, Towards a European framework for collective redress, COM (2013) 401. 
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collective redress is seen primarily as an instrument to provide those affected by 
infringements with access to justice and — as far as compensatory collective redress is 
concerned — the possibility to claim compensation for harm suffered. In this sense, public 
enforcement and private collective redress are seen as complementing each other. 
 
Collective damages actions should aim to secure compensation of damage that is found to 
be caused by an infringement. The punishment and deterrence functions should be 
exercised by public enforcement. There is no need for EU initiatives on collective redress 
to go beyond the goal of compensation: punitive damages should not be part of a European 
collective redress system.’ 
 
Despite the clear preference for the separate roles of public and private enforcement, it is 
submitted that due to the paucity of cross-border collective proceedings, it is time to 
proceed with a more holistic approach. It is argued that viewing these enforcement prongs 
as two separate entities can stunt the overarching regime of EU competition law. Bourgeois 
and Strievi7 advocate the need to form a hybrid between the public and private regimes by 
enabling the public authorities to deliver compensation under certain circumstances. 
Moreover, the UK Ministry of Justice has stated that, 'while regulatory aims and objectives 
are usually strategic and not specifically focused on compensatory objectives, this does not 
preclude their adaptation for this purpose.'8 Accordingly, so-called 'Public Compensation' 
may be seen as a positive extension of the role played by the public enforcer. In effect, it 
presents the middle ground between public and private enforcement; it employs public 
                                                                
7 J.H.J. Bourgeois and S. Strievi, EU competition law remedies in consumer cases: Thinking out of the 
shopping bag, (2010) 33(2) W.C. 241. 
8 Ministry of Justice, The Government’s response to the Civil Justice Council’s Report: Improving access to 
justice through collective actions, available at 
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20100208150045/http:/www.justice.gov.uk/about/docs/government-
response-cjc-collective-actions.pdf (accessed 08.08.2016), 18. 
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enforcement mechanisms to deliver a goal which is primarily in the realm of private 
enforcement.9  
 
Moreover, the interface between public and private enforcement has also been considered 
in a slightly different way by the European Consumer Organisation BEUC which 
advocates that the time has now come for the EU to consider redirecting portions of fines 
collected by the Commission in response to the infringement of EU competition law by 
allocating them to consumer organisations or consumer-related projects.10 It will be 
remembered that the last chapter advocated the use of the cy-pres doctrine to allocate the 
residue of unclaimed end-consumer damages to consumer organisations (lack of funding 
usually acting as a disincentive for these organisations to engage in litigation) who would 
then invest the funds in future litigation.11 
 
BEUC argues that this would enable, even if indirectly, activities aimed at enhancing 
consumer protection to be funded by those who infringe the laws.12 Currently, the fines 
imposed by the Commission in instances of competition law infringements are fully 
deposited in the EU budget. From cartels alone, the EU collected more than €614 million 
in 2011.13  
 
Consumer policy has long suffered from inadequate funding, whilst at the same time being 
promoted as key to the economic growth.14 In 2012, while voting on the 2014-2020 
                                                                
9 A. Ezrachi and M. Ioannidou (supra n.2), 539.  
10 The European Consumer Organization, BEUC, Redirecting justice - Competition fines as a source for 
funding consumer related projects and organizations, available at http://www.beuc.eu/publications/2012-
00561-01-e.pdf (accessed 08.08.2016). 
11 See Chapter 4. 
12 The European Consumer Organization, BEUC (supra n.10). 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid. 
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Consumer Programme Report,15 the European Parliament expressed concerns that the 
budget proposed for the Programme was 'not enough to meet the new challenges that will 
face EU Consumer Policy in 2020.'16While competition infringements occur every day, 
very few competition cases are reported and it is estimated that the unrecovered damages 
of infringements of EU competition law amount to over €20 billion per year.17 BEUC 
argues that although the fines imposed on those who infringe competition laws today serve 
another purpose than compensating victims, a part of the funds collected from fines could 
be used for consumer-related projects or the activities of consumer organisations.18  
 
In sum, two ideas are advocated by merging the roles of public and private enforcement. 
First, at the public enforcement stage, competition authorities would have the power to 
implement compensatory measures over and above the fines they have imposed. Second, 
portions of fines collected by public authorities could be used either to compensate victims 
directly or, where this is not possible or not practical, allocated to consumer-related 
projects or the activities of consumer organisations. These funds could be used to fund 
future litigation, thus bolstering the effectiveness of cross-border collective end-consumer 
redress.   
 
  
                                                                
15 The European Consumer Organisation, BEUC, Consumer programme 2014-2020: Proposed Commission 
regulation, BEUC position paper, available at http://www.beuc.eu/publications/2012-00203-01-e.pdf 
(accessed 05.09.2016). 
16 Ibid. 
17 J. Almunia, Commissioner for competition policy, Common standards for group claims across the EU, 
Speech at international conference on ‘private enforcement of competition law,’ University of Valladolid, 
School of Law, 15.10.2005, in L.A.V. San Pedro et al., Private enforcement of competition law, (Lex Nova, 
(2011)), 46. 
18 The European Consumer Organization, BEUC (supra n.10). 
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5.3 Compensation as a mitigating factor 
 
The relationship between public enforcement and compensation has been considered in the 
past. Compensation has been considered as a mitigating circumstance by public authorities 
when they come to impose a fine on an infringing undertaking.  
 
In the UK, the Independent Schools case concerned fee-paying schools exchanging 
amongst competitors detailed information as to the fees they intended to charge.19 The UK 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) ended its investigation against 50 independent 
British schools after it reached an agreement with a group of representatives from the 
schools. Each school had to pay a fine of £10,000 to the CMA and had to set up a trust 
fund, to which they paid £3 million over a period of four years, intended to benefit the 
pupils who were directly concerned during the period of exchange of information.20 Due to 
the settlement, the fine imposed on each school represented a great reduction. This was so, 
in particular, as the imposition of a fine could have led to an increase in tuition fees and 
resulted in further harm to the pupils’ welfare.21 The CMA noted that this outcome-
orientated solution was unique and specific to the circumstances at hand.22 
 
A similar situation occurred in the Rover case in connection with arrangements concluded 
between the company and its dealers which had unlawfully sought to dictate the levels of 
discount which dealers could offer to their customers. The arrangements were terminated 
                                                                
19 Office of Fair Trading, Competition Act Investigations, CA98 Public Register, Schools: exchange of 
information on future fees, CA98/05/2006, available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http:/www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/competition-
act-and-cartels/ca98/decisions/schools (accessed 05.09.2016).  
20 N. Jalabert-Doury, L. Nouvel, I. Simic, Competition policies, (2006) 4 I.B.L.J. 535, 543. 
21 J. Lawrence and M. Sansom, The increasing use of administrative settlement procedures in UK and EC 
competition investigations, (2007) 6 Comp Law 163, 168. 
22 A. Ezrachi and M. Ioannidou (supra n.2), 540.  
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once they came to the awareness of the senior management and besides notifying the 
authorities, Rover: 
 
 reimbursed the dealers for the discounts which had been withheld from them; and, 
 contributed £1 million towards two projects designed to benefit UK car buyers (on 
the basis that it could not identify individual buyers who had suffered loss). 
 
Announcing its decision not to open formal proceedings against Rover, the Commission 
stated that it 'welcomes the fact that companies which discover that their employees have 
broken competition laws disclose this fact to the Commission and to the relevant national 
authorities. Only by disclosure are companies able to avoid having contingent liabilities for 
fines for several years.'23 The Commission stated, however, that the relevant donation does 
not affect the rights of individual consumers to claim compensation from Rover or its 
dealers.24 This is an important point to be stressed, namely that the relevant donations 
should never replace private enforcement but merely facilitate restitution, particularly in 
scenarios where individual redress cannot be effectively carried out. 
  
Instances involving compensation as a mitigating factor in the course of a public 
investigation were also reported in The Netherlands. The Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit (NMa) fined Interpay, a provider of network services for debit card 
transactions, and fined the eight banks which set up the network. The NMa found that 
Interpay abused its dominant position on the market for network services for debit card 
transactions by charging excessive rates for the provision of these services. The banks were 
fined for limiting the sale of network services to Interpay, thereby excluding the possibility 
                                                                
23 K. Taylor and J. Pratt, Antitrust compliance programmes, (1994) 8 I.B.L.J. 981, 987. 
24 Ibid. 
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of providing these services in competition with each other.25 The fines imposed on the 
participating banks were reduced following the setting up of a €10 million fund by the 
banks for an efficient payment system. In addition, a compensatory scheme was reached 
between the banks and retailers offering PIN payments to consumers.26  
 
The Dutch competition authority in the Construction Cartel also granted companies a 10 
per cent fine reduction provided that they reached a compensation agreement with the 
Dutch government, the victim of the cartel agreement.27 
  
In Germany, the competition authority closed its abuse proceedings for excessive prices 
against gas suppliers after 29 of them committed to refund €127 million to affected 
customers through bonus payments and credits on future accounts.28 In another case, 
Stadtwerke Uelzen, a local gas supplier which was found to charge abusive prices was 
ordered to reimburse its customers. The remedy was subsequently upheld by the German 
Supreme Court.29 
  
In Nintendo, following a complaint by Omega, the European Commission found that 
Nintendo's distribution system impeded parallel trade. However, following direct 
compensation made by Nintendo to the victims, the fine was reduced by a significant 
amount.30 Similarly, in General Motors and the Pre-Insulated Pipe Cartel, the European 
Commission again treated the fact of paying compensation to the victims of the 
anticompetitive infringement as an extenuating circumstance in setting the appropriate 
                                                                
25 P. Bos and J. Braaksma, Netherlands: Bank payments system - review, 2006 (27(2) E.C.L.R. N38, N38. 
26 Ibid. 
27 A. Ezrachi and M. Ioannidou (supra n.2), 540; V. Onno Brouwer, Antitrust settlements in the Netherlands: 
A useful source of inspiration, in C. Ehlermann and M. Marquis, Antitrust settlements under EC competition 
law, (Hart Publishing, (2010)), 492-3. 
28 A. Ezrachi and M. Ioannidou (supra n.2), 541.  
29 Stadtwerke Uelzen BGH, Decision of 10 December 2008—KVR 2/08—OLG Celle. 
30 2003/675/EC: Commission decision: Omega – Nintendo, OJ L 255 8.10.2003 22, at paras. 440–441. 
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amount for the fine.31 The European Commission retains discretion to consider 
compensation to victims as a mitigating factor for fine reduction.32 
  
The decisions discussed above reveal the possibility to combine elements of compensation 
as part of the public enquiry. Under Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation 1/2003,33 the power to 
impose fines on companies that have infringed Article 101 and 102 TFEU has been 
entrusted to the Commission. The Guidelines on the method of setting fines34 provide 
further details about this public enforcement tool. They recall the case law of the CJEU 
granting the Commission a wide margin of discretion when setting fines.35 They recognise 
that fines should have a significant deterrent effect.36 The Guidelines state also that the fine 
may be reduced to reflect mitigating circumstances and list five examples including the 
termination of the infringement as soon as the Commission has intervened (not applicable 
to cartels) and the fact that the undertaking has effectively cooperated with the 
Commission outside the scope of the Leniency Notice and beyond its legal obligation to do 
so.37 The compensation of victims would be entirely in line with these reasons underlying a 
milder sanction. By compensating victims voluntarily, a company would take an active 
part in the enforcement of competition law, beyond what is legally required, and would 
help render corrective justice. Moreover, while it cannot retroactively act competitively 
and limit the harm, the offender would at least be adopting a critical view on its past 
behaviour and act accordingly by repairing the harm.38 
                                                                
31 75/75/EEC: Commission Decision General Motors Continental, OJ L 29 3.2.1975 14, at para 18; 
1990/60/EC: Commission Decision Pre-Insulated Pipe Cartel 127 OJ L 24 30.1.1999 1, at paras. 127 and 
172. 
32 Case T-59/02 Archer Daniels Midland Co v Commission [2006] E.C.R. II- 3627 at paras. 354 –355. 
33 Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of 
the Treaty, OJ L 1 4.1.2003 1. 
34 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation 1/2003 OJ C 
210 1.9.2006 2. 
35 Ibid., para 2. 
36 J.H.J. Bourgeois and S. Strievi (supra n.7), 249.  
37 Guidelines on the methods of setting fines (supra n.34), para 29.  
38 J.H.J. Bourgeois and S. Strievi (supra n.7), 249.  
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According to Bourgeois and Strievi, this self-critical and proactive behaviour deserves to 
be rewarded by a fine reduction or in some exceptional cases by the absence of a fine, 
where, for instance, the infringement is involuntary.39 The cases above show that the 
Commission and the NCAs have already granted or at least considered such a reward. To 
sum up, compensation paid to consumers could be taken into account as a mitigating factor 
when setting fines.  
  
Ioannidou and Ezrachi use these cases as a way of building their own proposal for Public 
Compensation. Their proposal departs from the above cases in two distinct ways. First, 
their proposal views compensation as an additional remedy to be enforced by the public 
competition authority. They see it as a way of supplementing the fine imposed. Second, it 
elevates compensation from its current incidental position into an integral part of the 
enforcement toolbox.40 In the cases above, compensation was used as an agreed substitute 
or mitigating factor to the imposed fine. By contrast, the proposed mechanism does not 
substitute the fine or necessarily represent an agreement between the parties and the 
competition authority. It is an additional and independent remedy, designed to foster 
positive transfer of wealth from the violators to the affected group or individuals.41 
Compensation should be imposed on the undertaking by the authority rather than simply 
being offered by the undertaking. This leaves total discretion to the decision making of the 
authority rather than simply to the good will of the infringing undertaking. This is the real 
difference between Ioannidou/Ezrachi’s and Bourgeois/Strievi’s interpretation of Public 
Compensation. Bourgeois and Strievi highlight the need for Public Compensation to be 
voluntary in nature. This can make companies more inclined to offer this kind of 
                                                                
39 Ibid. 
40 A. Ezrachi and M. Ioannidou (supra n.1), 541. 
41 Ibid., 542. 
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compensation, as it gives them the possibility to win back some of the goodwill that they 
have lost as a result of their infringement. Companies value their reputation because it 
influences their business. The voluntary payment of compensation could be the price that 
they are willing to pay to maintain or re-establish their good reputation.42  
 
Ioannidou and Ezrachi believe that their proposed Public Compensation system is set to 
bridge the current gap in corrective justice in competition cases. They state that the 
mechanism will increase the nexus between the public remedy and the injured group.43 The 
gap in corrective justice is most noticeable in cases involving a large number of injured 
parties, each sustaining a relatively small loss.44 They argue that the proposed Public 
Compensation mechanism is ideally suited to facilitating compensation in these cases.  
 
From the perspective of end-consumer redress, there would be a situation where the 
victims are compensated much earlier. Generally, in the enforcement of competition law 
the process begins with a public investigation. Only after the public investigation is 
complete, and the fines imposed do the follow-on actions (with the aim of compensation) 
take place. It is therefore, only towards the end of the process that end-consumers will have 
the opportunity to have their rights vindicated.  
 
There are several different ways under which this could be achieved. There are procedures 
which currently exist which could be adapted in order to allow the inclusion of Public 
Compensation, i.e. through a fine, settlement or commitment procedure.  
 
  
                                                                
42 J.H.J. Bourgeois and S. Strievi (supra n.7), 245.  
43 A. Ezrachi and M. Ioannidou (supra n.2), 542.  
44 Ibid., 541. 
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5.4 Fines 
 
Compensation could form part of the imposition of a fine following a finding of 
infringement. This is probably the most appealing option as the competition authority 
retains control over the process and determines the compensation. Ioannidou and Ezrachi 
argue that the quantification of damages in competition cases is an extremely difficult and 
complex process. The type of quantification in private enforcement cases, they argue, is 
not a suitable yardstick for their vision of Public Compensation.45 For consumers in 
particular, harm may be difficult to establish. In many cases, for example, end-consumers 
will not have kept the relevant receipts showing how much they paid for a particular 
product. The experience in JJB Sports which was discussed in the last chapter46 is 
particularly telling. Furthermore, disputes about the amount paid to each individual 
consumer would damage public enforcement by making it lengthy and complicated.47 
 
Instead Ioannidou and Ezrachi advocate that compensation would be based on a given 
percentage of the fine levied on the parties. When the fine imposed is below the maximum 
level set in the legislation, the compensation could be added to the fine, thus increasing the 
overall payment. This can be seen as giving added value, as bolstering deterrence and 
vindicating the rights of the victims of the infringement. Ioannidou and Ezrachi submit that 
in the majority of cases the fines are below the maximum permitted level. Therefore, they 
advocate that the 'top-up' with compensation or 'Fine Plus' should serve as the appropriate 
method of quantifying damage.48  
 
                                                                
45 A. Ezrachi and M. Ioannidou (supra n.2), 542.  
46 See chapter 4.  
47 J.H.J. Bourgeois and S. Strievi (supra n.7), 244.  
48 A. Ezrachi and M. Ioannidou (supra n.2), 542.  
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When the imposed fine is set at the maximum level permitted, compensation may form 
part of the overall fine. A portion of the overall fine may be set aside in order to 
compensate the victims. They call this 'Fine Minus'.49  
 
Ioannidou and Ezrachi's vision leaves discretion totally in the hands of the authority. 
Contrast this with Bourgeois and Strievi who state that, above all, the amount of 
compensation should not be determined by the competition authority but rather proposed 
by the infringer.50 They believe it is up to the infringer to determine how much they are 
willing to pay. They would have to consider the alternative if the authority does not accept 
their proposal and fines them for infringement of competition rules.51In any case, 
Ioannidou, Ezrachi, Bourgeois and Strievi seem to agree that the amount of compensation 
accepted by the competition authority should be capped at the level of the potential fine.52 
 
One would criticise this cap on the level of the potential fine. For example, an undertaking 
may consider that it may still be worthwhile to engage in anticompetitive conduct if it can 
foresee that the profit of its illegal practice outweighs the maximum level of fines and 
compensation that they will have to pay out. One considers the article by Riley53which 
considers that the financial penalties in many cases should be much heavier to recognise 
the scale of the gains made by undertakings.54His article makes a case for a more calibrated 
and focussed approach to sanction policy based upon, inter alia, actual profit gained. 
                                                                
49 A. Ezrachi and M. Ioannidou (supra n.2), 542. 
50 J.H.J. Bourgeois and S. Strievi (supra n.7), 244. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 A. Riley, Modernising cartel sanctions: effective sanctions for price-fixing in the European Union, (2011) 
32(11) E.C.L.R. 551. 
54 Ibid. 
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5.5 Settlement procedure 
 
Another option proposed by Ioannidou and Ezrachi concerns cartel settlement procedures. 
This would provide the competition authority with overall control over the level of 
compensation accepted. The reduced fine imposed as part of the procedure, will result in 
reduced Public Compensation, since the latter is derived from the level of the fine. 
Subsequently, the incentives for undertakings to take the cartel settlement route will be 
retained, since they obtain a fine reduction and a reduction on the compensatory remedy.55 
Furthermore, the incorporation of Public Compensation in settlement procedures could 
counterbalance the alleged negative impact cartel settlements have on private enforcement. 
As such, the mechanism will reduce the externalities currently stemming from cartel 
settlements due to the use of oral submissions,56 the limited rights of access to the 
Commission file,57 and the short final settlement decisions.58  
 
5.6 Commitment procedure 
 
The third option concerns commitment procedures. Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 
empowers the Commission to accept commitments offered by the undertakings after a 
preliminary assessment provided that these commitments meet the Commission's concerns. 
If the Commission accepts the commitments, it makes them binding on the undertakings 
and concludes that there are no longer grounds for action. The case is closed. The obvious 
difficulty stems from the inability to quantify compensation, since the procedure does not 
involve the finding of an infringement and the imposition of a fine. Compensation in such 
                                                                
55 A. Ezrachi and M. Ioannidou (supra n.2), 543.  
56 Regulation 622/2008 amending Regulation 773/2004, as regards the conduct of settlement procedures in 
cartel cases OJ L 171 1.7.2008 3, Article 12. 
57 Ibid., Article 6. 
58 U. Soltesz and C. Von Kockritz, EU cartel settlement in practice: The future of EU cartel law 
enforcement? (2011) 32(5) E.C.L.R. 258, 263. 
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a case is bound to be subjected to agreement between the competition authority and the 
parties. Thus, compensation in the course of commitment procedures remains a voluntary 
mechanism and it cannot be regulated in an effective manner.59  
 
The forthcoming cases fell short of compensation but act as building blocks for more 
mainstream compensatory procedures in the course of commitment decisions. The 
Commission came close to applying the compensation of victims via commitment 
decisions in Deutsche Telekom and in the Bank Charges Euro-zone decisions. In Deutsche 
Telekom, the Commission found that Deutsche Telekom had charged excessive prices for 
access to its network, but it decided to terminate its proceedings when Deutsche Telecom 
committed to apply lower tariffs.60 In the second case, several banks were accused of 
collectively fixing charges for exchanging Euro-zone banknotes.61 The Commission 
terminated proceedings against certain banks when they committed to reduce their charges. 
Two reasons were decisive: a particular circumstance existed (the introduction of euro 
notes and coins) and the reduction produced immediate beneficial effects for consumers.62 
 
The Commission simultaneously continued its investigations against the banks that 
contested the Commission's charges and fined them.63 Thanks to the commitment some 
consumers paid less for the service and ultimately benefited from a kind of compensation 
                                                                
59 A. Ezrachi and M. Ioannidou (supra n.2), 543.  
60 European Commission, XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy 1997, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/1997/broch97_en.pdf  (accessed 08.08.2016), 
para 77. 
61 Commission Press Release IP/01/1159, 31.07.2001 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-01-
1159_en.htm?locale=en (accessed 08.08.2016); Commission Press Release IP/01/635, 3.05.2001 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-01-635_en.htm (accessed 08.08.2016); Commission Press Release 
IP/01/650, 7.05.2001 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-01-650_en.htm (accessed 
08.08.2016); Commission Press Release IP/01/690, 14.05.2001 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-01-690_en.htm (accessed 08.08.2016); European Commission, XXXIth Report on Commission 
Policy 2001, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2001/en.pdf (accessed 
08.08.2016), para 64. 
62 J.H.J. Bourgeois and S. Strievi (supra n.7), 247.  
63 Commission Press Release IP/01/1796, 11.12.2001 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-01-
1796_en.htm?locale=en (accessed 08.08.2016). 
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whereas clients of the banks that were not part of the commitment decision continued to 
pay higher charges.64  
 
In Belgium, in the Banksys case,65the competition authority agreed to commitments offered 
by Banksys, which put to an end discriminatory prices and led to lower prices for small 
businesses. The commitments followed a private settlement between Banksys and the 
complainants, which was said to correspond to possible remedies suggested by the 
competition authority.66 In addition, these commitments met the competition authority's 
concerns.67 
 
Bourgeois and Strievi state that there is no reason to limit the commitment to the reduction 
of fines in the future. They argue that in the abovementioned cases, the commitments could 
easily68 have gone further and could have involved the reimbursement of the surcharge 
paid by consumers/customers in the past.  
 
The Commission took such a step two years later after Bank Charges Euro-zone when it 
terminated its investigation in the Phillips/Sony CD Licensing Program case.69 Amongst 
the commitments was the retroactive application of a reduced royalty rate. However, the 
Commission settled/terminated the case informally when 'after discussing the preliminary 
                                                                
64 J.H.J. Bourgeois and S. Strievi (supra n.7), 247.  
65 Case CONC-I/O-00/0049: Banksys SA and others, available at  
http://economic.fgov.be/organization_market/competition/jurisprudence/jurisprudence_12006Io12.pdf 
(accessed 08.08.2016). 
66 Ibid., footnote 14 of the decision. 
67 J.H.J. Bourgeois and S. Strievi (supra n.7), 258.  
68 Ibid. 
69Cases COMP/C-3/37.228 Ingman Disc and VD v Philips and Sony; COMP/C-3/37.561 Pollydisc v Philips 
and Sony; COMP/C-3/37.707 Broadcrest and Others v Philips and Sony; COMP/C-3/38.787 Philips and 
Sony: notification of the standard license agreement. European Commission XXXIIIrd Report on 
Competition Policy, 2003, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2003/en.pdf (accessed 08.08.2016) 197; 
Commission Press Release IP/03/1152, 7.08.2003 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-03-
1152_en.htm?locale=en (accessed 08.08.2016). 
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analysis with the parties, in view of the alleged abusive behaviour and the cooperative 
attitude of all the parties involved, a two-step solution was envisaged, the result of which 
turned out to be equivalent to the one that could have been obtained through more formal 
proceedings.'70 The first step consisted of allowing time for complainants and alleged 
infringers to reach a settlement. This led to almost all complainants withdrawing their 
complaints. The second step consisted of Sony and Phillips notifying new agreements, that 
is, improved versions of the agreements that were under scrutiny. The retroactive 
application of the reduced royalty rate was one of the improvements. In addition, Philips 
and Sony undertook to grant a one-time credit of $10000 on royalties to each EEA 
licensee, which amounted to about $800000.71 Bourgeois and Strievi believe that the 
voluntary nature of this type of compensation would be an efficient and speedy way of 
contributing both to remedying possible anticompetitive behaviour and indemnification of 
victims.72  
 
Following cases such as Alrosa,73 the main criticism of commitment decisions is that the 
severely limited judicial review may result in a vicious circle: legal uncertainty about 
outcomes in the infringement procedure makes commitment decisions attractive for 
undertakings.74 The resulting decrease in the number of infringement decisions would 
breed further legal uncertainty about what the law demands.75 This leads to even greater 
demand for commitment decisions and accordingly fewer infringement decisions. Lacking 
authoritative statements of the law, undertakings look to previous commitment decisions 
                                                                
70 European Commission, XXXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy, 2003, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2003/en.pdf (accessed 05.09.2015), 199. 
71 J.H.J. Bourgeois and S. Strievi (supra n.7), 248.  
72 Ibid. 
73 Case 441/07 European Commission v Alrosa Co. Ltd., [2010] 5 C.M.L.R. 11. 
74 F. Wagner-Von Papp, Best and even better practices in commitment procedures after Alrosa; The dangers 
of abandoning the ‘struggle for competition law,’ (2012) 49(3) C.M.L.R. 929, 931. 
75 Ibid.  
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and non-binding guidelines to estimate the threat points in the bargaining process.76 This 
reliance on 'quasi-case law' increases the Commission's discretion in future negotiations. 
The Commission, in turn, accommodates increased demand for commitment decisions so 
as to profit from the increased discretion it enjoys, for example in framing proactive 
remedies.77 The incentives for the Commission to resort to the commitment procedure are 
especially strong in those cases in which the benefit of legal certainty provided by an 
infringement decision would be particularly great, namely involving cases with novel legal 
issues. There is the danger that the struggle for law is abandoned in favour of discretionary 
case-to-case negotiations.78 
 
Commitment procedures are a good way of transforming third parties' claims into 
additional concessions from the undertakings. One of the incentives for undertakings to 
offer commitments is the potential to avoid private litigation in the form of follow-on 
actions in the wake of an infringement decision. The Commission is able to transform any 
deterrent effect of future private litigation into a bargaining chip for exacting further 
reaching commitments in the public enforcement sphere.79 Wagner Von Papp argues that 
this gives a curious twist to the Commission's efforts to strengthen private litigation, which 
ostensibly has the sole purpose of ensuring 'compensation', and not the purpose to deter.80 
Once private enforcement is strengthened, the Commission can transform the 
(strengthened) claims of parties seeking compensation into an additional bargaining chip to 
extract commitments, which furthers mostly the goal of deterrence, and will at best have an 
                                                                
76 Ibid.  
77 In the infringement procedure, the case law of the Court restricts the Commission to imposing obligations 
that ‘restore compliance with the rules infringed,’ see e.g. Joined Cases 241 & 242/91 P, RTE and ITP v 
Commission [1995] E.C.R. I-743, at para 93. 
78 F. Wagner-Von Papp (supra n.75), 931.  
79 Ibid., 949.  
80 Ibid., Footnote 75. 
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indirect compensatory effect (unless the commitment procedure is used to compensate 
direct victims).81  
 
Another issue with the commitment procedure is whether commitments are adequate to 
deal with third party competition concerns. Competition law inherently deals with 
externalities imposed on third parties and on the public interest. The offer of commitments 
does not in any way guarantee that third-party interests are well served. In the 
Commitment procedure, third party interests are to some degree represented by the 
Commission, aided by third-party comments in the Article 27(4) market test procedure.82 
Nevertheless, the Commission may not be the best advocate for the public interest for 
several reasons when it proceeds along the line of commitment rather than infringement 
decisions. First, the Commission does not have the benefit of a full investigation into the 
facts, as it would have during an infringement procedure. Second, without this 
investigation, the assessment of proportionality of the remedies can only be assessed 
tentatively. Third, comments by third parties in the market test procedure may not reflect 
the full extent of the public interest at stake, especially if the negative externalities from 
any remaining competitive constraints are dispersed among many stakeholders with a low 
degree of consolidation. These reasons show that the Commission may well be a less 
reliable agent for third party interests and the public interests in the commitment procedure 
than it is during the infringement procedure.83 
 
The mere fact that certain sacrifices need to be made when substituting a commitment 
decision for an infringement decision is, of course, not decisive. The benefits of 
commitment decisions as a form of consensual dispute resolution are well known. 
                                                                
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid., 950. 
83 Ibid. 
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Commitment decisions are speedier and less costly. Speedier, because the Commission 
need not engage in time consuming fact finding missions for evidence that would hold up 
in court. Moreover, the negotiated remedies are more acceptable to all parties concerned, 
thus avoiding protracted litigation. This means that the authorities can concentrate their 
limited resources on serious infringements. There are also added benefits for the public, in 
that a lengthy investigation and drawn out court battle would render any remedy 
meaningless because competition would be choked off in the meantime, perhaps 
irrevocably.84 
 
The EU legislature chose not to implement any ex ante mandatory court supervision of 
commitment agreements. This can be contrasted with the US Tunney Act.85 Even though 
the US procedure may often not be much more than a rubber-stamping of the negotiated 
solution, it may well have a disciplining effect on the negotiations and the transparency of 
the procedure.86 The possibility of appealing commitment decisions in Europe is a very 
deficient substitute for ex ante substitution. First, there will usually be no appellant, 
because the addressees have no interest in, and possibly not even the opportunity of 
appealing the decision. Second, third parties will not necessarily have locus standi.87  
 
It is equally important to clarify the limitations that commitment decisions have put on 
private parties and the NCAs. Recital 13 of Regulation 1/2003 states that: 
 
'Where, in the course of proceedings which might lead to an agreement or practice being 
prohibited, undertakings offer the Commission commitments such as to meet its concerns, 
the Commission should be able to adopt decisions which make those commitments binding 
                                                                
84 Ibid., 959. 
85 15 US Code § 16. 
86 F. Wagner-Von Papp (supra n.74), 967.  
87 Ibid. 
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on the undertakings concerned. Commitment decisions should find that there are no longer 
grounds for action by the Commission without concluding whether or not there has been or 
is still an infringement. Commitment decisions are without prejudice to the powers of 
competition authorities and courts of the Member States to make such a finding and decide 
upon the case. Commitment decisions are not appropriate in cases where the Commission 
intends to impose a fine.'88  
 
Article 22 states that: 
 
'In order to ensure compliance with the principles of legal certainty and the uniform 
application of the Community competition rules in a system of parallel powers, conflicting 
decisions must be avoided. It is therefore necessary to clarify, in accordance with the case-
law of the Court of Justice, the effects of Commission decisions and proceedings on courts 
and competition authorities of the Member States. Commitment decisions adopted by the 
Commission do not affect the power of the courts and the competition authorities of the 
Member States to apply Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty.' 
 
The supposedly unaffected opportunities for control by NCAs and private parties result in 
the misleading assumption that commitment decisions are little more than a qualified 
closing of the file.89 De facto, however, it appears unlikely that private enforcement and 
enforcement by the NCAs will act as a sufficient check on infringements that escape the 
Commission's attention in the commitment procedure; and where it is the commitments 
themselves that have anticompetitive effects, this safety valve does not even exist de iure.90 
The practical effect of a commitment decision is therefore akin to a negative clearance or 
                                                                
88 Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101 and 102 
TFEU] OJ L 1 4.1.2003 1. 
89 F. Wagner-Von Papp, 967. 
90 Ibid. 
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an individual exemption under the notification system than to a closing of the file, because 
third-party actions are largely forestalled by the commitment procedure.91 The 
Commission should realise the responsibility that comes with this de facto monopoly, a 
responsibility that is obscured by the misleading pronouncements in Recitals 13 and 22.92  
 
It is submitted that the most favourable method of achieving Public Compensation is 
through an adaptation of the Commission's fining procedure. A straightforward set of 
guidelines without the rigmarole associated with the quantification of damage in private 
actions would mean a speedier and more efficient mode of delivering compensation to 
injured parties, whether direct or indirectly. Under the commitment procedure, there would 
be a greater level of legal uncertainty and a depleting number of formal decisions which 
would lead to a coherent body of law. Moreover, the limited review of commitment would 
hamper transparency. In addition, without the benefit of a full infringement investigation, 
the authorities may fail to gauge the actual level of harm caused by the anticompetitive 
conduct.   
 
5.7 Compensation 
 
Regarding the actual compensation itself, there are practical issues which need further 
consideration: to whom should compensation be paid and how should it be paid.  
 
One questions whether only the victims of an infringement that can prove their loss should 
benefit from this remedy. Bourgeois and Strievi submit two reasons why compensation 
should be granted to victims in a wider sense, i.e. to past and even future consumers.93 
                                                                
91 Ibid. 
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93 J.H.J. Bourgeois and S. Strievi (supra n.7), 244.  
   
 
  205 
 
First, this measure is not a substitute for private damages actions but part of the public 
enforcement of competition rules. As such it is intended to have a wider scope than 
individual interests. Second, a requirement of individual proof of harm would render the 
procedure too burdensome, ultimately putting at risk the effectiveness of the entire public 
action. Bourgeois and Strievi state that Public Compensation, particularly in terms of its 
form, should be flexible and adapted to the particular circumstances of each case. One can 
imagine for instance that the infringer might wish to offer to grant discounts to consumers 
adding up a total predefined amount, or to reduce prices, or even to offer goods or services 
for free up to a certain amount.94Referring back to previous chapters, one can see the 
difficulties associated with mass consumer claims in the private sense. The problems with 
consumer apathy, proof of purchase and consumer willingness to take active steps to claim 
their individual compensation reveal the need for a wider interpretation and application of 
compensation. With reference to the past chapter on the appropriate remedy for consumers, 
where Public Compensation is unlikely to be claimed by each individual member of the 
class, the cy-pres doctrine could be applied to the residue. This money could, inter alia, be 
reinvested to help finance private litigation by consumer associations. This should be 
welcomed given the limitations on litigation funding in the EU.  
  
5.8 Concluding remarks on damages claims and public compensation 
 
Public compensation should never be a replacement for private enforcement. It merely 
forms a reactive tool addressing current shortfalls in access to compensation. Accordingly, 
injured parties should not be barred from launching damages actions in court. When Public 
Compensation is channelled to a collective, it would often be the case that it does not 
                                                                
94 A class action against some department stores in the US accused of price fixing was settled in the US after 
the stores agreed to give away free cosmetics amounting up to $175 million. Only one free product per 
person, cited by J.H.J. Bourgeois and S. Strievi (supra n.7), Footnote 13. 
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directly compensate the injured party for its damages. This is because Public 
Compensation serves as a vehicle for corrective justice in the wider sense, compensating a 
collective with a sufficient nexus to the violation, rather than compensating the individual. 
In those cases, the injured parties may still be incentivised to claim damages in courts. 
Where part of the Public Compensation is directly paid to these parties, that sum could be 
deducted from any future compensation they obtain through the court.  
 
One should accept that in some cases, the availability of Public Compensation may curtail 
the incentive to launch a follow-on damages claim. Recall, however, that the proposed 
mechanism is reactive in nature and stems from limited access to judicial remedies in 
competition cases. Accordingly, the possible limited adverse effect on some claims should 
be balanced against the clear benefit flowing from Public Compensation.  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  207 
 
CHAPTER 6 THE APPROPRIATENESS OF AN EU COMPETITION COURT  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The diversity of the EU Member States' approach towards collective redress leads to the 
potential for forum shopping and irreconcilable judgments. Consumers from different 
Member States who have suffered harm from the same anticompetitive behaviour may be 
treated in a dissimilar manner depending on the willingness of national courts to hear and 
recognise foreign collective claims. One solution could be to have all of the cross-border 
collective claims for damages suffered as a result of anticompetitive behaviour heard in a 
centralised supranational EU Competition Court.  
 
It is acknowledged from the outset that this proposal poses many challenges. First, it 
presents a radical change in the way private claims are heard. Traditionally, private 
enforcement of competition law is a matter for the national courts. EU Courts do not 
adjudicate private actions. Second, it may be difficult to gather the support of the Member 
States for such a forum when the Commission has firmly underlined a preference to try to 
harmonise as much as possible the national regimes. Third, while there are examples of 
specialist supranational EU courts which may act as a precedent for the formation of an EU 
Competition Court, they are not without their limitations. Recently the EU Civil Service 
Tribunal has been abolished and its judges returned to the General Court in order to tackle 
the mounting pressure of the EU judiciary’s workload. Meanwhile, the creation of a 
supranational patent court has been a project which has spanned decades due to numerous 
failures to reach a consensus. The latest offering in the form of the Unitary Patent Court 
has faced staunch opposition from certain Member States and remains heavily criticised by 
stakeholders. The development of these courts and the challenges that they have faced shall 
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be examined in order to provide an insight into the potential difficulties that the creation of 
an EU Competition Court may encounter. Lastly, one would need to resolve the issue of 
the type of cases before a new Competition Court. Construed narrowly, the Competition 
Court would solely be responsible for competition matters involving cross-border 
collective redress. Interpreted in a broader sense, a Competition Court may have the power 
to adjudicate over all cross-border private competition cases.  The final option would be to 
have a Competition Court which entertains both public and private matters.  
 
Notwithstanding these challenges, it is argued that an EU Competition Court would be the 
most effective way of establishing consistent decision making and equal treatment of 
victims from different Member States in mass harm situations. It has been seen that cross-
border litigation becomes much more complicated when a cross-border element is 
introduced. This is particularly the case from the perspective of the conflicts-of-laws. 
These rules were originally designed on the basis that litigation takes place between one 
specific defendant and one specific claimant. It is arguable that they do not naturally ‘fit’ 
with cross-border mass harm situations. Even if these rules were overhauled to take greater 
account of cross-border collective redress, it is difficult to design rules which are fair and 
equal to every party to the litigation in every situation. The Brussels I Recast Regulation, 
the Rome II Regulation, the Directive on Damages Actions and the Recommendation on 
collective redress provide limited guidance, if any. The current situation is that cross-
border collective redress is subject to a regime which is based on the ‘first-in-time’ rule. 
The issue of forum shopping becomes inflamed with a race to the court in order to ‘win’ 
the right to proceed litigation in the claimant’s (or indeed the natural defendant’s) forum of 
choice. In some cases, jurisdiction can be founded exorbitantly. The first claimant 
collective to file in a suitable forum will be rewarded by being able to define the scope of 
the action based on the claims in their pleadings. This may prejudice the collective 
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members who have not decided to opt-in, members who have opted-out, members who 
have failed to opt-out, and other group claimants in parallel or future collective 
proceedings.1A single forum could help to address this issue. It would enhance legal 
certainty. Claimants would be certain of where they can bring an action. Defendants would 
have foresight of where they can be sued.  
 
Moreover, even with the advent of ADR and more specifically collective arbitration, there 
are still significant shortfalls in providing effective end-consumer redress. The US 
experience of commerce’s reluctance to refer cases to class arbitration in their contracts 
and the US Supreme Court’s steadfast preference to enforce class action waivers paint a 
dismal picture of how cross-border collective arbitration may operate in the EU.  
 
In addition, while public enforcement is the default mode of enforcement in the EU to 
which private enforcement is somewhat the poor relation, the US experience shows the 
benefits that private enforcement can have as a complementary mechanism in terms of 
deterrence as well as compensating victims. An EU Competition Court facilitating cross-
border collective redress could elevate the role of private enforcement in the EU.  
 
It would appear that there are several ways in which to create an EU Competition Court. 
The first option would be to integrate a specialist panel within the existing framework of 
the General Court. This could be performed by way of a specialist tribunal under Article 
257 TFEU or, alternatively by forming a specialist chamber within the General Court. 
Another option would be to create a new EU Competition Court. The final option would be 
                                                                
1 J. Stefanelli, Parallel litigation and cross-border collective actions under the Brussels I framework: 
Lessons from abroad, in D. Fairgrieve and E. Lein, Extraterritoriality and collective redress, (OUP (2012)), 
9.15. 
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to create a ‘World Competition Court’ of which the EU is a Member. Each option shall be 
considered in turn.  
 
It will be argued that a new EU Competition Court would be the most desirable option 
given the fact that a specialist tribunal or chamber attached to the General Court would be 
at odds with the basic principle that the General Court and CJEU are administrative courts. 
Moreover, the EU Courts have been under increasing pressure to tackle a growing 
workload.  
 
6.2 A specialist tribunal under Article 257 TFEU 
 
The first option is to create an EU Competition Court as a specialist court within the 
General Court. The legal basis for this would be Article 257 TFEU which enables the 
establishment of specialist tribunals attached to the General Court to hear and determine at 
first instance classes of action or proceedings in specific areas. Article 257 TFEU gives the 
General Court jurisdiction to hear and determine actions or proceedings brought against 
decisions of such specialist courts. 
   
The concept of specialist courts annexed to the General Court was established following 
the Nice Intergovernmental Conference.2 There, a consensus was reached that the existing 
court structure of the European Union had become increasingly overloaded.3 The creation 
of the General Court in 1989 aimed to alleviate the overloading of the CJEU by 
concentrating on judicial review of competition cases and employment disputes between 
                                                                
2 The Intergovernmental Conference of 2000 reached agreement on the institutional questions and on a range 
of other points, namely a new distribution of seats in the European Parliament, more flexible arrangements 
for enhanced cooperation, the monitoring of fundamental rights and values in the EU, and a strengthening of 
the EU judicial system.  
3 H. Cameron, Establishment of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal, (2006) 5 Law & Prac. Int'l Cts. 
& Tribunals 273, 273. 
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European civil servants and the European Institutions that employed them, i.e. staff cases. 
However, despite this, the Report by the Working Party on the Future of the Economic 
Communities’ Court System (Due Report) of January 2000,4 found evidence of a serious 
crisis in the Union courts.5 The Due Report found, inter alia a steady rise in the number of 
cases brought before the Union Courts and a lengthening of time to deal with cases. The 
Due Report considered that these problems would only get worse in the future. A major 
reason for this was the enlargement of the Union. One of the solutions proposed by the 
Due Report was that certain categories of cases should be dealt with according to special 
rules. The first of the possible categories of cases set out was staff cases, for which an 
‘internal institutional complaints tribunal’ should be set up.6 The Due Report also 
recommended four other categories. These were cases of intellectual property, judicial 
cooperation in civil matters, competition, and justice and home affairs. At this point, we 
see a brief mention of a potential competition tribunal attached to the General Court.  
 
Staff cases were probably given preferential treatment on account of the fact that they were 
deemed to be of a relatively uncontroversial (politically, at least) nature. They are brought 
against the EU institutions without generally involving the Member States themselves. The 
other most obvious reason was the increasing volume of staff cases before the General 
Court. Figures available from the Court showed that by the end of 1990, of the 143 cases 
pending before the General Court, 63 were staff cases. In 1997, after the accession of 
Austria, Finland and Sweden, the figure for the year increased to 136 of 481 cases. In 
2004, the number of staff cases pending was 237 of 1174 cases. To be able to section off 
that number of cases would be a significant step in reducing the case-load of the General 
                                                                
4 Report by the Working Party on the future of the European Communities’ Court System, (Due Report), 
January 2000, available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/legal_service/pdf/due_en.pdf (accessed 22/4/2016).  
5 Ibid., 2.  
6 H. Cameron (supra n.3), 273.  
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Court. 7The increase in the jurisdiction of the General Court under aspects of the Nice 
Reforms made it all the more imperative that it lose some of its existing caseload. 8  
  
In 2004, the Council adopted Council Decision 2004/7529approving the establishment of 
the EU Civil Service Tribunal. The General Court would take over the role of being the 
court of appeal in those cases from the CJEU, so that the CJEU was essentially freed from 
dealing with staff cases. 10 Unfortunately, the Civil Service Tribunal was short-lived. Just 
over a decade following the inception of the Tribunal, the EU’s judiciary began to buckle 
under growing pressure. The General Court continued to face a growing tide of new cases 
every year, and the backlog continued to swell.11The number of new cases per year before 
the General Court increased from fewer than 600 prior to 2010 to 912 in 2014, resulting in 
an unprecedented 1270 pending cases at the end of 2015.12 
 
By the end of 2015, the Council adopted a Regulation reforming the General Court.13 The 
aim of this reform is to enable the General Court to face an ever-increasing workload and 
ensure that legal redress in the EU is guaranteed within a reasonable time. 'The reform of 
the General Court reinforces an institution that has provided significant impetus to 
European integration,' commented Felix Braz, Minister for Justice of Luxembourg and 
President of the Council.14 
  
                                                                
7 Ibid., 274. 
8 Ibid. 
9 2004/752/EC Decision establishing the European Union Civil Service Tribunal, OJ L 333 9.11.2004 7 
10 N. Lavranos, The new specialised courts within the European judicial system, (2005) 30 E.L. Rev. 
261, 265. 
11 D. Hadroušek and M. Smolek, Solving the European Union's General Court, (2015) 40 E.L. Rev.  188, 
188. 
12 Press Release, Council of the EU, Court of Justice of the EU: Council adopts reform of the General Court, 
03.12.2015, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/12/03-eu-court-of-
justice-general-court-reform/ (accessed 11.07.2016). 
13 Regulation 2015/2422 amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, OJ L 341 24.12.2015 14. 
14 Press Release (supra n.12). 
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The reform provides for a progressive increase in the number of judges at the General 
Court and for the merging of the EU Civil Service Tribunal with the General Court. At the 
entry into force of the reform, the number of judges will increase by 12. In 2016, the seven 
posts of judges at the Civil Service Tribunal are being transferred to the General Court, to 
which nine further judges will be attributed three years later. In total, this means 21 
additional judges at the end of the process.  
 
The increase in the number of judges will allow the General Court to deliver judgments 
within a reasonable time, in conformity with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. It will also allow the General Court to deliver more cases in chambers of five 
judges or in a grand chamber which will enable a more in-depth deliberation on important 
cases. Increasing the number of judges by 21 and merging the Civil Service Tribunal with 
the General Court would cost €13.5 million per year. These costs compare favourably with 
the €26.8 million claimed in several actions for damages due to the delay in judgment and 
will allow the EU's first instance jurisdiction to fulfil its functions within the time limits 
and the quality standards which European citizens and companies are entitled to expect in a 
Union based on the rule of law.15 
 
The creation and abolition of the EU Civil Service Tribunal is relevant on the basis that a 
Competition Court under Article 257 TFEU would now seem an unlikely prospect. It sends 
a message that Article 257 TFEU, i.e. the idea enshrined therein, that the EU’s judiciary 
should be further developed in particular through the creation of specialist courts, is dead 
and that the wish of the authors of the Treaties to remain unfulfilled.16  
                                                                
15Ibid. See also M. Abenhaim, Epilogue, at last, on the reform of the General Court, Kluwer Competition 
Law Blog, 26.01.2016, http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2016/01/26/epilogue-at-last-on-the-reform-of-
the-general-court/ (accessed 06.09.2016). 
16 D. Hadroušek and M. Smolek (supra n.11), 199: In the run-up to the Treaty of Nice, Presidency report to 
the Feira European Council, 15.06.2000, CONFER 4750/00, paras 8 and 9: ‘Delegations were in favour of 
creating specialised judicial boards of appeal, particularly for staff matters and for actions arising from the 
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Nice was not the only time a specialist tribunal under Article 257 TFEU was considered. 
Last decade, the Confederation of Business Industry (CBI) suggested the creation of an EU 
Competition Court following concerns about judicial review of merger control cases.17 
This was considered in the UK Parliament’s Select Committee on the European Union 
Fifteenth Report. 18The CBI argued that one way to create an EU Competition Court would 
be through the creation of a specialist tribunal under Article 257 TFEU. The new court 
would have nine full time judges and would hear cases in chambers of three. It was 
proposed that the Court’s jurisdiction would not be limited to merger cases as there would 
not be enough business from merger cases to justify a brand new court. It was submitted 
that the Court would therefore welcome all kinds of competition cases and the CBI 
believed that with the increased emphasis on private enforcement of competition law, it 
would perform an important function in assisting this development in the Member States.19 
These comments could provide the basis upon which to argue that an Article 257 TFEU 
Competition Court could assist in the development of EU cross-border collective redress.  
 
The CBI’s proposals on the basis of Article 257 TFEU were struck down. Moreover, the 
need for a new court more generally (at least within the merger setting) was contested 
                                                                
Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market in Alicante. There was a consensus on making provision for 
appeals to the [General Court] against decisions taken by these boards of appeal. The Council should also be 
given the power to provide for such appeals by means of the procedure for amending the Protocol on the 
Statute of the Court of Justice.’ In this light, the abolition of the Civil Service Tribunal, which ‘is a success 
story and [raises] no concerns regarding its ability to manage its cases load’ (see European Union Committee, 
House of Lords, The Workload of the Court of Justice of the European Union (2011), para 56), would clearly 
be a step back in itself.’  
17 Significant doubts as regards the effectiveness of the mechanism of judicial control of merger decisions 
emerged with the prominent Airtours (Case T-342/99, Airtours plc v Commission, [2002] E.C.R. II-2285) 
and Tetra Laval (Case T-80/02, Tetra Laval v Commission, [2002] E.C.R. II-4519; Case 12/03 P, [2005] 
E.C.R. I-1113) judgments. The length of time that the General Court took to rule over the validity of the 
Commission’s decision prohibiting the merger between First Choice and Airtours and the fact that the 
concentration was subsequently abandoned supported the argument that there was no such thing as an 
‘effective judicial remedy’ against decisions prohibiting concentrations. 
18 Great Britain, Parliament, House of Lords, An EU Competition Court: report with evidence, 15th report of 
session 2006-07, The Stationery Office, 23.04.2007. 
19 CBI Brief, The need for an EU Competition Court, 15,6.2006. 
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greatly. Neither the Commission nor the General Court saw the need for a new court. M. 
Michel Petite, EU Commission Legal Service commented, ‘we believe the CBI’s case to 
be thin.’ 20The Select Committee understood that Merger Control brought with it many 
problems which needed to be addressed but disagreed that a new Court was the best way 
forward, instead opting to look for less institutionally radical solutions.21 
 
It was also felt that the CBI’s proposal for a specialist court with responsibility for all 
competition cases except for state aid would risk negating the very cornerstone of the 
CBI’s arguments, in that the Court’s resources would be taken up with more numerous 
non-merger cases that it could not provide the desired speedy process. If, however, the 
Court only dealt with merger cases, it would risk the accusation of being an inefficient use 
of resources at times when fewer merger appeals were brought.22 This raises an interesting 
question for the purposes of this thesis regarding the types of cases before the proposed 
Competition Court. The Court could hear only collective cases (which may, at least in the 
formative years be quite small in numbers and thus be seen as an insufficient justification 
for allocating resources) or a broad range of competition cases.  
 
The CBI’s proposal for an EU Competition Court also considered the fact that the UK 
already had a specialist competition tribunal. However, in the EU Select Committee’s 
Report the extent to which the parallel between the proposed judicial panel and the UK 
Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) could be justified was doubted. The Committee 
recognised significant differences between the enforcement frameworks laid down by the 
TFEU and the UK Competition Act. Sir Christopher Bellamy, former Chair of the CAT, 
considered that the CAT enjoyed three advantages vis-à-vis the General Court. 
                                                                
20 House of Lords, An EU Competition Court (supra n.18) para. 46.  
21 Ibid., para. 4. 
22 M. Israel, Jury out on EU Competition Court, (2006) 64 Euro. Law. 3. 
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First, the CAT had started with a ‘completely clean sheet’ and functioned according to 
tailor-made procedural rules. Second, unlike the General Court, it only had one working 
language. Third, in numerical terms the case law did not remotely equate to that pending 
before the General Court. 23 The major difference was, however, found in the scope of the 
power of judicial control exercised by the CAT, whereas the General Court’s scrutiny is 
limited to a ‘judicial review-type’ control in accordance with Article 263 TFEU. 24The 
inquiry conducted by the EU Select Committee raised significant doubts as regard the 
scope of jurisdiction of the proposed Competition Court, its potentially far-reaching 
implications for judicial and overall institutional structure of the EU and, more generally, 
its viability in terms of workload and resources. 25  
 
In theory, an EU Competition Court is possible by way of Article 257 TFEU. However, in 
reality it is an unlikely proposition. While the Nice Intergovernmental Conference 
envisaged Article 257 TFEU as a vehicle for creating a tribunal for inter alia competition 
matters, the increasing workload and the abolition of the only existing specialist tribunal 
sends a clear signal not to expect any further use of Article 257 TFEU in the foreseeable 
future. Moreover, the idea that a specialist court attached to the General Court for these 
types of cases would not fit well with the administrative characteristics of these courts. The 
EU Courts have never been involved in the direct enforcement of private rights. While a 
Competition Court with collective redress powers is desirable in order to provide coherent 
and equal treatment of victims of mass harm, this is not the preferred method.  
 
  
                                                                
23 House of Lords (supra n.18) para. 135.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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6.3 A specialist chamber within the General Court 
 
The second option is to create an EU Competition Court as a specialist chamber within the 
General Court. The General Court’s Rules of Procedure allows the Court to lay down 
certain criteria by which cases are to be allocated to each of its chambers.26 This was also 
considered following the CBI’s request for an inquiry by the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the EU on the possibility of establishing an EU Competition Court. It was 
suggested that competition cases could be heard by a specialised chamber within the 
General Court to ensure ‘expertise’ and ‘continuity’ in the adjudication of these cases.27 It 
is argued that expertise and continuity would benefit matters involving end-consumer 
collective redress.  
 
This proposal was initially welcomed by some stakeholders: it was suggested that 
competition law had reached a sufficiently ‘mature’ stage in its development as to 
constitute a relatively unitary, albeit still integral, aspect of EU law and could therefore be 
feasibly and efficiently applied by the same group of judges to maintain its inner 
consistency.28 
 
Establishment of a specialist chamber within the General Court received support from 
industry and legal practitioners. For example, the International Business Association 
submitted that this solution would be ‘comparatively simple, and carries both legal and 
practical advantages over the creation of a separate Competition Court.’29 The proposal 
also received support from those favouring a new court. The International Chamber of 
                                                                
26 Rules of Procedure of the General Court, OJ L 105 23.4.2015 1.  
27 A. Andreangeli, Private claims as a ‘special case’ in M. Danov, F. Becker, P. Beaumont, Cross-border EU 
competition law, (Hart Publishing, (2013)), 119. 
28 Ibid. 
29 House of Lords (supra n.18), para. 113.  
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Commerce (ICC) considered the specialist chamber to be ‘a sensible interim solution’ 
having regard to the time which would be needed to set up a Competition Court.30 The 
CLA thought that the creation of a specialist chamber ‘would be a step in the right 
direction and should be instigated immediately.’31  
  
Others, however, were more critical of the idea. Sir Christopher Bellamy pointed to 
possible negative consequences: 
  
‘Effectively, that means you have got to take six judges out of the life of the [General 
Court] and tell them to get on with competition cases. It is probably the case that among 
those six would be at least two judges from major Member States who would, as it were, 
peel off and do competition. Now if you assume one of those judges might be the United 
Kingdom judge, for example, what you have effectively achieved is to take the United 
Kingdom judge out of the [General Court], i.e. he is not participating, or hardly 
participating, in the other 900 cases the Court is doing because he has been told to 
specialise in competition. Whether or not that is an entirely desirable development, I am 
not at all sure.’32 
 
The Commission doubted whether the Court would favour the idea. M. Petite stated:  
 
‘The more specialised chamber you have the less flexibility you have in turning the cases 
to a chamber or to another. Would the judges easily accept not to be in the chamber dealing 
with competition cases? I do not know. Most of them want to remain in a wide panel of 
types of cases, so that will be an internal problem for the General Court.’33 
                                                                
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., para. 114. 
32 Ibid., para. 118. 
33 Ibid., para. 119. 
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Temple Lang and O’Donoghue were more positive:  
 
‘[C]ourt specialisation might possibly have disadvantages, such as specialised judges’ loss 
of perspective, and issues of status as between judges in different chambers. But we 
believe that these risks are not significant or likely to outweigh the gains in efficiency and 
consistency of decision-making that can be expected to result from having a specialised 
chamber and specialised judges.’34 
 
At the time of the House of Lords EU Select Committee consultation on the CBI’s 
proposals for a Competition Court, there were also significant doubts with regards to the 
level of work and the number of judges. One answer was to appoint more judges. On the 
face of it this would seem a simple and straightforward way of addressing the issue but 
history does not provide a helpful precedent. In the past, the appointment of extra judges 
has resulted in serious political difficulty. In 1999, the General Court requested an 
additional six judges, allowing for two extra chambers to be set up in order to deal with 
trade mark cases. The Council of Ministers agreed in principle to the increase. However, as 
Sir Christopher Bellamy noted, ‘The proposal got nowhere because no-one could agree on 
who the other six would be and which privileged states would have a second judge.’35 
Judge Vesterdorf commented that, ‘the case died an undignified death before the 
Council.’36  
 
However, at the end of 2015, the Council decided to reform the General Court. The aim of 
this reform was to enable the General Court to face an increasing workload and to ensure 
                                                                
34 Ibid., para. 120. 
35 Ibid., para. 140. 
36 Ibid.  
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that legal redress in the EU is guaranteed within a reasonable time.37The latest increase in 
the number of judges involved more than four years of debate. The President of the CJEU 
initially proposed to increase the total number of judges by 12 at the General Court, a 
figure which he later changed to 9, in response to cost concerns. When Member States 
could not agree that there be a departure from the pre-existing equality in numbers of 
judges from each Member State, the President simply adapted the proposal to provide for a 
doubling (to 56) of the number of judges. In June 2015, realising the urgency of the 
situation, and perhaps more conscious of the delays at the General Court, the Council 
accepted the revised proposal and sent it to the European Parliament. 
  
This proposal was met with some fierce opposition largely by the Rapporteur on the 
dossier, Antonio Marinho e Pinto. He criticised a ‘deep contempt for European taxpayers’ 
money’ and argued that the proposed reforms amounted to an unnecessary increase in 
spending, ‘at a time when the EU is imposing severe austerity measures to balance the 
Member States’ budgets.’38 There was also great criticism of the lack of a proper impact 
assessment and questioning of the figures provided by the CJEU on the number of 
outstanding cases before the General Court and their average duration.39 Ultimately, 
despite Marinho e Pinto’s opposition, the proposal to double the number of judges was 
supported and passed by the European Parliament and the Council.   
  
The fact that extra judges are coming to the General Court could weigh in favour of 
allocating some of them to a specialist competition chamber. However, even this addition 
may still not be enough for some to be persuaded. It may be pointed out that routinely the 
General Court already tends to concentrate, thanks to its informal organisation practice 
                                                                
37 Press Release (supra n.12). 
38 M. Abenhaim (supra n.15). 
39 Ibid. 
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arrangements, competition cases in certain chambers. It also seeks to ensure that at least 
one judge would be an expert in dealing with these questions.40 Thus it has been argued 
that entrenching these arrangements and thereby instituting officially specialised chambers 
would not significantly contribute to the swift adjudication of competition cases and could 
even jeopardise the Court’s efficiency by making case allocation excessively rigid.41 
Similar concerns have been raised by one of the members of the General Court. Judge 
Irena Pelikanova observed that the Court in recent years has seen itself responding 
effectively to the challenges posed by the technical and fact-intensive nature of 
competition and merger cases, by adopting a range of practices designed to provide 
sufficient expertise on the bench for each of these cases. Therefore, she doubted that 
institutionalising these arrangements would bear significant benefits for the Court’s 
workload and suggested that adopting this option could result in dampening the efficiency 
of adjudication.42 More generally, she suggested that any reform impacting on the normal 
rotation of judges across the chambers and on the way cases were assigned to each of them 
should be treated with caution to avoid taking away limited resources from the functioning 
of the already stretched General Court.43 
 
Moreover, while this chapter talks of creating a Competition Court, it is submitted that the 
General Court was in itself, essentially established as a ‘Competition Court’ and, even 
taking into account the pressure stemming from having to be a ‘general’ court of first 
instance, has been able to discharge the function thoroughly.44 From its inception, many of 
the Members of the General Court have been ‘competition lawyers’ with a high degree of 
                                                                
40 A. Andreangeli (supra n.27), 119.  
41 H. Gilliams, Modernisation: from policy to practice, (2003) 28(4) E.L. Rev 451, 453. 
42 A. Andreangeli (supra n.27), 119.  
43 Ibid. 
44 Written evidence submitted by Sir David Edward to the House of Lords Select Committee on the EU, 
Subcommittee E, 7-8.  
   
 
  222 
 
expertise in the field. Of particular note are José Luis da Cruz Vilaça,45Christopher 
William Bellamy,46Virpi Tiili,47Enzo Moavero Milanesi,48Nils Wahl,49 and Laurent 
Truchot.50Current members continue that trend including Irena Wiszniewska-
Bialecka,51Alfred Dittrich,52Marc van der Woude,53Eugène Buttigieg,54Carl 
Wetter,55Constantinos Ilipoulos,56and Ian Stewart Forrester.57 There is an argument in 
favour of allowing novel, underdeveloped fields (such as cross-border collective redress) to 
be heard before specialist judges of this standing in order to grow and develop a consistent, 
well-reasoned body of law. Given the paucity of cross-border collective claims, there is no 
guarantee that under the current decentralised model, the judge in the national court seised 
of the case will have experience of dealing with complex competition cases (let alone those 
involving mass harm). In an area that lacks homogeneity, there is a strong case for 
                                                                
45 Competition experience includes: lawyer at the Lisbon bar, specialising in European and competition law 
(1996-2012). 
46 Competition experience includes: barrister, Middle Temple; Queen's Counsel, specialising in commercial 
law, European law and public law; co-author of the three first editions of Bellamy & Child, Common market 
law of competition. 
47 Competition experience includes: member of the Competition Council (1991-94). 
48 Competition experience includes: Head of Cabinet of the Commissioner responsible for the internal market 
(1995-99) and competition (1999), Director, Directorate-General for Competition (2000-02). 
49 Competition experience includes: member of the Rådet för konkurrensfrågor (Council for Competition 
Law Matters) (2001-06). 
50 Competition experience includes: Deputy Section Head, then Section Head, in the Directorate-General for 
Competition, Consumption and the Combating of Fraud at the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finance and 
Industry (June 1992 to September 1994). 
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concentrating a specific area of law in the hands of a few, at the very least until it becomes 
developed and there is a culture of enforcement.    
 
There are, however some issues associated with having a specialist chamber. For example, 
there may be considerable difficulties in identifying ‘pure’ competition cases to be 
assigned to the specialist court, not only due to the often complex nature of the facts, but 
also because this exercise could undermine the central role of competition law and the 
policy within the structure of the Treaties.58 
  
Another argument against the establishment of a specialist court chamber generally is 
based on its actual ability to relieve the General Court of a significant part of its workload. 
For instance, in 2009 the General Court completed 31 competition cases against a total of 
439 cases. These figures may be compared with the case law in the field of intellectual 
property, which constitutes by far the ‘bulk’ of the General Court’s activity, with 169 
closed files.59 
 
These trends seem to have remained unaltered in 2010 and 2011. According to the 2011 
Report on the activity of the General Court respectively 79 and 39 new cases were 
launched in the field of competition law. These figures may be contrasted against, 
respectively, 207 and 219 new proceedings instituted in the area of intellectual property 
law. Thus, competition filings made about 15% of the 636 new cases lodged with the 
General Court in 2010, and in 2011 this percentage decreased to close to 8% of the total 
722 new actions brought before the same court. By contrast, intellectual property remained 
                                                                
58 Written evidence submitted by Sir Christopher Bellamy to the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
EU, Subcommittee E (supra n.18), 44.  
59 Annual Report of the General Court (2009), http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2010-
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a prominent portion of the General Court’s workload, making around 40% of the total new 
filings in both years. 
  
Similar figures characterise the ‘split’ between competition and intellectual property 
completed proceedings. 38 competition cases were closed, compared with 180 intellectual 
property actions. In 2011, 100 competition actions were completed, higher than in the past 
few years, but still significantly lower than the 240 cases closed in the field of intellectual 
property. This difference appears even more marked if these figures are seen against the 
background of the total number of proceedings closed each year. In 2010 the General 
Court terminated a total of 527 cases, of which competition actions represented less than 
10% and intellectual property cases numbered almost a third. In 2011, although the number 
of Article 101 and 102 TFEU decisions rose significantly, it was still in the region of 14%, 
whereas intellectual property decisions represented, once again, a third of the Court’s 
decisions. 60 Recent figures confirm that with regards to intellectual property, there are 
around 100 to 300 cases per year. This is in contrast to 20 to 80 new cases per year in the 
field of competition law.61 
 
The foregoing commentary shows that a specialist chamber presents a number of 
significant problems. First, it may risk insulating a key area of EU law from the overall 
legal system centred on the EU Treaties. Second, it has been shown that due to the make-
up of the workload of the General Court, creating a specialist tribunal and thereby 
committing resources to this area of law that may be used across the board to deal with the 
whole array of appeals may not be sustainable. The analysis of the General Court’s activity 
has indicated that it is not competition law, but rather intellectual property cases that 
                                                                
60 Annual Report of the General Court (2011) http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2012-
06/ra2011_activite_tribunal_en.pdf (accessed 13.7.2016). 
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generate the significant portion of the Court’s case load. Consequently, it is suggested that 
the Member States’ move towards the negotiation of the UPC and the unitary patent is not 
entirely surprising. It is possible to argue that this move can be read as evidence of a 
concern for efficient decision-making in these cases and for lightening the load pending 
before the EU judiciary, an issue which does not, however, seem to arise in relation to 
competition actions.62 
 
To establish a Competition Court as an integrated component of the EU General Court 
seems appealing at first glance. In practice, however, it poses many issues. The only 
specialist tribunal has been abolished and its judges transferred to the General Court in 
order to account for the latter’s increasing case load. It seems unlikely that the same 
General Court would want to establish another specialist tribunal in the near future. 
Moreover, the likelihood is that most members of the General Court would prefer to have a 
more varied portfolio of cases rather than one involving matters of ‘pure competition.’ The 
General Court already allocates certain cases to specific chambers where at least one judge 
is an expert in a given field. There seems to be a feeling that anything more than this, i.e. 
chambers which exclusively preside over competition law matters could result in 
enforcement becoming unnecessarily inflexible and rigid.  The General Court also 
considers itself very much, ever since its inception, as ‘The Competition Court’ and would 
appear to believe that while it exists as a ‘general’ court of first instance, it already deals 
with competition matters in an efficient and competent manner.  
  
One also has to remember the scope of the current analysis. It considers the formation of 
an EU Competition Court with specific powers to hear cases involving cross-border 
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collective redress. This is a matter of private enforcement. Horizontal private rights are 
adjudicated by the national courts. It seems unlikely that the EU Judiciary, which follows a 
supranational administrative structure, would be willing to expand its jurisdiction to a court 
of first instance in private damages claims.  
 
Aside from acknowledging that this is unlikely ever to happen, one recognises the positives 
of allowing the General Court to hear cross-border collective cases at first instance. The 
centralised nature of the proceedings would eradicate the possibility of forum shopping and 
irreconcilable judgments which exist at national level. Every EU consumer who has 
suffered from the same anticompetitive conduct would benefit from equal treatment 
regardless of their location in the EU. Cross-border collective cases would benefit from a 
central panel of experienced competition judges and a consistent body of case law.     
 
6.4 A new EU Competition Court  
 
A third option would be to create a new EU Competition Court which is not attached to the 
General Court. This would be most desirable as a new court would begin with a completely 
clean sheet rather than attempting to shoehorn private enforcement concerns into an 
administrative court system.  
 
The first major issue would be whether the Union would have the power to create such an 
institution within the existing powers provided under the Treaties. The Union shall have 
exclusive competence in establishing the competition rules necessary for the functioning of 
the internal market.63It may be possible to argue that the Union could, in theory, create an 
                                                                
63 Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. 
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EU Competition Court if it was ‘necessary for the functioning of the internal market.’ 
Securing agreement between the Member States may be difficult.  
 
Moreover, it may be difficult to legislate for a Competition Court which has powers to 
adjudicate over cross-border collective redress. There is no explicit power for the EU to 
legislate on collective redress matters. That is why there was a non-binding 
Recommendation on collective redress rather than a Regulation or Directive. The 
Commission has been very reserved in its latest vision of collective redress. This is as a 
result of the very hostile view shared by some Member States and stakeholders towards the 
subject. There are fears of US-style class actions which have the potential to encourage 
abusive and vexatious litigation. There are concerns that the nature of the opt-out class 
action model is unconstitutional given that many Member State laws require putative 
claimants to be individually identified and consent to being part of the litigation. The 
Commission has previously received serious opposition in the European Parliament on the 
basis inter alia that it required mandatory ‘opt-out’ collective action procedures at national 
level.64It seems very unlikely that the same European Parliament would be in favour of 
supporting a centralised supranational forum with extensive powers of collective redress. 
Moreover, one could argue that the path towards harmonisation at Member State level has 
already been firmly laid. In the Communication from the Commission ‘Towards a 
European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress,’65it was mentioned that several 
stakeholders recommended the creation of a specialist judicial panel for cross-border 
collective actions.66 This has not been pursued. Instead, the Commission considers that the 
existing conflicts-of-laws rules should be fully exploited.67 The EU advocates 
                                                                
64 P. Boylan, Draft Damages Directive: Off the Agenda for Now, Practical Law, (2009) available at 
http://uk.practicallaw.com/8-500-5687?service=competition (Accessed 6.7.2015). 
65 Commission Communication, Towards a European horizontal framework for collective redress, 11.6.2013 
COM (2013) 401 final. 
66 Ibid., 3.7. 
67 Ibid. 
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harmonisation at EU Member State level. It is difficult to envisage a Union-wide desire for 
an EU Competition Court with powers of collective redress. 
 
In the absence of unanimous support, there may be scope to create such a forum through 
the process of ‘enhanced cooperation’ under Title IV of the TEU. Member States which 
wish to establish enhanced cooperation between themselves within the framework of the 
Union’s non-exclusive competences may make use of its institutions and exercise those 
competences by applying the relevant provisions of the Treaties. Enhanced cooperation 
shall aim to further the objectives of the Union, protect its interests and reinforce its 
integration process. Such cooperation shall be open at any time to all Member States, in 
accordance with Article 328 TFEU.68 
 
The decision authorising enhanced cooperation shall be adopted by the Council as a last 
resort, when it has established that the objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained 
within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole, and provided that at least nine 
Member States participate in it. The Council shall act in accordance with the procedure 
laid down in Article 329 of the TFEU.69 
 
Enhanced cooperation was used for the first time by the EU in 2010 to authorise a group of 
Member States to adopt rules on conflicts-of-laws in divorce proceedings, known in 
practice as the ‘Rome III Regulation.’70The following year, enhanced cooperation was 
authorised for the second time with respect to the creation of unitary patent protection to 
                                                                
68 Article 20(1) TEU. 
69 Article 20(2) TEU. 
70 Regulation 1259/2010 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and 
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1143. 
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achieve the Union’s internal market objectives regarding the establishment of EU 
intellectual property rights under 118 TFEU.71It was subsequently authorised in relation to 
the financial transaction tax (FTT), with a similar aim to achieve the Union’s internal 
market objectives concerning the harmonisation of indirect taxation under Article 113 
TFEU.72The main concern with regards to enhanced cooperation is that the framework 
created through such a mechanism is only applicable to those States participating within 
the regime. In theory, if the minimum number of States (9) participated, the end result 
would be that 19 States would remain outside the enhanced cooperation. This could result 
in all kinds of enforcement problems with non-participating States refusing to enforce 
judgments decided within the enhanced cooperation. It could also result in a two-speed 
regime with participating States developing the law far beyond the rest of Europe.  
 
From the perspective of an EU Competition Court, the main problem is that competition 
law is an exclusive competence and this is not eligible for enhanced cooperation. It seems 
likely that there would need to be a Treaty change. However, shared competence between 
the Union and the Member States applies inter alia consumer protection.73Instead of an EU 
Competition Court, one could consider creating an EU Consumer Court which happens to 
have collective redress powers over competition law infringements. In essence, this would 
mean trying to create an EU Competition Court through the ‘back door.’ However, one 
foresees this making matters even more complicated.  
  
                                                                
71 Regulation 1257/2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent 
protection OJ L 361 31.12.2012 1. 
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As stated above, the Unified Patent Court (UPC) was created under the process of 
enhanced cooperation. Its creation and the challenges faced by it may provide us with an 
insight into the difficulties of creating an EU Competition Court. 
 
Intellectual property falls within the shared competences.74Competition law does not. This 
is interesting given the interplay between patent protection and competition law. It seems 
very likely that strengthening the patent protection system might bring some new 
challenges to the application of competition law, particularly the prohibition to abuse a 
dominant position in Article 102 TFEU.75  
 
The Agreement on a Unified Patent Court was signed as an intergovernmental treaty in 
2013 by 25 States (all EU Member States except Spain, Poland and Croatia).76 Currently, 
there is no such thing as a single European patent and with the coming into force of the 
UPC this will remain the case as not all EU Member States are participating. Instead, 
inventors must maintain individual patents in each country in which they wish to do 
business. These patents must also be litigated separately in the national courts of each 
country. In addition, the ultimate outcome in each Member State may very well vary, 
further discouraging an investment in patent enforcement. Some national courts are more 
likely to provide fast results, while others move more slowly. The risk of conflicting 
decisions creates great legal uncertainty and decreases the value of EU patent rights. 
Additionally, the difference in enforcement outcomes increases the incidence of forum 
shopping77with patent owners more likely to litigate in states perceived as pro-
                                                                
74 Article 4(2)(a) TFEU. 
75 M. Malaga, The European patent with unitary effect: incentive to dominate? A look from the EU 
competition law viewpoint. (2014) 45(6) I.I.C. 621, 621. 
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patentee.78These challenges mirror those faced by cross-border collective redress in terms 
of national division, differences in enforcement outcome and lack of certainty. 
 
An empirical study carried out by Harhoff79provided an insight into the current and 
forecasted levels of litigation duplication in patent disputes in European 
countries.80Focussing on institutional matters, Harhoff calculated that having a UPC could 
save between 146 and 431 duplicated litigation proceedings (both infringements and 
invalidation) per year. This would amount to a total private saving of between €148 and 
€289 million.81The perspective of eliminating such duplication by the establishment of the 
UPC provided Harhoff with a basis to recommend82 that the Presidency of the European 
Council continued efforts in establishing such a court.83In future, there will be the choice 
of protecting your invention in up to 25 EU countries with a single unitary patent. One will 
be able to challenge and defend unitary patents in a single court action through the UPC. 
The goals of the UPC are to reduce costs, increase legal certainty, and reduce forum 
shopping in connection with patent litigation.84These developments have been said to take 
their lead from the example set by the US.85The UPC resembles the creation of the Court 
of Appeals by US Congress in the 1980s which has exclusive jurisdiction over all US 
                                                                
78 See generally C.J. Harnett and A. Wieker, The EU Unitary Patent Court and Unified Patent Court: 
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81 Ibid. 
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patent appeals. Regional disparity in patent law produced forum shopping in the US, as 
both patent owners and potential infringers raced to file suit in circuits believed to offer an 
advantage in litigation. The regional disparity in US patent law, and resultant forum 
shopping, made it difficult to counsel clients, as the value of a patent often depended on the 
ultimate location of an infringement suit (an unpredictable factor). The existence of the 
Federal Circuit in the US has eliminated forum shopping, at least at appellate level. While 
forum shopping does continue to exist at district level, consistent appeal decisions improve 
uniformity among the trial courts.  
 
The UPC, through its central Court of Appeals, is expected to develop a consistent body of 
case law, applying the substantive patent law of the EU. While there remain many courts 
of first instance, the channelling of all appeals to a single appeals court is believed to 
clarify the existing and future inconsistencies. In addition, the common training provided 
to all UPC judges, as well as the technical expertise available to the courts, should lead to 
more consistent decisions.    
 
The UPC will establish a completely new system for civil law proceedings. It will be the 
first supranational court on a European level that decides claims between private parties. 
Therefore, it will not only harmonise national procedural rules, but also completely 
different legal traditions.86 While there are obstacles to an EU Competition Court, the 
creation of the UPC suggests that a supranational court adjudicating private rights is 
possible.  
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Stakeholder criticism may stand in the way of an EU Competition Court. Stakeholder 
criticism has been prevalent with regards to the UPC. For example, the Max Planck 
Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law has published a list of reasons why 
the unitary patent and UPC pose a concern. A letter from the Institute has stated that: 
 
‘While a superficial glance may create the false impression of a patent law advancement 
through the proposal, it instead actually threatens to forestall the necessary legal progress 
and innovation capacities for the foreseeable future. The concerns of the Max-Planck 
Institute are shared by experts throughout Europe. Likewise, considerable parts of the 
industry harbour doubt as to the proposed system’s efficiency. Large undertakings might 
need to benefit from a reinforcement of their patent portfolios through the proposed 
system. Particularly small and medium-sized enterprises are however likely to experience 
significant obstacles to their innovation activities.’87 
 
One concern centres on the fragmentation of patent protection in the EU. Instead of 
consolidating patent law in Europe, the Unitary Patent Package would add to its 
fragmentation on both the territorial and substantive level. Territorial on the basis that the 
unitary patent would not cover the full territory of the Internal Market. It is restricted to the 
EU Member States participating in the enhanced cooperation. In addition, it will become 
operable only for those Member States which ratify the Unitary Patent Agreement.88  
Substantive fragmentation will also exist in the sense that the Unitary Patent Package 
would create four overlapping levels of patent protection in Europe: national patents 
granted nationally, national patents granted by the EPO (European patents) within the 
system of the Unitary Patent Agreement, national patents granted by the EPO, but without 
                                                                
87 R.M. Hilty, T. Jaeger, M. Lamping, H. Ullrich, The Unitary Patent Package: Twelve reasons for concern, 
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subjection to the Unitary Patent Agreement (due to transitional opt-out, non-ratification by 
Member States, or for non-EU States) and, European patents with unitary effect.89 There 
would be fragmentation if the decisions of an EU Competition Court did not apply to every 
Member State.  
 
The fragmentation on the level of the substantive law is mirrored by a large number of 
courts which would be competent to interpret and apply patent law in Europe under the 
new court system. Jurisdictional competences would lie with: The UPC in respect of 
infringements and validity of European and unitary patents for those Member States which 
have ratified the Unitary Patent Agreement, the CJEU in respect of preliminary references 
from the UPC regarding infringements of Unitary Patents, national courts of EU Member 
States not ratifying the Unitary Patent Agreement or not participating in the enhanced 
cooperation and those of all non-EU EPO Contracting States regarding infringements and 
validity of national and European patents, the EPO’s Boards of Appeal in administrative 
appeals for European patents and, national courts or administrative bodies in proceedings 
regarding nationally granted patents.90 
 
Under each of these jurisdictions, similar principles of patent law might be elaborated 
differently, and different layers of substantive rules applied. The Unitary Patent Agreement 
does not provide for any method of consolidation. The Agreement simply adds an 
additional enforcement layer alongside the pre-existing.91 A similar issue could arise if an 
EU Competition Court’s decisions did not apply to every Member State.  
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The Max Planck Institute was of the opinion that the UPC and the Unitary Patent Regime 
would likely impair the development of a homogenous body of patent law in Europe, fail 
to establish a fair balance in the rights and remedies available to patent holders and third 
parties respectively, and open the system to continued forum shopping by claimants.92An 
EU Competition Court which does not preside over the whole EU could face similar 
criticism.  
 
Aside from the concerns of the Max Planck Institute, one must also note that the Unitary 
Patent Regime faced tough opposition from EU Member States such as Spain and Italy.93 
An EU Competition Court may face similar opposition. By taking legal action, Spain and 
Italy used a broad range of arguments, such as that the Council did not have the 
competence to establish enhanced cooperation. The CJEU rejected these arguments.94Spain 
then sought the annulment of the two regulations forming part of the unitary patent 
protection and the regulation governing the applicable translation arrangements. The CJEU 
dismissed both of Spain’s actions.95  
 
The legitimacy of this patent system seems dubious, and instead of leading to the 
unification of protection and strengthening of the internal market, it will deepen already 
existing divisions.96 The areas of difficulty pertain to the degree of unification achieved in 
the substantive material laws, and the continuing fractured legal architecture and lack of 
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integration of the UPC and EU systems.97 The new legal structure is a complex and 
disjointed legal mosaic with only 25 out of 28 EU participating States conferring exclusive 
jurisdiction on a Court created by an international agreement whose decisions are not 
binding on the EPO. At a time when the EU's economic policies and its democratic 
legitimacy are under unprecedented pressure, the EU patent package looks much like the 
addition of epicycles to the cycles of times past, building up a fractured and uncertain legal 
structure on the back of an autonomous organization which is the leading engine for patent 
policy in Europe but is not itself subject to judicial or meaningful political scrutiny.98The 
UPC is not the best example to justify the creation of a Competition Court which entertains 
cases concerning horizontal private rights but it is the only one there is.  
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6.5 A World Competition Court  
 
The fourth option would be to create a World Competition Court of which the EU is a 
member. This would take us beyond the scope of the analysis as focus is specifically on the 
EU. However, this may be a consideration for the future especially given the trend towards 
globalised markets. This is forcing the world's largest corporations to engage in ever 
greater and further reaching transactions.99Eventually, one envisages a uniform code of 
international competition rules, and specifically, for our purpose, a uniform code of 
collective redress powers. This could lead to the creation of a World Competition to 
monitor the uniformity of international competition law. This could ensure the unification 
of law and prevent the problem of forum shopping, at least in extreme forms.  
 
However, as the debate over the European Commission's White Paper on Articles [101] 
and [102] [TFEU] has shown, a far-reaching reform of competition law is not easy to 
achieve, even in a legal community such as the European Union. This is the point which 
will make the creation of a World Competition Law difficult. It appears improbable that 
the various countries will agree in the foreseeable future to cede such a large portion of 
national sovereignty as would be required for World Competition Law and Court. Even if 
the example of the European Union shows us that it is not impossible for nation states to 
relinquish sovereignty in pursuit of a common goal, such an undertaking will be much 
more difficult on a global scale. Recalling past negotiations of the WTO makes it clear that 
such an ambitious project will not be accomplished in the near future.100 Note also the 
results of the UK Referendum on membership of the EU and the uncertainty over the UK’s 
future relationship with Europe. This thesis is written at a time when the ‘mood music’ of 
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international relations is dominated by the idea of national sovereignty and reflected in the 
conversation about ‘taking back control.’  
 
6.6 The preferred option for an EU Competition Court 
 
Each of the four options presented for the creation of an EU Competition Court come with 
their difficulties. A specialist tribunal under Article 257 TFEU is unlikely given the recent 
dissolution of the EU Civil Service Tribunal and the requirement for the increase of judges 
in the General Court in order to tackle an increasing workload. A specialist chamber within 
the General Court may also face a degree of hostility from the Members of the Court given 
their desire to maintain a varied case load and the common view that the General Court is 
very much a ‘Competition Court’ in its own right with specialist judges and existing 
flexible case management. One also has to remember that allocating cross-border 
collective actions to the General Court marks a significant shift in the way private 
enforcement of competition law is adjudicated in the EU. There is no private competition 
litigation at EU level. Private litigation is primarily a matter subject to the competence of 
the Member States, and thus, victims of EU competition law infringements must assert 
their claims before the national courts. 
  
Creating a new EU Competition Court may be a more viable concern. The main issue is 
whether there would be a desire amongst Member States to support such a forum. It has 
taken decades to arrive at an agreement establishing the UPC. The first attempt goes back 
to the 1970s and over the next few decades, the Member States repeatedly failed to reach 
an agreement. One must also remember that the UPC falls short of a Union-wide 
consensus. It was deemed to be last resort and created through the method of enhanced 
cooperation which means that some Member States will remain outside the jurisdiction of 
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the UPC and free to develop their own (potentially inconsistent) body of case law. 
Moreover, as it stands, competition law does not present itself as a possibility for enhanced 
cooperation as it is an exclusive competence.  
 
6.7 A challenging but worthwhile step 
 
Even though there are clear obstacles, the creation of an EU Competition Court comes with 
many advantages. Sir Peter Roth considers what may be said to qualify competition law for 
specialist treatment.101First, competition law involves a form of conceptual analysis that is 
very different from the main body of law. Whether an agreement is to be condemned as 
having an adverse effect on competition in the market is an approach far removed from the 
traditional legal view that agreements honestly undertaken should be kept, absent proof of 
breach or frustration.102Second, the fact that the theory of competition law rests on 
economic foundations means that the courts may have to make economic judgments, and 
thus digest sophisticated economic evidence of a kind with which most judges are 
unfamiliar.103There is no doubt that the reliance upon economic analysis in fashioning the 
competition rules has significantly increased over the past couple of decades. In Europe, 
this was highlighted by the adoption of the Commission’s guidelines on vertical restraints 
and on agreements for horizontal cooperation in 2000.104This has continued ever since. 
  
The intricate nature of competition law leads one to consider whether certain elements 
should be dealt with by a specialist court, namely cross-border collective cases. A 
                                                                
101 P. Roth, Specialised antitrust courts, in B. E. Hawk, International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham 
Competition Law, (Juris Publishing, (2013)), 100. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Commission Notice: Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ C 291 13.10.2000 1; Commission Notice: 
Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements, OJ C 3 
6.1.2001 2. Both these guidelines have since been superseded. 
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specialist court can bring a high level of knowledge and expertise.105Even if not held by the 
judges on appointment, they should acquire it over time by contrast with a judge for whom 
hearing a competition case (let alone a cross-border collective competition claim) would be 
very exceptional. Whether this results in better quality decision-making probably depends 
as much on the quality of individual judges. However, a specialist court should at least 
provide a safeguard against poor decisions. Moreover, it should lead to more efficient 
hearings. Specialist judges should be familiar with the specific case law, and more likely to 
have the confidence to make robust decisions. Private competition actions are notoriously 
complex. The experience in the UK, where antitrust cases have been heard by both the 
CAT and ordinary courts, is that ordinary courts are likely to take longer.106 
 
Specialism is a major reason cited in support for the creation of courts such as the UPC. It 
is well-argued that since patent cases often involve consideration of legal rules together 
with complex technical matters, a high level of expertise is often required.107The main 
arguments in favour of the UPC are quality and effectiveness.108In the absence of the UPC, 
a large number of national courts located in different jurisdictions would have the 
jurisdiction to hear patent cases. Some of the smaller courts rarely have the opportunity to 
consider patent issues and as such have developed little expertise in the field. This may 
affect the quality of judgments. Thus, it has been argued that a central court would limit the 
risk of bad decisions by a variety of ‘smaller’ courts. Moreover, as regards effectiveness, 
the establishment of a central court would eliminate the risk of parallel proceedings and 
forum shopping as a uniform body of substantive and procedural doctrine would exist.  
 
                                                                
105 P. Roth, Specialised antitrust courts (supra n.1), 105. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
108 See for example, C.S. Peterson and J. Schovsbo, On law and policy in a European and European Union 
Patent Court: What will it do to patent law and what patent law will do it? Available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1572521 (accessed 14.7.2016). 
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Frederica Baldan and Esther Van Zimmerman consider the need for judicial coherence in 
European patent cases.109 Coherence in patent cases has traditionally been pursued through 
several harmonising legislative measures, and most importantly, by national judges. 
Notwithstanding such efforts, the European patent system has been renowned for the risk 
of divergent decisions, high costs and ultimately ‘judicial incoherence.’110 For decades, the 
answer to this problem has been identified in the creation of a centralised specialised patent 
court. Centralisation and specialisation should lead to a coherent body of patent doctrine 
and high quality decisions in a legally and complex subject matter. The UPC in its current 
form is not altogether perfect in the sense that it does not include all EU Member States 
and may present many operational challenges including those discussed above. However, it 
marks the first time that private rights will be adjudicated by a supranational court. It is 
submitted that such a Competition Court with the scope to preside over cross-border 
collective redress cases is likely to encourage greater uniformity of case law. Identifying a 
central forum to hear cross-border competition claims may overcome the hurdles caused by 
the diversity of national legal systems. Where there is widespread cross-border harm, it is 
prudent to consolidate all claims of the same nature in one action to ensure equal and 
effective remedies. The current diversity allowed by a decentralised private enforcement 
regime and the lack of mandatory collective procedures act as a disincentive towards cross-
border collective actions. Without effective private enforcement procedures, infringing 
undertakings retain the spoils of their illegal conduct. 
  
A centralised mechanism already exists in the public enforcement of EU competition law. 
It is recognised that where a case has far-wide implications for EU competition law, the 
proper case-handler should be the Commission instead of the national competition 
                                                                
109 F. Baldan and E. Van Zimmeren, The future of the Unified Patent Court in safeguarding coherence in the 
European patent system, (2015) 52 C.M.L.R. 1529, 1529. 
110 Ibid. 
   
 
  242 
 
authorities. According to the Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of 
Competition Authorities,111the Commission is considered particularly well-placed to deal 
with a case if one or several agreement(s) or practice(s), including networks of similar 
agreements or practices, have effects on competition in more than three Member States 
(cross-border markets covering more than three Member States or several national 
markets).112 
  
Moreover, the Commission is particularly well-placed to deal with a case in several 
circumstances: if it is closely linked to other EU rules which may be exclusively or more 
effectively applied by the Commission, if the Community interest requires the adoption of 
a Commission decision to develop EU competition policy when a new competition issue 
arises, or to ensure effective enforcement.113On this basis, it may not be such a big step to 
justify a similar centralised mechanism in the private setting. The basic principle of the 
Notice on cooperation is to identify the public authority best placed to conduct the 
investigation, thereby taking into account the territory affected by the alleged infringement, 
the means of gathering evidence, the possibility to bring effectively to an end the entire 
infringement, or to sanction adequately the infringement, and, possibly the need to develop 
EU competition policy or to ensure effective and coherent enforcement.114The motivations 
for creating a Competition Court (at least from a collective redress standpoint) are largely 
the same.  
 
                                                                
111 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101 27.4.2004 
43. 
112 Ibid., para 14. 
113 Ibid., para 15. 
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6.8 Designing the EU Competition Court 
 
After having discussed how an EU Competition Court with powers of collective cross-
border redress could be created and why it is important, the following section shall 
consider the structure of such a forum. Factors such as the appointment of judges, 
jurisdiction and standing shall be examined. The format of the UPC and the European Civil 
Service Tribunal shall be drawn upon as examples.  
 
6.9 Jurisdiction 
 
In terms of the jurisdiction of a Competition Court, one could consider that the Council has 
adopted a regulation amending the Brussels 1 Recast Regulation with the aim of allowing 
the rules of the Brussels Regime to be applied by inter alia, the UPC.115 The Regulation 
clarifies that the UPC replaces national courts for certain disputes.116 It also clarifies that 
the lis pendens system shall operate with respect to proceedings brought in the UPC and in 
a court of a Member State which is not a party to the instrument establishing the UPC. It 
shall also apply during the transitional period referred to in Article 83 of the UPC 
Agreement to proceedings which are brought in the UPC and in a court of a Member State 
party to the UPC Agreement. A similar regulation could be created for the purposes of a 
Competition Court with powers of collective redress. The Regulation amending the 
Brussels 1 Recast Regulation does not come without its criticism117however it sets a 
precedent for a specialist court being recognised by the Brussels Regime. 
                                                                
115 Regulation 542/2014 amending Regulation 1215/2012 as regards the rules to be applied with respect to 
the Unified Patent Court and the Benelux Court of Justice, OJ L 163 29.5.2014 1.  
116 Ibid., Article 1 inserting Article 71(a) into Regulation 1215/2012. 
117 For a critique of the UPC and the new jurisdictional rules, see P. A. De Miguel Asensio, Regulation 
542/2014 and the international jurisdiction of the Unified Patent Court, (2014) 45(8) IIC 868; See also F.M. 
Buonaiuti, The Agreement establishing a Unified Patent Court and its impact on the Brussels I Regulation. 
The new rules introduced under Regulation 542/2014 in respect of the Unified Patent Court and the Benelux 
Court of Justice¸ Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional (2016) 8(1) 208. 
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6.10 Structure 
 
If an EU Competition Court was created as a tribunal attached to the General Court, one 
could look at the structure of the (now abolished) EU Civil Service Tribunal for guidance. 
The Tribunal was a court of first instance for disputes between the EU institutions and their 
members of staff. In accordance with Article 257 TFEU, appeals may be lodged at the 
General Court against decisions of the judicial panel on points of law only in the same 
conditions as those appeals lodged at the CJEU against decisions of the General 
Court.118Based on this model, an EU Competition Court could act as a court of first 
instance for competition cases involving cross-border end-consumer harm. All end-
consumer claims arising from the same anticompetitive conduct would be consolidated and 
heard by this centralised forum. An appeal to the General Court would be limited to points 
of law. It would lie on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction of the Tribunal, a breach of 
procedure before it which adversely affects the interests of the appellant as well as the 
infringement of Union law by the Tribunal.119No appeal would lie regarding the amount of 
costs or the party ordered to pay them.120 
  
Alternatively, if a new EU Competition Court was to be created as a forum separate from 
the General Court, one could consider the formation of the UPC as a potential framework 
upon which to model such a forum. Article 6 of the Agreement on A UPC states that the 
                                                                
1182004/752/EC, Council Decision establishing the European Union Civil Service Tribunal OJ L 333 
9.11.2004 7, Recital 8; An appeal may be brought before the General Court, within two months of 
notification of the decision appealed against, against final decisions of the Civil Service Tribunal and 
decisions of the Tribunal disposing of the substantive issues in part only or disposing of a procedural issue 
concerning a plea of lack of jurisdiction or inadmissibility, Article 9(1). 
119 Ibid., Article 11(1). 
120 Ibid., Article 11(2). 
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Court shall comprise of a Court of First Instance, a Court of Appeal and a Registry.121The 
Court of First Instance shall comprise a central division as well as local and regional 
divisions.122 Preliminary rulings of the CJEU shall be available by way of Article 267 
TFEU.  
 
At this juncture, one would wish to consider the categories of cases over which a new 
Competition Court separate from the General Court would preside. It is submitted that 
there are three options: 
1. To have all EU competition cases (both public and private) before the Competition 
Court; 
2. To have all private enforcement of EU competition law cases before the 
Competition Court; or 
3. To have solely cross-border collective cases before the Competition Court. 
 
The first option would be to have all competition cases, both public and private, heard by 
the new Competition Court. This would require a transfer of public enforcement cases 
from the General Court. This would also require either the transfer of existing judges from 
the General Court or the appointment of new judges. Both are problematic. Transferring 
judges will take judges away from the busy caseload of the General Court. Judges have just 
been transferred from the recently abolished Civil Service Tribunal and new judges are 
being appointed in stages. The General Court will most likely not wish to lose judges that 
they have just gained. Alternatively, the appointment of new judges will have cost 
                                                                
121 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court OJ C 175 20.6.2013 1, Article 6(1); The Court of Appeal shall have 
its seat in Luxembourg, Article 9(5); The Registry shall keep records of all cases before the Court, Article 
10(3). 
122 Ibid., Article 7(1); The central division shall have its seat in Paris, with sections in London and Munich, 
Article 7(2). 
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implications. It has already been mentioned that the appointment of new judges to the 
General Court received staunch criticism against the backdrop of the economic climate.  
 
A Competition Court presiding over all cases presents three other connected issues. First, it 
has been considered in this chapter that existing judges of the General Court would likely 
prefer a more varied workload than a portfolio exclusively confined to competition issues. 
Second, it has been mentioned in this chapter that members of the General Court already 
consider pubic competition cases to be managed effectively. On that basis, it may be more 
desirable to leave the status quo intact. Bert Lance’s phrase ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’ 
seems apt. Third, the removal of all competition cases from the General Court may 
unnecessarily isolate EU competition law from other areas of EU law and policy.   
 
Another option may be to restrict the caseload of the new Competition Court exclusively to 
matters of private enforcement. This would include all competition cases of a private 
nature. The major issue is that it goes against the EU’s policy of decentralisation and the 
role of the national courts in private damages actions. One way to resolve this may be to 
design the Competition Court in a way that resembles the structure of the UPC. The court 
of first instance has a central division as well as regional and local divisions. The national 
courts could act as local and regional divisions of the Competition Court which feed into a 
central division. This may assuage the Member States, leaving their role in private 
enforcement intact, whilst the central division would ensure coherent decision making and 
a consistent body of law. Having said that, there remain concerns that more than one court 
dealing with cross-border collective redress issues at local and regional levels may still 
encounter some form of diversity and fragmentation. One way to resolve this may be to 
ensure that all cases involving cross-border collective redress are exclusively dealt with by 
the central division whilst other matters of private enforcement are allocated at first 
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instance by the national courts. Particularly contentious cases at national level could then 
be referred to the central division.   
 
The final option would be to create a Competition Court which deals solely with cross-
border collective cases. With regards to the final option, one questions whether there 
would be enough cases to justify the operation of a full time court (at least within the 
formative years). Regarding this option, there are a number of international tribunals that 
do have part-time judges so having a part-time court would not be such an extraordinary 
thing to proposes should this option prevail.123 To ensure consistency and the consolidation 
of cross-border collective claims, it is submitted that under the third option, only a central 
division would be required in the EU Competition Court of first instance. Unless there was 
a substantial influx of collective cases and it could be shown that there were marked 
benefits of having local and/or regional divisions, it is submitted that only a central 
division would be needed.  
 
It is submitted that the second option is most desirable. It is argued that presiding over all 
private matters (individual claims (i.e. between one specific claimant and one specific 
defendant) and collective claims) would ensure that private enforcement is dealt with in a 
coherent fashion.  
 
As with the UPC, a new Competition Court could request preliminary rulings before the 
CJEU by way of Article 267 TFEU. The reference to the CJEU from both the General 
                                                                
123 G. Sacerdoti, The dispute settlement system of the WTO: Structure and function in the perspective of the 
first 10 years, in A. Del Veccio, New international tribunals and new international proceedings, (Giuffrè 
Editore, (2006)), 168; G. Sacerdoti, The dispute settlement system of the WTO in action: A perspective on the 
first 10 years, in G. Sacerdoti, A. Yanovich, J. Bohanes, The WTO at ten: The contribution of the dispute 
settlement system, (Cambridge University Press, (2006)), 43; W. Schabas, An introduction to the 
International Criminal Court, (Cambridge University Press, (2007)), 350; A. Zimmerman, K. Oellers-Frahm, 
C. Tomuschat, C.J. Tams, The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary, (OUP, (2012)), 
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Court (dealing with public cases) and the new Competition Court (dealing with private 
cases) would provide a central point at which to ensure a consistent and coherent EU 
competition law enforcement policy.  
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6.11 Appointment of judges and their organisation 
 
The appointment of judges to an EU Competition Court could resemble the process 
adopted by the EU Civil Service Tribunal. During the establishment of the Tribunal, the 
Member States were prepared to adopt a radically different system of judicial appointments 
based on open applications, expert assessment on the basis of technical merit, and Council 
appointments based on enumerated criteria. For the first time, the judicial architecture 
introduced a direct applications system. Any person who is a Union citizen, whose 
independence is beyond doubt and who possesses the ability required for appointment to 
judicial office124 may submit an application for the post of judge.125This was an open and 
subjective test: any person who feels that he fulfils the relevant criteria is able to apply. 
The Council was in charge of determining the conditions and arrangements for processing 
such applications. Then a Selection Committee would be consulted by the Council to give 
an opinion on the candidates’ suitability to perform the duties of judge at the Tribunal. This 
committee would comprise seven individuals from among former members of the CJEU 
and General Court and lawyers of recognised competence. The Committee would append 
to its opinion a list of candidates having the most suitable high-level experience. Such a list 
would contain the names of at least twice as many candidates as there were judges to be 
appointed by the Council.126 When appointing judges, the Council was to ensure a 
balanced composition of the Tribunal on as broad a geographical basis as possible from 
among nationals of the Member States and with respect to the national legal systems 
represented.127 
   
                                                                
124 Article 257(4) TEU.  
125 2005/150/EC, Council Decision concerning the conditions and arrangements governing the submission 
and processing of applications for appointment as a judge of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal OJ L 
50 23.2.2005 7, Annex para 5. 
126 Ibid., para 2. 
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This method was attractive for several reasons. First it was clear that it was in the Council 
that the political and geographical balance would be ensured between different Member 
States and different legal systems. Second, the alternative, rotating the rights to present 
candidates among Member States would have meant that some Member States would have 
to wait up to 21 years for their turn to nominate a judge. The system would not necessarily 
ensure the highest level of technical expertise in appointees unless the Selection 
Committee took the politically bold stance of declaring that the candidate put forward by a 
Member State did not fulfil the criteria for appointment.128 A similar model could be used 
in order to make sure that representation in the EU Competition Court is as politically and 
geographically balanced as possible.  
 
With regards to the UPC, Article 15 of the Agreement considers the eligibility criteria for 
the appointment of judges. The Court shall comprise both legally qualified judges and 
technically qualified judges.129Legally qualified judges shall possess the qualifications 
required for appointment to judicial offices in a Contracting Member State.130Technically 
qualified judges shall have a university degree and proven expertise in a field of 
technology. They shall also have proven knowledge of civil law and procedure relevant in 
patent litigation. Judges shall have a good command of at least one language of the 
European Patent Office.131 
 
In terms of the appointment procedure, it shall be the responsibility of the Advisory 
Committee to establish a list of the most suitable candidates to be appointed as judges of 
the Court.132The Committee shall appoint as many judges as are needed for the proper 
                                                                
128 H. Cameron (supra n.3), 281.  
129 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (supra n.121), Article 15(1).  
130 Ibid., Article 15(2). 
131 Ibid., Annex 1 Statute of the Unified Patent Court, Article 2(2). 
132 Ibid., Annex 1 Article 16(1). 
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functioning of the Court.133 Judges shall be appointed for a term of six years.134 Legally 
qualified judges, as well as technically qualified judges who are full-time judges of the 
Court, may not engage in any other occupation unless an exception is granted by the 
Administrative Committee.135The exercise of the office of technically qualified judges who 
are part-time judges of the Court shall not exclude the exercise of other functions provided 
there is no conflict of interest.136 
 
The UPC shall consist of a Pool of Judges which shall be composed of all legally qualified 
judges and technically qualified judges from the Court of First Instance who are full-time 
or part-time judges of the Court. The Pool of Judges shall include at least one technically 
qualified judge per field of technology with the relevant qualifications and experience. The 
technically qualified judges from the Pool of Judges shall also be available to the Court of 
Appeal.137 
 
Article 19(1) promotes a training framework for judges in order to improve and increase 
available patent litigation expertise and to ensure a broad geographic distribution of such 
knowledge and expertise. This training framework shall be continuous.138 This shall be 
financed by the budget of the Court.139 
 
With regards to the number of judges, Recital 6 to the Preamble of the Council Decision 
establishing the EU Civil Service Tribunal states that the number of judges of the judicial 
panel should match its caseload.  However, Article 2 to Annex I states that the Tribunal 
                                                                
133 Ibid., Annex 1, Article 3. 
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135 Ibid., Article 17(2). 
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137 Ibid., Article 18(2). 
138 Ibid., Article 19(3). 
139 Ibid., Article 38. 
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would consist of seven judges. Should the CJEU so request, the Council may increase the 
number of judges. The judges would be appointed for a period of six years and retiring 
judges may be appointed.140The Tribunal was organised to sit in chambers of three. In 
certain circumstances, determined by its rules of procedure, it could sit in full court or in a 
chamber of five judges or of a single judge.141A President of the Tribunal would be elected 
by the judges for a term of three years. There was a possibility to re-elect.142A similar 
appointment and organisation of judges could be adopted by an EU Competition Court 
integrated within the General Court.  
 
With regards to the UPC, Article 8(1) of the Agreement on a UPC states that any panel of 
the Court of First Instance shall have a multinational composition. It shall sit in a 
composition of three judges. Under Article 9, any panel of the Court of Appeal shall sit in 
a multinational composition of five judges. It shall sit in a composition of three legally 
qualified judges who are nationals of different Contracting Member States and two 
technically qualified judges with qualifications and experience in the field of technology 
concerned. Those technically qualified judges shall be assigned to the panel by the 
President of the Court of Appeal from the pool of judges in accordance with Article 18.  
 
In both the UPC and the EU Civil Service Tribunal, there are strong key themes. These are 
largely based on ensuring a political and geographical balance and that the best candidates 
are selected to perform the role. Depending on which model is adopted, an EU 
Competition Court could follow the processes for appointing judges outlined above.    
 
  
                                                                
140 2004/752/ EC, Council Decision establishing the European Union Civil Service Tribunal, OJ L 333 
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6.12 Designing a Competition Court appropriate for the EU 
 
In designing a Competition Court with powers to adjudicate cross-border collective claims, 
EU Member States may request safeguards against the kind of US-style litigation which 
has a reputation for being vexatious and abusive in some circumstances. However, one 
cannot ignore the prominence of private enforcement in the US when measured against the 
paucity of claims in the EU. Perhaps one could learn (albeit cautiously) from the 
experience across the Atlantic. Slowly, the EU could import ideas such as punitive 
damages in order to encourage collective cases. A centralised forum could monitor this in a 
controlled environment. A single forum would ensure consistency in interpretation and a 
coherent body of law. There would be no opportunity for forum shopping given that only 
one forum in the EU would have full jurisdiction, and expert judges could develop their 
own methods of striking down claims which are abusive and have little merit.  
 
Last decade, Beisner and Borden argued that Europe stood at the same policy crossroads 
where America stood forty years ago.143 They commented that: 
 
‘Much like European policy-makers today, the American policy-makers of that era were 
motivated by the best of intentions – they wished to create a more efficient legal system 
that would make it easier for individuals with meritorious claims to have their day in court. 
But in their zeal to expand opportunities for private individual and group litigation, these 
policy-makers failed to see how their procedural reforms were opening the door to 
widespread litigation abuse. Plaintiffs’ attorneys quickly realised that they could use 
newly-enacted procedural devices, such as the modern American class action device, to 
                                                                
143 J. H. Beisner and C. E. Borden, On the road to litigation abuse: The continuing exportation of US class 
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exert substantial settlement pressure against defendants independent of the merits of their 
case. As a result, within a short time, America descended into a litigation morass from 
which it has only recently begun to extricate itself. Our concern is that European policy 
makers would make the same mistake.’144 
 
Despite these concerns, it is argued that the image of oppressive litigation in the US is 
sometimes overplayed. There are safeguards in place to counter oppressive and vexatious 
litigation and a central forum in the EU could build on these to ensure the legitimacy of 
cases.  
 
Antitrust law in the US plays a special role in the US legal system. As the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly stressed, every antitrust violation strikes at the very heart of the US 
economy—the free enterprise system.145Unlike most types of commercial wrongdoing, an 
antitrust violation has consequences that extend well beyond the party bringing the lawsuit. 
It can adversely impact on entire industries with wide-scale consumer consequences.146For 
these reasons, the antitrust laws are treated with special concern in the US and their active 
enforcement is highly encouraged. The US recognised that the government would not have 
the resources to handle this task alone to an effective extent. Therefore, it enlisted the 
support of the public to serve as ‘private attorneys general’ to assist in the 
enforcement.147Congress encouraged these actions through a package of treble damages, 
attorneys’ fees and costs awarded to successful claimants. In light of these incentives, 
private actions have become an integral part of US antitrust enforcement. The number of 
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private actions for any given year eclipses the number of government actions, in some 
years by as much as a factor of 20.148 
 
There are clear benefits to the US regime. An obvious factor is that it provides a much 
needed supplement to the significant resource constraints of the government. Governments 
can only devote so much of their budget to antitrust enforcement. It is also likely that they 
will resist launching difficult cases. Governments would usually choose to allocate their 
limited budgets to cases which are clearly winnable.149 Private actions also provide 
antitrust victims with a vehicle for obtaining compensation for their harm, and serve as an 
additional level of deterrence by exposing violators to significantly increased monetary 
risk.150 
 
EU hostility lies mostly with the image of the self-serving lawyer who brings cases with 
questionable intentions, with no meaningful goal other than to make money by 
‘blackmailing’ defendants with the threat of large damages awards. Neelie Kroes has 
remarked: ‘how can we foster a competition culture, not a litigation culture.’151 
 
However, the reality is that class action abuse in the US is largely driven by non-antitrust 
cases. Securities actions and business tort cases have traditionally been more susceptible to 
this kind of abuse. Defendants generally will not even consider an antitrust class action 
until they have fully explored the three opportunities they have to strike down the case: a 
motion to dismiss, an opposition to class certification, and a motion to summary judgment. 
These are three distinct hurdles antitrust class claimants must overcome before defendants 
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concern themselves over the potential for treble damages. In the antitrust context, it is 
extremely difficult for a frivolous case to overcome these hurdles. With the Supreme 
Court’s whittling away of per se antitrust liability, its introduction of a heightened pleading 
requirement for antitrust conspiracy cases, and its revitalised aversion to condemning 
conduct within regulated industries, these hurdles become considerably higher.152This is 
particularly true in light of the increased rigour with which more and more courts are 
evaluating the propriety of class certification.153 
 
Serving as a further bulwark against a self-serving lawyer, the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005,154for example, has made it significantly more difficult to bring class actions in state 
courts which is the traditional hotbed of abusive cases and illicit attorney recoveries. The 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act155similarly hampers class action malfeasance 
by barring from US courts most kinds of foreign purchaser actions.156Finally, there is the 
r.11 sanction against parties and their counsel for bringing frivolous cases.157While not 
often used, r.11 offers what could be an extremely potent safeguard against the lawyer with 
ulterior motives.  
 
The point to make is that while many Member States fear US-style collective redress, it is 
possible to put safeguards in place to strike down cases which have no or little merit. An 
EU Competition Court with safeguards could provide that controlled environment within 
which to prevent claims being launched with ulterior motives. One needs to move past this 
predetermination that the US-model is beyond reproach and recognise the vital role that 
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Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007); Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007). 
153 G. Schnell (supra n.145), 618.  
154 Pub. L. No.109-2 (2005). 
155 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982). 
156 See F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd v Empagran SA, 542 US 155 (2004); Empagran II, 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005); Inquivosa v Ajinomoto Co, 477 F.3d 535 (8th Cir. 2007). 
157 28 U.S.C. §11(c). 
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collective redress could play in the private enforcement of EU competition law. In the US, 
collective redress has actually been successful in remedying serious deficiencies and 
bringing about wide-scale consumer relief. One case, for example, is the action brought on 
behalf of five million merchants against Visa and MasterCard, challenging their 
exclusionary conduct in the debit market. Over the six-year life of the case, the claimants 
spent around $18 million in costs and 250,000 hours of attorney time. The results were 
staggering with $3.4 billion in monetary damages and tens of billions of dollars more in 
reduced pricing. In the words of the District Court, the case resulted in ‘significant and 
lasting benefits for America’s merchants and consumers.’158 Yet, not many are willing to 
include these important class action triumphs as part of the debate. They are either brushed 
aside as aberrations, or ignored altogether. This does not permit a fair assessment of the US 
system. Nor does it provide a reliable direction to those in Europe looking to learn from the 
American experience. 
 
One way to assuage those who fear US-style class actions may be to consider who has the 
standing to bring an action before the Competition Court. Instead of allowing anyone to 
bring an action before the Court, it is submitted that only named and pre-approved 
representative entities may have standing. This could include entities such as Which?, the 
largest consumer body in the UK which is completely independent with no owners, 
shareholders or Government departments influencing its decision making.159 
 
The Consumer Rights Act 2015160 in the UK implemented a number of a number of 
sweeping reforms of the private competition litigation regime.161 Sections 47B and 47C of 
                                                                
158 Re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp.2d 503, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
159 Which? Available at http://www.which.co.uk/about-which/who-we-are/overview/ (accessed 14.7.2016). 
160 C.15 Consumer Rights Act 2015. 
161 B. McGrath and T. Reddy, The Consumer Rights Act: full steam ahead for collective proceedings? (2016) 
9(1) G.C.L.R. 15, 15. 
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the Competition Act 1998162 (implemented by the Consumer Rights Act 2015) create a 
new ‘collective proceedings regime’ under which claims may be brought on behalf of a 
collective by nominated representatives, either on an opt-in or opt-out basis. A similar rule 
could be adopted for the jurisdiction of the EU Competition Court. In France, it is largely 
consumer associations that have a monopoly for legal standing with regards to collective 
redress mechanisms.163 Moreover, in Spain, in order to avoid abusive claims on behalf of 
user groups, only those affected by the infringement will be allowed to file a claim (e.g. a 
consumer group for food products would not be allowed to file a claim against a prohibited 
practice in the automotive sector).164 
 
Under the Consumer Rights Act, the identity of the class representative is of central 
importance to the new regime. It is self-evident that there will be no collective proceedings 
unless representatives come forward to bring claims on behalf of classes of persons who 
are alleged to have suffered as a result of a competition infringement. For this to happen, 
the representative must also be significantly incentivised to bring the claim. As with any 
complex litigation, bringing a competition claim is typically expensive, time-consuming 
and a risky undertaking. The new ‘Guide to Proceedings’ warns sternly that being a class 
representative ‘involves significant and serious obligations and is not a responsibility to be 
taken on lightly.’165A putative representative will take on such a heavy responsibility when 
the benefits are correspondingly large. Conversely, if incentives are slanted too far in 
favour of claimant representatives, there is the risk that this will lead to excessive and 
                                                                
162 C.41 Competition Act 1998. 
163 D. Fairgrieve and A. Baird, France, http://www.collectiveredress.org/collective-
redress/reports/france/overview (accessed 14.07.2016). 
164 S. Turnbull, L. Freeman, E. Whiteford, T. Siebert, Mark Levy and R. Croce, Legislating to incentivise 
competition class actions: recent EU developments,  
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1ba5d77b-f83b-4ea3-8409-592e88abe28c (accessed 
14.7.2016). 
165 Competition Appeal Tribunal, Guide to Proceedings, 2015, para. 6.29, available at 
http://www.catribunal.org.uk/files/Guide%20to%20Proceedings%20-%202015.pdf (accessed 14.7.2016). 
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overly-burdensome levels of litigation, to the ultimate detriment of law-abiding as well as 
infringing businesses. 
  
In recognition of this, the UK government included a number of safeguards in the new 
regime. In particular, collective proceedings will be subject to normal cost-shifting 
principles, under which the loser generally pays the winner’s costs, albeit with the 
important caveat that the direct costs risk will be met by the class representative, rather 
than by individual class members.166In addition, the CAT is prevented by statute from 
awarding exemplary damages in collective proceedings167and damages-based agreements 
(under which the fees payable to the claimant’s legal representative are determined as a 
percentage of the damages awarded) are expressly prohibited for opt-out collective 
proceedings.168 
 
Under the new rules, the CAT has wide discretion to approve a person as a representative 
for collective proceedings, with the only statutory requirement being that it must consider 
that it is ‘just and reasonable’ for it to do so.169The 2015 Rules state that, in reaching this 
decision, the CAT must be satisfied that the person concerned: would fairly and adequately 
act in the interests of the collective members; does not have a material conflict of interest 
with collective members; is the most sensible representative (if there is more than one 
applicant); and would be able to pay the defendant’s recoverable costs, if ordered to do so, 
or satisfy any undertakings as to damages in the event of an interim injunction being 
sought.170 
 
                                                                
166 The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (SI 2015 No.1648), Rule 98. 
167 Competition Act 1998 section 47C(1). 
168 Ibid., section 47C(8). 
169 The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 Rule 78(1), applying Competition Act 1998 section 
47B(8)(b). 
170 The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules Rule 78(2). 
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In determining whether the representative would act ‘fairly and adequately,’ the CAT will 
take into account whether it is a member of the collective, the nature of the body generally 
and whether it has a satisfactory plan for the proceedings, including any estimate and 
details of costs and fees.’171 
 
The government’s consultation on the draft 2015 Rules172indicated that, in order to address 
concerns that overly-aggressive claimant lawyers would trigger a flood of litigation, it was 
minded to introduce a presumption that organisations that offer legal services, special 
purpose vehicles and third party funders should not be able to act as representatives. This 
position was softened somewhat in the government’s subsequent policy document,173in 
which it was noted that a presumption against these potential representatives would be too 
prohibitive and could, for instance, prevent a special purpose vehicle that had been 
established in a genuine manner to represent the class from being able to bring a case. 
 
The new Guide to Procedures reflects this more open approach, stating that ‘there is no 
blanket prohibition against certain types of organisation taking on the role of class 
representative. It nevertheless goes on to adopt a cautious outlook, noting that the potential 
for: 
 
‘Conflict between the interests of a law firm or third party funder and the interests of the 
class member may mean that such a body is unsuitable to act as a class representative.’174 
                                                                
171 Ibid., Rule 78(3). 
172 Department for Business Innovation & Skills, Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) Rules of Procedure: 
review by the Rt. Honourable Sir John Mummery - Consultation, (2015), section 7, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/401678/bis-15-75-
competiiton-appeal-tribunal-cat-rules-of-procedure-consultation.pdf (accessed 14.7.2016). 
173 Department for Business Innovation & Skills, Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) Rules of Procedure: 
Government response, 2015, section 3, accessed 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/460442/BIS-15-357-
competition-appeal-tribunal-rules-of-procedure-government-response.pdf (accessed 14.7.2016). 
174 Competition Appeal Tribunal, Guide to Proceedings, para.6.30. 
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Where the CAT will draw the line remains to be seen, though no doubt claimant law firms 
and third party funders will be very keen to demonstrate why any such concerns of 
interests are misguided in a particular case.175 
 
It is submitted that in order to make cross-border collective redress a success in the EU, 
there have to be incentives. Incentives drive class actions in the US. On the other hand, 
collective redress has to be protected from abuse. Regardless of whether the US’ reputation 
for harbouring vexatious claims is well-justified, it is clear that collective redress is far 
more advanced than the EU and returns much more compensation from the pockets of 
wrongdoers.  
 
An EU Competition Court could experiment with the further-reaching elements of US-
style collective redress in a controlled environment. One court would mean a single set of 
substantive and procedural rules. It would eliminate the risks of irreconcilable judgments 
and forum shopping which come with a decentralised model. Moreover, in order to prevent 
the self-serving lawyer from accessing the court, only representative entities which can 
demonstrate that they represent a legitimate consumer interest should be allowed standing.  
 
  
                                                                
175 B. McGrath and T. Reddy (supra n.160), 20.  
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6.13 Concluding remarks on the need for a Competition Court  
 
Creating an EU Competition Court poses many difficulties. However, it has been argued 
that cross-border collective redress requires a centralised forum in order to grow and 
develop a body of law and overcome the problems caused by the diversity of national 
systems. Failure to create an effective cross-border collective mechanism means that 
undertakings are not held to account. This means that they retain the profit from their 
wrongdoing. In the Report on making antitrust actions more effective in the EU: welfare 
impact and potential scenarios176it was estimated that if private antitrust actions did not 
become more effective in the years to come, foregone benefits of antitrust infringement 
would range between €5.7 billion and €23.3 billion.177 It was expected that overall, more 
effective enforcement of competition law in Europe (with public and private enforcement) 
could bring about yearly social benefits as high as 1% of GDP, or €113 billion alone in 
2006.178The contribution of private enforcement to this impact was expected to be 
substantial.179The EU Competition Court may be a radical solution but a radical solution is 
required.  
  
 
  
 
 
  
                                                                
176 A Renda, J. Peysner, A.J. Riley, B.J. Rodger, R.J. Van Den Bergh, S. Keske, R. Pardolesi, E.L. Camilli, P. 
Caprile, Report for the European Commission, DG COMP/2006/A3/012, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf (accessed 
14.7.2016). 
177 Ibid., 11. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Research questions 
 
This thesis set out to examine the relationship between the private enforcement of EU 
competition law and forum shopping with a particular focus on cross-border end-consumer 
collective redress. 
 
This is an important topic because mass harm situations will often have a cross-border 
element. Goods and services of all types are distributed throughout the Member States of 
the EU. Breach of EU competition rules may therefore entitle end-consumers domiciled in 
different Member States to claim compensation from the infringing undertaking(s). Cross-
border collective redress offers claimants the opportunity to consolidate all claims 
stemming from that conduct. However, cross-border cases have the potential to raise 
complex issues of private international law. If all claims are not pooled together then this 
opens up the risk of parallel proceedings, irreconcilable judgements and unequal treatment 
of end-consumers.   
 
There is no coherent framework for cross-border collective redress in the EU. Instead, 
there are significant differences in the approaches of Member States towards collective 
redress. The Commission Recommendation on collective redress was the latest attempt to 
level the playing field. However, the ‘soft’ approach adopted by the Recommendation does 
not generate an obligation for the Member States to align their procedures to tackle cross-
border inequality in mass harm situations. It simply invites Member States to establish 
minimum standards.   
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Against this background, the motivation for this thesis stemmed from the idea that in the 
absence of uniformity, litigants may have an incentive to bring their case to a court that is 
considered to be the most convenient for their action, i.e. where they will be most likely to 
obtain a favourable judgment. This in turn can provide Member States with incentives to 
amend their laws to attract collective proceedings and create competition between national 
judicial systems.  
 
However, as the research developed, other fundamental issues came to the fore. For 
example, there are concerns regarding the scarcity of claims and the lack of motivation for 
end-consumers to seek a remedy, particularly if they have to seek redress outside of their 
own legal regime. While the loss suffered by an individual end-consumer following a 
breach of EU competition law may be de minimis, the aggregate harm can amount to a 
significant sum. In the absence of effective private enforcement, infringing undertakings 
will retain the profit from their conduct.1  
 
With these concerns in mind, two research questions were identified. First, the extent to 
which the conflicts-of-laws encourage forum shopping in the context of cross-border end-
consumer collective redress. Second, the identification of the appropriate forum for this 
type of case and the procedural measures required to be adopted in order to facilitate equal 
and effective access to justice for victims of EU competition law violations. 
 
  
                                                                
1 For background, see Chapter 1. 
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7.2 Developing the research questions 
 
When researching the extent to which the conflicts-of-laws encourage forum shopping 
within the context of cross-border end-consumer redress, this thesis assessed the rules on 
jurisdiction and the applicable law together with the various options which these presented 
to the litigant.2  
 
The research then turned to where, under the current conflict-of-laws regime, should be the 
most appropriate forum to bring a cross-border collective case. Member State cooperation 
in order to facilitate the proper forum was also considered.3   
 
This thesis also looked at whether the most suitable forum for cross-border end-consumer 
collective cases may exist outside of the traditional court setting. This was considered in 
response to the advent of alternative dispute resolution practices. More specifically, 
collective arbitration was considered. The experience of class arbitration in the US was 
drawn upon in order to evaluate whether such an approach would be suitable in a European 
setting.4  
 
Moreover, as this thesis developed, it was important to incorporate an examination of the 
attitudes of the primary stakeholders and beneficiaries of collective redress: i.e. end-
consumers. Their expectations should be taken into account in order to refine collective 
redress and develop it as a more responsive and tailored enforcement tool.5  
 
                                                                
2 See Chapter 2. 
3 Ibid. 
4 See Chapter 3. 
5 See Chapter 4. 
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Flexibility was also considered as a factor which may influence the success of cross-border 
collective redress. The two pillars of competition enforcement have very distinct roles. The 
public element focusses on deterrence while the private role is in place to compensate. 
However, it was questioned whether, in the face of the paucity of cross-border end-
consumer claims, the separation of these roles is excessively rigid. Therefore, this thesis 
analysed whether it would be appropriate for modes of public enforcement to be 
interlinked with the private sphere in order to facilitate the redress of victims.6   
 
Finally, in the light of a heterogeneous landscape of cross-border collective redress, it was 
considered whether the decentralised model of private enforcement is the most appropriate. 
An alternative could be to have all cross-border end-consumer damages claims following a 
breach of EU competition law heard in a centralised supranational EU Competition Court.7 
 
7.3 The extent to which the conflicts-of-laws encourage forum shopping 
 
From the jurisdictional perspective, it was considered that the Brussels 1 Recast Regulation 
(the instrument used to allocate jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters) can present 
the litigant with the opportunity to choose between more than one forum.8 
 
There are several Articles of the Regulation which appear to be relevant. First, Article 4 
underlines the general rule and allocates jurisdiction to the courts of the defendant’s 
domicile.9 For a claimant, this Article in itself has the potential to encourage forum 
shopping. The definition of the ‘domicile’ of companies or other legal persons in the 
Regulation may prove in a collective redress setting to favour a claimant. Article 63(1) 
                                                                
6 See Chapter 5.  
7 See Chapter 6. 
8 See Chapter 2, sections 2.0 – 2.5. 
9 Ibid., Section 2.2. 
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provides that the domicile of legal persons is linked to the statutory seat, central 
administration, or principal place of business. These criteria do not follow any hierarchical 
order and leave the claimant free to choose upon which to found jurisdiction. From a forum 
shopping perspective, claimants may potentially launch a collective suit in a certain 
Member State for the simple reason that the company has a registered office there. This 
raises questions of appropriateness when the selected forum is only tenuously linked to the 
dispute while the major focus of the case rests elsewhere.10  Alternatively, an undertaking 
seeking to engage in anticompetitive conduct could establish a domicile in a Member State 
which has a limited or no collective regime. Consumers would face having to litigate on an 
individual basis. The obligation to pursue an action on an individual basis acts as a 
significant barrier to end-consumer redress. In sum, Article 4 presents tactical 
opportunities for both parties to the dispute.  
 
Second, Article 8 provides that jurisdiction over one defendant on the basis of their 
domicile may be extended to other defendants on the justification of procedural efficiency. 
According to Article 8(1), several co-defendants can be sued at the domicile of one co-
defendant (‘the anchor defendant’). It presupposes a close connection between the causes 
of action. Hence, if several undertakings with headquarters in different Member States are 
sued for the same cause of action, the claimant may freely select among the courts of 
different Member States. The claims brought by the same claimant against different 
defendants must be so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them 
together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings. 
This permits a centralisation of collective litigation by bundling parallel lawsuits against 
several defendants domiciled in different EU Member States. Accordingly, this head of 
                                                                
10 Ibid., section 2.2, page 43. 
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jurisdiction potentially opens up a gate way for forum shopping in different EU Member 
States.11  
 
Third, under Article 7(2) a case may be heard before the courts of the place where the 
harmful event occurred or may occur.12 The place where the harmful event occurred or 
may occur is to be understood as twofold: it will either be at the place where the harmful 
event giving rise to the damage occurred (place of acting) or the place where the actual 
damage occurred (the place where the harm was felt). The choice between these two places 
is left to the claimant. To place reliance exclusively on the place of acting could make 
Article 7(2) lose most of its effectiveness since ordinarily a person would act where they 
have their domicile and thus Article 4 would come in to play to the detriment of Article 
7(2). This so-called principle of ubiquity avoids choosing between the alleged tortfeasor’s 
activity and its results by attributing the same weight to both, and thereby favours the 
claimant, the alleged victim.13  
 
The principle of ubiquity is restricted. At the place where the damage was sustained, a 
claim can only be brought for the damage sustained in the forum state, and not for world-
wide damage. The advantage of having a forum actoris is combined with a limitation. This 
should be seen as an obstacle to forum shopping. To favour the claimant overly would 
constitute a windfall profit for the claimant and would deny, or at least neglect, the 
defendant’s legitimate interests.14 
 
Fourth, a defendant may be sued in another Member State as regards a dispute arising out 
of a branch, agency or other establishment, in the courts for the place where the branch, 
                                                                
11 Ibid., section 2.4. 
12 Ibid., section 2.3. 
13 Ibid., page 45. 
14 Ibid. 
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agency or other establishment is situated. While this comes with certain restrictions, it 
opens up the potential for the claimant to choose an alternative forum.15   
 
The current jurisdictional provisions create the possibility to choose between a wide range 
of fora. Cases such as Cooper Tire16 provide a practical example of how an infringement of 
the EU competition rules may provide choice to a putative claimant. In this case there was 
the potential choice to sue, inter alia in the courts of Milan, Vienna, Amsterdam, Brussels, 
Richmond-on-Thames, Frankfurt and Prague.17   
 
The inability to tie a collective redress case to a single forum, especially given the ongoing 
proliferation of divergent national regimes for dealing with such claims in EU Member 
States, has the potential to entail parallel proceedings. Parallel proceedings in a collective 
case not only go against the very notion of consolidating such claims but might also foster 
forum shopping to such an extent as Member States make themselves more or less 
attractive to foreign collective claimants. For example, cases such as Deutsche Bahn gives 
more options to try to establish jurisdiction in the UK, in turn allowing them to take 
advantage of the perceived ‘claimant-friendly’ nature of the English judicial system.18 The 
importance of the law of the forum could be further strengthened by making reference to 
Article 6(3)(b) of the Rome II Regulation, which allows private antitrust claimants to base 
their claim on the lex fori where the market is, or is likely to be, affected in more than one 
country provided that the market in that Member State is amongst those directly and 
substantially affected by the anticompetitive conduct.19  
  
                                                                
15 Chapter 2, section 2.5. 
16 Cooper Tire [2010] EWCA Civ 846. 
17 Chapter 2, section 2.3. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Chapter 2, section 2.9. 
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7.4 The appropriate forum for cross-border end-consumer cases and the procedural 
measures required to be adopted in order to facilitate effective and equal access to 
justice for victims 
 
Where there is an opportunity to sue in alternative fora, the research turned to assess the 
most appropriate forum for cross-border end-consumer cases. An analysis of the 
jurisdictional rules considered that the domicile of the defendant (or one of the defendants) 
would in theory provide the most appropriate jurisdiction.20 By definition, the cross-border 
conduct causes damage in the territories or in the markets of more than one State. The 
victims who are harmed by this activity are based in different States. In theory, the 
defendant’s domicile would seem to provide the only central point where all claims and 
interests can be consolidated and taken into account by a single court. It would also enable 
the application of one single law to the entire action, thus alleviating the claimants of the 
burden of pleading and proving several foreign laws. It would greatly simplify the creation 
of mixed classes consisting of both domestic and foreign victims.  
 
Allocating jurisdiction to any other court would require that a choice be made amongst 
potentially a large number of fora. This has the potential to create several problems. It 
could discriminate between end-consumers. The action could be brought in a Member 
State where some of the end-consumers are domiciled, but not others. Moreover, allocating 
jurisdiction to more than one court could mean that collective redress proceedings may 
potentially be initiated concurrently in different Member States raising the issue of parallel 
proceedings and irreconcilable judgments.  
  
                                                                
20 Chapter 2, section 2.2, page 45. 
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The arguments in favour of the domicile of the defendant are not entirely robust. The rule 
clearly favours the defendant. This was intentional in the structuring of the Brussels 
Regime, having taken the actor sequitur forum rei as its foundation. The Brussels Regime 
operates on the basis that the defendant should have a reasonable expectation of where they 
are likely to be sued. However, it has the potential to put claimants at a tactical 
disadvantage. The defendant will generally be left in an economically strong position and 
would benefit from the practicality of their home jurisdiction. Meanwhile, foreign class 
members suffer from high costs and the many risks associated with litigation abroad. 
Moreover, jurisdiction at the domicile of the defendant may give the wrong incentives. 
Even though it is unlikely, undertakings may deliberately choose to incorporate or take 
their seat in countries which do not provide for any collective redress mechanisms.    
 
An exclusive jurisdiction was also considered. However, in trying to create a jurisdictional 
rule exclusive to cross-border collective redress, it is difficult to locate a forum (other than 
at the domicile of the defendant) which effectively concentrates and consolidates all 
claims. One suggestion was to create a rule based on the Member State or market which is 
most affected by the anticompetitive conduct. However, such a concentrating rule may risk 
attributing jurisdiction only to Member States which have large markets, where harmful 
activities are felt on a wider basis. Injured parties from smaller markets would never enjoy 
the benefit of bringing collective proceedings in their home Member State.21 
 
Therefore, under the current regime, the most appropriate forum is the domicile of the 
defendant.   
 
                                                                
21 Chapter 2, section 2.3, page 55. 
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In the light of private international law principles which lend themselves to the choice of 
more than one forum, it was considered that greater guidance, communication and 
interaction between the Member States should be considered in order to ensure that the 
most legitimate venue is seised.22 This kind of cooperation has been recognised as 
beneficial in both the US and Canada. In the US, for example, the Manual for Complex 
Litigation provides guidance for judges when related proceedings are lodged within 
different courts. When consolidation is unavailable, judges should coordinate their 
proceedings in order to avoid duplication and conflicts. The Manual stresses that the need 
to coordinate is especially acute where overlapping or multiple identical class actions are 
filed in more than one court. It goes on to suggest that as a minimum, judges should 
exchange case materials such as master pleadings, questionnaires, and discovery protocols. 
In Canada, procedures are in place to encourage informal cooperation between class 
counsel.  
 
Coordination and communication could further be reinforced by a central registry of 
collective actions in the EU. The creation of a registry in Canada acts as a clearing house 
for lawyers to consult in order to determine the existence of collective proceedings and 
avoid the filing of parallel cross-border proceedings. In the context of the EU, a registry 
could be established and managed by a pre-existing EU body such as the European Judicial 
Network [EJN]. Note that the Recommendation already suggests that the Member States 
should establish a national registry of collective redress actions.   
 
The EU may also consider the possibility of assigning to one body the role of managing 
cross-border collective actions. The US has a Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
[MDL Panel]. There may be scope for the EJN to operate in a similar way to the MDL 
                                                                
22 Chapter 2, section 2.7. 
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Panel and to make decisions regarding the transfer and consolidation of proceedings. 
Coupled with management of a central registry, the EJN would have an ability to assess 
fully the appropriateness of consolidating a case in an attempt to reduce parallel litigation.  
 
Outside of the Brussels Regime, this thesis considered a range of different options in order 
to facilitate the most appropriate forum to remedy cross-border mass harm situations.  
 
The first option concerned the operation of collective redress outside of the traditional 
court setting. More specifically, collective arbitration was considered. In the US, class 
arbitration is a well-known device. The advantage of collective arbitration over the 
traditional court process is that a procedure could be designed free from interference from 
Member States. It was also considered that the supranational element of international 
collective arbitration would, prima facie, alleviate concerns associated with forum 
shopping and the potential diversity associated with private enforcement of competition 
law by the national courts.23  
 
However, the whole point of arbitration is that it is a consensual practice. One wonders 
whether a well-informed undertaking would elect to proceed to arbitration at all if it knew 
that it would have to do so on a collective basis. The answer is probably not. Apathy most 
likely prevails. Collective arbitration is a high cost and high stakes process with an 
uncertain preclusive effect on collective members. Businesses would likely oppose 
collective arbitration. The US Supreme Court has supported class action waivers in spite of 
there being no practical alternative to seek a remedy. Should the EU take a similar 
approach, it is submitted that collective arbitration would not be appropriate.24   
                                                                
23 Chapter 3, section 3.1. 
24 Chapter 3, section 3.7. 
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When researching the appropriate forum and the necessary procedures to ensure a suitable 
remedy, it was important to consider consumer attitudes and expectations. In many cases 
end-consumers would be of the opinion that the effort of taking steps to claim their share 
of compensation would far outweigh and be disproportionate to the amount that they 
would actually receive.25 It may sometimes be difficult to identify every collective member 
and it could be prohibitively expensive to distribute what are essentially nominal damages 
to a large collective. The question then remains as to what happens to the large residue of 
unclaimed funds. The remedy put forward was the cy-pres doctrine.26 In Europe, an 
adapted cy-pres mechanism could make sure that a) compensation is made available for a 
period to those who want to claim it and b) that unclaimed funds do not revert to 
defendants, deterring undertakings from future anticompetitive conduct. The concern about 
cy-pres awards is that the residue is allocated to a charity which has no meaningful 
connection to the case at hand. A cautious approach is therefore warranted. This could be 
overcome by instead allocating the funds to the consumer association which has acted on 
behalf of the collective. This would provide consumer associations with the incentive to 
reinvest the funds into future litigation. It would bolster the effectiveness of private 
enforcement and would vindicate the rights of end-consumers, perhaps not individually, 
but in the much broader sense, acting in the public interest.  
 
This thesis also considered that compensation does not always have to be exclusive to 
private enforcement of competition law. It was considered that at the end of the public 
investigation, the competition authority should be able to impose not only a fine but also 
award a certain form of compensation to the injured parties.27 In essence, this means 
                                                                
25 Chapter 4, sections 4.2 to 4.4. 
26 Chapter 4, sections 4.5 to 4.6. 
27 Chapter 5, section 5.2. 
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blurring the boundaries between public and private enforcement. However, in a situation 
which faces diversity across different legal systems, forum shopping, end-consumer apathy 
and procedural obstacles (incentives to litigate and the financial risk associated with losing 
a claim) public compensatory measures could be one of a range of methods used to bolster 
effective redress.  
 
Finally, it was considered that given the diversity of the EU Member States’ approach 
towards collective redress, it may be desirable to have all of the cross-border collective 
claims for damages suffered as a result of anticompetitive behaviour heard in a centralised 
supranational EU Competition Court.28 In designing a Competition Court with powers to 
adjudicate cross-border collective claims, EU Member States may request safeguards 
against the kind of US-style litigation which can sometimes be viewed as vexatious and 
abusive. However, one cannot ignore the success of private enforcement in the US against 
the paucity of claims in the EU. Perhaps one could learn (albeit cautiously) from the 
experience across the Atlantic. Slowly, the EU could import ideas such as punitive 
damages in order to encourage collective cases.29 A centralised forum could monitor this in 
a controlled environment. A single forum would ensure consistency in interpretation and a 
coherent body of law. There would be no opportunity for forum shopping given that only 
one forum in the EU would have full jurisdiction and expert judges could develop their 
own methods of striking down claims which are abusive and have little merit.  
 
It is acknowledged that an EU Competition Court poses many difficulties. The UPC and 
the EU Civil Service Tribunal which have been used as ideas for the creation of an EU 
Competition Court are not perfect examples. The former has faced strong criticism from 
                                                                
28 Chapter 6. 
29 Chapter 6, section 6.12. 
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stakeholders while the latter has been abolished. An in depth analysis of these courts has 
shown the types of trials and tribulations such a proposed forum may face. However, given 
the potential for forum shopping, the diversity of Member States and the paucity of claims, 
it is submitted that a centralised forum would be the ideal solution. 
 
7.5 Ranking of ideas developed in this thesis 
 
A Competition Court would be the ideal solution. If forum shopping is to be overcome, 
then a single forum dealing with cross-border collective redress would be the ultimate 
remedy. Expert judges, a coherent body of case law and one set of substantive and 
procedural rules would transform cross-border collective redress into an effective 
vindicator of end-consumer harm. 
 
If this is not possible, then several developments must happen. First, greater cooperation 
between the Member State courts must be engaged and, where possible, collective claims 
must be consolidated and allocated to the most appropriate forum. Where consolidation is 
not possible, the Member State courts must engage in close communication to avoid 
irreconcilable disputes. One way to ensure this would be to have an appointed case-handler 
to ensure that similar claims arising out of the same infringement are allocated to 
appropriate fora and orchestrated in a consistent manner.  
 
Finally, this thesis advocates greater flexibility. Whether a Competition Court is developed 
or Member States continue be able to adjudicate collective claims, measures must be 
adopted in order to facilitate more effective redress. The investment of unclaimed damages 
in the financing of litigation led by authorised consumer bodies would help to alleviate the 
financial strain on these entities and encourage them to come forward with more claims on 
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behalf of consumers. Moreover, the provision of compensatory powers to competition 
authorities could bolster private enforcement and be an effective ancillary mechanism 
towards the vindication end-consumer rights.  
 
7.6 Final remarks 
 
The conflicts-of-laws have the potential encourage forum shopping. Whether they actually 
do is a different story given the paucity of claims. The potential to eliminate forum 
shopping could be ensured by allocating the case to the appropriate forum. A Competition 
Court is the ideal solution. The EU has a single market. However, it does not have a single 
legal market. It could grow a body of coherent law in a controlled, expert environment.  
 
Aside from the appropriate forum, one needs to consider the appropriate procedures. The 
reality is that end-consumers will not come forward for a minimal sum of compensation. 
Therefore, a next-best scenario has to be considered. A cy-pres doctrine which distributes 
the residue to consumer associations so that they can reinvest the funds into future 
litigation would bolster private enforcement. Moreover, greater interaction and flexibility 
between public and private enforcement could provide more effective means of vindicating 
the rights of collective victims. 
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